Federal
Recognizing the People's Republic of China as the greatest foreign threat to United States peace, security, and stability.
Source: Congress.gov ·
1,298 words in original text
Plain English summary not yet available
The full original text is available below. Check back soon as we process this bill.
IV
116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H. CON. RES. 121
Recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the greatest foreign threat
to United States peace, security, and stability.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OCTOBER 20, 2020
Mr. BIGGS submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the greatest
foreign threat to United States peace, security, and stability.
Whereas the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a popu-
lation of approximately 1,400,000,000, compared to the
United States population of approximately 330,000,000;
Whereas the PRC’s economy is the second largest in the
world, as measured by gross domestic product (GDP), be-
hind only the United States;
Whereas the PRC’s GDP will likely surpass United States
GDP in the coming decades;
Whereas the PRC has the largest active duty military in the
world;
Whereas the PRC has committed to aggressively modernizing
its military capabilities in the coming decades;
VerDate Sep 11 2014
20:50 Oct 20, 2020
Jkt 019200
PO 00000
Frm 00001
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6300
E:\BILLS\HC121.IH
HC121
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2
•HCON 121 IH
Whereas the PRC possesses nuclear-capable intercontinental
ballistic missiles;
Whereas the PRC does not share the democratic or free mar-
ket values of the United States;
Whereas Xi Jinping has been the de facto paramount leader
of the PRC since November 2012, when he attained the
positions of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist
Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission;
Whereas Xi became the head of state of the PRC in March
2013, with a title usually labeled ‘‘President’’ in Western
sources;
Whereas President Xi has decisively broken with the foreign
policy restraint practiced by his immediate predecessors;
Whereas President Xi declared in a 2018 speech before the
National People’s Congress that the PRC ‘‘must ride on
the mighty east wind of the new era, charge forward with
a full tank and steadily steer the wheel with full power’’;
Whereas the PRC has neoimperial ambitions to spread its
power throughout the world;
Whereas the PRC launched the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) in 2013, to offer financing for transportation and
energy infrastructure projects in dozens of countries;
Whereas many of the BRI-participating countries are poor,
unstable, or potentially vulnerable to debt dependence on
Beijing;
Whereas the United States has very sensitive strategic rela-
tionships with many BRI-participating countries, includ-
ing Afghanistan and Pakistan;
Whereas the PRC has released few details about the BRI, de-
spite widespread calls from the United States, the Inter-
VerDate Sep 11 2014
20:50 Oct 20, 2020
Jkt 019200
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6300
E:\BILLS\HC121.IH
HC121
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
3
•HCON 121 IH
national Monetary Fund, and other governments and
multinational organizations for greater transparency;
Whereas while the PRC has been opaque about the BRI, it
has been very clear about its ambitions in the South
China Sea in recent years;
Whereas the PRC claims ‘‘indisputable sovereignty over the
South China Sea islands and their adjacent waters’’;
Whereas this assertion of sovereignty is not, in fact, ‘‘indis-
putable’’ to the other countries in the region;
Whereas Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and
the Philippines, a United States treaty ally, all dispute
the PRC’s expansive South China Sea claims;
Whereas the PRC continues to construct militarized artificial
islands in the South China Sea to bolster its position;
Whereas trillions of dollars of ship-borne commerce pass
through the South China Sea each year, including to
United States markets;
Whereas the PRC continues to aggressively claim sovereignty
over Taiwan;
Whereas, on September 30, 2020, the PRC’s Premier, Li
Keqiang, proclaimed that ‘‘we will . . . resolutely oppose
and curb any ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist behaviors
and external interference, . . . and promote . . . the re-
unification of the motherland’’;
Whereas Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over Taiwan are
belied by the fact that the Taiwanese people have inde-
pendently governed their island for over 70 years;
Whereas Taiwan is a vitally important friend and regional se-
curity partner of the United States;
VerDate Sep 11 2014
20:50 Oct 20, 2020
Jkt 019200
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6300
E:\BILLS\HC121.IH
HC121
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
4
•HCON 121 IH
Whereas the Taiwan-United States bond has been solidified
by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Taiwan Travel Act, and
the ‘‘Six Assurances’’ first promulgated by the Reagan
administration in 1982;
Whereas the PRC continues to curtail the rights of the resi-
dents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
Whereas, on June 30, 2020, the PRC’s National People’s
Congress passed an expansive national security law to
broadly criminalize democratic participation and protest
in Hong Kong;
Whereas this law and other efforts to curtail democratic par-
ticipation in Hong Kong violates the PRC’s commitments
in 1984 and 1997 to the United Kingdom to respect
Hong Kong’s long tradition of economic and democratic
freedoms for 50 years, beginning on July 1, 1997;
Whereas the Beijing government’s increasingly hostile actions
threaten the 85,000 American residents and 1,300
United States firms operating in Hong Kong;
Whereas, in addition to the above and other geostrategic
threats, the PRC wields enormous influence over the
United States economy;
Whereas the PRC holds over $1,000,000,000,000 in United
States Treasury bonds, more than any other foreign na-
tion except Japan;
Whereas in recent years the PRC has maintained a massive
trade surplus over the United States, valued at
$345,600,000,000 in 2019, by manipulating its currency
and maintaining unreasonably high tariffs, among other
tactics;
VerDate Sep 11 2014
20:50 Oct 20, 2020
Jkt 019200
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6300
E:\BILLS\HC121.IH
HC121
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
5
•HCON 121 IH
Whereas the PRC routinely pressures United States compa-
nies entering its market to cede their intellectual property
and market licensing rights;
Whereas the PRC frequently carries out cyberattacks on
United States companies to steal trade secrets or other
sensitive information it cannot obtain by other means;
Whereas cyberattacks originating from the PRC target not
only companies, but also United States Government and
United States defense interests, academic institutions,
nonprofit organizations, and average citizens; and
Whereas it is likely that the PRC has access to the personal
data of most citizens of the United States: Now, there-
fore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
1
concurring), That Congress—
2
(1) recognizes that the People’s Republic of
3
China (PRC) currently poses the greatest foreign
4
threat to United States peace, security, and stability;
5
(2) recognizes that the PRC, regardless of fu-
6
ture leadership, will likely continue to be a major
7
rival of the United States in the coming decades,
8
due to the enormous cumulative size and scale of its
9
population, economy, and military capabilities; and
10
(3) supports the Trump administration’s overall
11
strategic approach to the PRC, grounded in prin-
12
cipled realism and firm-but-measured competitive
13
engagement whenever United States national inter-
14
VerDate Sep 11 2014
20:50 Oct 20, 2020
Jkt 019200
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\HC121.IH
HC121
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
6
•HCON 121 IH
ests are at stake, that has been outlined in sources
1
including but not limited to—
2
(A) the United States Strategic Approach
3
to the People’s Republic of China (May 2020);
4
(B) the National Defense Strategy of the
5
United States of America (October 2018);
6
(C) the National Cyber Strategy of the
7
United States of America (September 2018);
8
and
9
(D) the National Security Strategy of the
10
United States of America (December 2017).
11
Æ
VerDate Sep 11 2014
20:50 Oct 20, 2020
Jkt 019200
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6301
E:\BILLS\HC121.IH
HC121
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
Important: This plain English summary was generated by AI and is provided for informational purposes only.
It is not legal advice. Always consult the official bill text on Congress.gov
or a qualified attorney for legal matters.