Taiwan Defense Act

I 116TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION H. R. 7423 To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, and for other purposes. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUNE 30, 2020 Mr. GALLAGHER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Com- mittee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdic- tion of the committee concerned A BILL To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Defense Act’’. 4 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 5 In this Act: 6 (1) DENY.—The term ‘‘deny’’ means to use 7 combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ul- 8 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:11 Jul 23, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7423.IH H7423 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 7423 IH timately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic 1 of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, 2 resulting in— 3 (A) the termination of hostilities or, at a 4 minimum, the termination of the attempted fait 5 accompli; or 6 (B) the neutralization of the ability of the 7 People’s Republic of China to execute a fait 8 accompli against Taiwan. 9 (2) FAIT ACCOMPLI.—The term ‘‘fait accompli’’ 10 means the strategy of the People’s Republic of 11 China designed to allow the People’s Republic of 12 China to use military force to seize control of Tai- 13 wan before the United States Armed Forces are able 14 to respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring 15 an effective combined joint response by the United 16 States Armed Forces by convincing the United 17 States that mounting such a response would be pro- 18 hibitively difficult or costly. 19 SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 20 Congress makes the following findings: 21 (1) Taiwan is— 22 (A) a beacon of democracy in Asia; and 23 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:11 Jul 23, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7423.IH H7423 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 7423 IH (B) a steadfast partner of the United 1 States in the common pursuit of a free and 2 open Indo-Pacific region in which— 3 (i) all societies enjoy sovereign auton- 4 omy; 5 (ii) people live securely, prosperously, 6 and with dignity; and 7 (iii) the societies of the region rise 8 and fall not by coercion but on the basis 9 of peaceful competition. 10 (2) If the Government of the People’s Republic 11 of China were to use military force to compel the 12 unification of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of 13 China— 14 (A) the world would lose one of the great 15 champions of freedom and democracy; 16 (B) the United States and allies and part- 17 ners of the United States would face severe dif- 18 ficulty in maintaining favorable balances of 19 power relative to the People’s Republic of China 20 in Northeast and Southeast Asia; and 21 (C) as the balance of power in the Indo- 22 Pacific region shifted in favor of the People’s 23 Republic of China, the Government of the Peo- 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:11 Jul 23, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7423.IH H7423 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 7423 IH ple’s Republic of China would possess an in- 1 creasing ability— 2 (i) to impose its will throughout the 3 Indo-Pacific region; and 4 (ii) to prevent United States access to 5 key trade routes and markets in the Indo- 6 Pacific region, thereby imposing severe 7 economic hardship on middle-class and 8 working-class people of the United States 9 and undermining the American way of life. 10 (3) In January 2019, the Defense Intelligence 11 Agency assessed that the ‘‘longstanding’’ intent of 12 the Government of the People’s Republic of China to 13 compel the unification of Taiwan with the People’s 14 Republic of China, and deter any attempt by Taiwan 15 to declare independence, was the ‘‘primary driver for 16 China’s military modernization’’. 17 (4) The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific 18 Strategy Report released in June 2019, states that 19 the Government of the People’s Republic of China is 20 ‘‘preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with 21 the mainland by force, while simultaneously deter- 22 ring, delaying, or denying any third-party interven- 23 tion on Taiwan’s behalf’’. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:11 Jul 23, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7423.IH H7423 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 7423 IH (5) Department of Defense statements and pub- 1 lications indicate that the Government of the Peo- 2 ple’s Republic of China is developing the plans and 3 capabilities required to employ the fait accompli 4 strategy to compel the unification of Taiwan with 5 the People’s Republic of China, including— 6 (A) the assessment by the Defense Science 7 Board in 2017 that the Government of the Peo- 8 ple’s Republic of China had adopted a theory of 9 victory whereby once conflict with the United 10 States appeared inevitable, as might be the case 11 if the Government of the People’s Republic of 12 China attempted to use military force to compel 13 the unification of Taiwan with the People’s Re- 14 public of China, then the Government of the 15 People’s Republic of China ‘‘will attempt to 16 achieve a decisive outcome very quickly, pre- 17 senting the United States and its allies with a 18 fait accompli’’ and ‘‘then seek to demonstrate 19 that the United States and its allies will incur 20 significant costs in seeking to reverse that out- 21 come’’; 22 (B) the assessment in the Indo-Pacific 23 Strategy Report that, if the Government of the 24 People’s Republic of China or another compet- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:11 Jul 23, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7423.IH H7423 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 7423 IH itor in the Indo-Pacific region decides ‘‘to ad- 1 vance their interests through force, they are 2 likely to enjoy a local military advantage at the 3 onset of conflict. In a fait accompli scenario, 4 competitors would seek to employ their capabili- 5 ties quickly to achieve limited objectives and 6 forestall a response from the United States and 7 its allies and partners’’; 8 (C) testimony by then Acting Secretary of 9 Defense Patrick Shanahan in March 2019 10 that— 11 (i) the Government of the People’s 12 Republic of China ‘‘has made investments 13 specifically intended to offset U.S. advan- 14 tages’’; and 15 (ii) if deployed in the initial stages of 16 a conflict, ‘‘these capabilities could seek to 17 achieve a ‘fait accompli’ that would make 18 reversing Chinese gains more difficult, 19 militarily and politically’’; and 20 (D) testimony by then Commanding Gen- 21 eral of Marine Corps Combat Development 22 Command Lieutenant General David Berger in 23 April 2019 that peer adversaries of the United 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:11 Jul 23, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7423.IH H7423 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 7 •HR 7423 IH States seek ‘‘to create strategic dilemmas 1 through fait accompli scenarios’’. 2 (6) In March 2019, then Acting Secretary of 3 Defense Patrick Shanahan testified that the imple- 4 mentation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy 5 would ensure the United States has ‘‘the capabili- 6 ties, posture, and employment of forces’’ required to 7 prevent a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of 8 China. 9 (7) According to the Indo-Pacific Strategy Re- 10 port, ‘‘[t]he National Defense Strategy implicitly ac- 11 knowledges the most stressing potential scenarios 12 will occur along our competitors’ peripheries’’. An 13 attempted fait accompli by the People’s Republic of 14 China against Taiwan should therefore be expected 15 to constitute a ‘‘most stressing’’ potential scenario 16 for the United States Armed Forces. 17 (8) The National Defense Strategy Commission 18 found that the United States Armed Forces must be 19 postured ‘‘to deter and prevent a fait accompli by an 20 agile opportunistic adversary’’ in order to compete 21 effectively in the Indo-Pacific region and stated that 22 ‘‘the United States must develop new operational 23 concepts to achieve strategic advantage, including by 24 addressing the ability of aggressive regimes to 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:11 Jul 23, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7423.IH H7423 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 8 •HR 7423 IH achieve a fait accompli against states on their pe- 1 riphery,’’ in recognition of— 2 (A) the unique challenges to the United 3 States Armed Forces posed by the employment 4 of the fait accompli strategy by the Government 5 of the People’s Republic of China or another 6 strategic competitor; and 7 (B) the consequent urgent need for new 8 thinking and steady focus by the Department of 9 Defense on ensuring the ability of the United 10 States Armed Forces to prevent an adversary 11 from using the fait accompli strategy to ad- 12 vance its interests at the expense of those of the 13 United States. 14 (9) Department of Defense strategic guidance 15 and official statements underscore the essential role 16 that denial operations will play in preventing a fait 17 accompli by the People’s Republic of China against 18 Taiwan, including— 19 (A) the incorporation in the National De- 20 fense Strategy of the Global Operating Model 21 that includes a ‘‘blunt layer’’ of combat-credible 22 forward forces postured and employed to 23 ‘‘delay, degrade, or deny adversary aggression’’; 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:11 Jul 23, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7423.IH H7423 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 9 •HR 7423 IH (B) the conclusion by the National Defense 1 Strategy Commission that the Department of 2 Defense must position ‘‘substantial capability 3 forward’’ in the form of the ‘‘blunt layer’’ in- 4 cluded in the Global Operating Model to ‘‘deter 5 and prevent a fait accompli’’; 6 (C) the statement for the record by the 7 Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific 8 Command, Admiral Phil Davidson, in April 9 2018 in which he concludes, ‘‘[d]ue to the dis- 10 tances involved in the Indo-Pacific, we cannot 11 rely solely on surge forces from the continental 12 United States to deter Chinese aggression or 13 prevent a fait accompli. PACOM must maintain 14 a robust blunt layer that effectively deters Chi- 15 nese aggression in the Indo-Pacific’’; 16 (D) the Joint Operating Concept for De- 17 terrence Operations, which states that forward- 18 deployed forces, such as those included in the 19 blunt layer of the Global Operating Model and 20 referenced by the National Defense Strategy 21 Commission and the Commander of the United 22 States Indo-Pacific Command, contribute to 23 ‘‘denying benefits’’ and thereby reduce ‘‘the 24 likelihood of an adversary achieving strategic or 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:11 Jul 23, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7423.IH H7423 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 10 •HR 7423 IH tactical surprise, thus helping to prevent adver- 1 sary decisionmakers from concluding they 2 might achieve a military fait accompli that 3 could be extremely costly for the [United 4 States] to reverse by force’’; 5 (E) the United States Army Multi-Domain 6 Operations concept document, which states that 7 the Armed Forces must demonstrate the capa- 8 bility ‘‘to immediately deny a fait accompli at- 9 tack’’ in order to deter a near-peer adversary; 10 and 11 (F) the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 12 report, which states that forward-deployed 13 forces ‘‘that can continue to operate inside an 14 adversary’s long-range precision-fire weapons 15 engagement zone (WEZ) are more operationally 16 relevant than forces which must rapidly maneu- 17 ver to positions outside the WEZ in order to re- 18 main survivable,’’ and that such ‘‘stand-in’’ 19 forces possess the capability to ‘‘attrite adver- 20 sary forces, enable joint force access require- 21 ments, complicate targeting and consume adver- 22 sary [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- 23 sance] resources, and prevent fait accompli sce- 24 narios’’. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:11 Jul 23, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7423.IH H7423 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 11 •HR 7423 IH SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 1 It is the sense of Congress that— 2 (1) the ability of the United States to uphold 3 a free and open Indo-Pacific region would be se- 4 verely compromised if the Government of the Peo- 5 ple’s Republic of China were able to compel the uni- 6 fication of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of 7 China, particularly if the People’s Republic of China 8 were able to do so by military force; 9 (2) the loss by the United States of the ability 10 to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region 11 would result in the significantly increased vulner- 12 ability of the middle-class and working-class people 13 of the United States and the allies and partners of 14 the United States to economic coercion by the Gov- 15 ernment of the People’s Republic of China; 16 (3) the fate of Taiwan is therefore crucially 17 linked to the fates of all countries in the Indo-Pa- 18 cific region, including to the fate of the United 19 States; 20 (4) under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 21 3301 et seq.), it is the policy of the United States 22 to consider any effort to determine the future of 23 Taiwan by other than peaceful means to be of grave 24 concern to the United States; 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:11 Jul 23, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7423.IH H7423 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 12 •HR 7423 IH (5) since 1979, the United States Government 1 has consistently upheld the commitments of the 2 United States under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 3 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.); 4 (6) the National Defense Authorization Act for 5 Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) reaffirms 6 that the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et 7 seq.) and the ‘‘Six Assurances’’ are the cornerstones 8 of United States relations with Taiwan; 9 (7) the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 10 et seq.) further establishes the policy of the United 11 States ‘‘to maintain the capacity of the United 12 States to resist any resort to force or other forms 13 of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the 14 social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan’’; 15 (8) the Gov [Text truncated for display. 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