SB75 - Relating to the resilience of the electric grid and certain municipalities.

      S.B. No. 75         AN ACT   relating to the resilience of the electric grid and certain   municipalities.          BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:          SECTION 1.  The legislature finds that:                (1)  electric grid outages threaten the lives of the   citizens of this state and pose a disproportionately large risk to:                      (A)  the elderly, vulnerable, and underprivileged   within this state; and                      (B)  communities facing disproportionate   environmental health burdens and population vulnerabilities   relating to facilities such as chemical plants and refineries that   can become environmental disaster areas when taken off-line due to   loss of electricity;                (2)  the 16 critical infrastructure sectors identified   in President Barack Obama's Presidential Policy Directive   "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience" (PPD-21)   (chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical   manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services,   energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government   facilities, health care and public health, information technology,   nuclear reactors, materials, and waste, transportation systems,   water and wastewater systems) depend on the electric grid in this   state and make the grid's protection vital to the economy of this   nation and homeland security;                (3)  the power outage that occurred in this state in   February 2021 caused:                      (A)  death and suffering in this state;                      (B)  economic loss to this state's economy;                      (C)  impacts to all critical infrastructures in   this state;                      (D)  the dispatch of generation units that likely   exceeded limits established by the Environmental Protection Agency   for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury, and carbon monoxide   emissions and wastewater release limits;                      (E)  radically increased pricing of electricity   and made electric power bills unaffordable to many customers across   this state; and                      (F)  exacerbation of COVID-19 pandemic risk by   forcing many of the state's citizens to consolidate at warming   centers and in other small spaces where warmth for survival   superseded social distancing protocols;                (4)  a previous large-scale power outage occurred in   this state in February 2011 during which 4.4 million customers were   affected;                (5)  this state is uniquely positioned to prevent power   outages because this state is a net exporter of energy and is the   only state with an electric grid almost exclusively within its   territorial boundaries;                (6)  the 2011 and 2021 power outages call into   question:                      (A)  whether too much risk has been accepted   regarding weatherization of electric generation infrastructure;                      (B)  whether this state lacks the internal   distribution structure and control systems to manage rolling   outages; and                      (C)  whether sufficient resources have been   allocated toward overall grid resilience;                (7)  public confidence in the resilience of the   electric grid in this state is essential to ensuring economic   prosperity, domestic tranquility, continuity of government, and   life-sustaining systems;                (8)  a resilient electric grid that offers businesses   in this state continuity of operations in the event of a natural or   man-made disaster will be an unrivaled attraction for businesses to   expand or move their operations to this state;                (9)  a resilient electric grid that can operate in the   event of a natural or man-made disaster will protect important   facets of this state, including its military installations and   environment;                (10)  current market incentives and regulations are not   sufficient for electric utilities to:                      (A)  prioritize grid security and resilience; and                      (B)  protect the grid against hazards;                (11)  protection of the electric grid in this state   against hazards would assure businesses and the citizens of this   state that the "lights will be back on first in Texas" in the event   of a nationwide catastrophe affecting electric infrastructure,   sparing this state from catastrophic societal and environmental   consequences; and                (12)  when this state begins implementation of the plan   for all hazards resilience described by Section 44.007, Utilities   Code, as added by this Act, to protect the electric grid in this   state, short-term and long-term economic benefits will far exceed   even the most optimistic estimates of the conventional economic   incentives provided by tax abatements to attract businesses to this   state.          SECTION 2.  Section 38.077, Utilities Code, is amended to   read as follows:          Sec. 38.077.   RELIABILITY [ LOAD SHEDDING ] EXERCISES.  (a)   In this section, "critical facility" means a transmission   substation and any associated control centers that, if rendered   inoperable or damaged because of a physical attack, could cause   widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading   outages within an interconnection.           (b)   The commission and the independent organization   certified for the ERCOT power region under Section 39.151  shall   conduct simulated or tabletop load shedding exercises with   providers of electric generation service and transmission and   distribution service in the ERCOT power region.          [ (b) ]  The commission shall ensure that each year at least   one simulated or tabletop load shedding  exercise is conducted   during a summer month and one simulated or tabletop load shedding     exercise is conducted during a winter month.           (c)     The commission and the independent organization   certified for the ERCOT power region under Section 39.151 shall   conduct simulated or tabletop exercises with providers of electric   generation service and transmission and distribution service in the   ERCOT power region to mitigate and prepare for a threat of an attack   or an actual physical attack on a critical facility. The exercises   required by this subsection are in addition to the exercises   required by Subsection (b) and any requirements of the North   American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure   Protection plan standards. The commission and the independent   organization shall conduct the exercises under this subsection at   least once every two years.           (d)     A simulated or tabletop exercise conducted under   Subsection (c) must identify the roles and responsibilities of the   following in the event of a threat of an attack or an actual   physical attack on a critical facility:                 (1)  transmission and distribution service providers;                 (2)  providers of electric generation service;                 (3)  law enforcement;                 (4)     the independent organization certified for the   ERCOT power region under Section 39.151; and                 (5)  the commission.           (e)     A transmission and distribution service provider is not   required to disclose the specific location of the provider's   critical substations to the commission or the independent   organization certified for the ERCOT power region under Section   39.151 for the purposes of a simulated or tabletop exercise   conducted under Subsection (c).           (f)     Each provider of electric generation service and of   transmission and distribution service that participates in a   simulated or tabletop exercise conducted under Subsection (c) shall   provide to the independent organization certified for the ERCOT   power region under Section 39.151 a written attestation that the   provider has coordinated with law enforcement when identifying   roles and responsibilities under Subsection (d).            SECTION 3.  Subtitle B, Title 2, Utilities Code, is amended   by adding Chapter 44 to read as follows:   CHAPTER 44. GRID RESILIENCE           Sec. 44.001.  DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:                 (1)  "All hazards" means:                       (A)     terrestrial weather, including wind,   hurricanes, tornadoes, flooding, ice storms, extended cold weather   events, heat waves, and wildfires;                       (B)     seismic events, including earthquakes and   tsunamis;                       (C)     physical threats, including terrorist   attacks with direct fire, drones, explosives, and other methods of   physical sabotage;                       (D)     cyber attacks, including malware attacks and   hacking of unprotected or compromised information technology   networks;                       (E)     manipulation of operational technology   devices, including sensors, actuators, and drives;                       (F)     electromagnetic threats through man-made   radio frequency weapons, high-altitude nuclear electromagnetic   pulses, and naturally occurring geomagnetic disturbances;                       (G)     electric generation supply chain   vulnerabilities, including insecure or inadequate fuel   transportation or storage; and                       (H)     insider threats caused by compromised or   hostile personnel working within government or the utility   industry.                 (2)     "Micro-grid" means a group of interconnected loads   and distributed energy resources inside clearly defined electrical   boundaries.                 (3)     "Public utility"   means an entity that generates,   transmits, or distributes electric energy to the public, including   an ele [Text truncated for display. 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