HALT Act of 2020

II 116TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION S. 4045 To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United States, and for other purposes. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES JUNE 23, 2020 Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for Mr. MARKEY (for himself and Mrs. FEINSTEIN)) intro- duced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations A BILL To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United States, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Hastening Arms Limi- 4 tations Talks Act of 2020’’ or the ‘‘HALT Act of 2020’’. 5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6 Congress makes the following findings: 7 (1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an exis- 8 tential threat to humanity, a fact that led President 9 Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorba- 10 VerDate Sep 11 2014 06:41 Jul 09, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4045.IS S4045 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 2 •S 4045 IS chev to declare in a joint statement in 1987 that a 1 ‘‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 2 fought’’. 3 (2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 4 people attended the largest peace rally in United 5 States history, in support of a movement to freeze 6 and reverse the nuclear arms race, a movement that 7 helped to create the political will necessary for the 8 negotiation of several bilateral arms control treaties 9 between the United States and former Soviet Union, 10 and then the Russian Federation. Those treaties 11 contributed to strategic stability through mutual and 12 verifiable reciprocal nuclear weapons reductions. 13 (3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 14 1945, millions of people around the world have stood 15 up to demand meaningful, immediate international 16 action to halt, reduce, and eliminate the threats 17 posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing, 18 and nuclear war, to humankind and the planet. 19 (4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera- 20 tion of Nuclear Weapons done at Washington, Lon- 21 don, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483) (com- 22 monly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation 23 Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’) entered into force, which in- 24 cludes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weapon 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 06:41 Jul 09, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4045.IS S4045 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 3 •S 4045 IS states (commonly referred to as the ‘‘P5’’), among 1 other things, ‘‘to pursue negotiations in good faith 2 on effective measures relating to the cessation of the 3 nuclear arms race . . . and to nuclear disar- 4 mament’’. 5 (5) Bipartisan United States global leadership 6 has curbed the growth in the number of countries 7 possessing nuclear weapons and has slowed overall 8 vertical proliferation among countries already pos- 9 sessing nuclear weapons, as is highlighted by a more 10 than 85-percent reduction in the United States nu- 11 clear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of 12 31,255 in 1967. 13 (6) The United States testing of nuclear weap- 14 ons is no longer necessary as a result of the fol- 15 lowing major technical developments since the Sen- 16 ate’s consideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear- 17 Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to as the 18 ‘‘CTBT’’) in 1999: 19 (A) The verification architecture of the 20 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Orga- 21 nization (commonly referred to as the 22 ‘‘CTBTO’’)— 23 (i) has made significant advance- 24 ments, as seen through its network of 300 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 06:41 Jul 09, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4045.IS S4045 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 4 •S 4045 IS International Monitoring Stations and its 1 International Data Centre, which together 2 provide for the near instantaneous detec- 3 tion of nuclear explosives tests, including 4 all 6 such tests conducted by North Korea 5 between 2006 and 2017; and 6 (ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 7 days a week. 8 (B) Since the United States signed the 9 CTBT, confidence has grown in the science- 10 based Stockpile Stewardship and Management 11 Plan of the Department of Energy, which forms 12 the basis of annual certifications to the Presi- 13 dent regarding the continual safety, security, 14 and effectiveness of the United States nuclear 15 deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, 16 leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest 17 Moniz to remark in 2015 that ‘‘lab directors 18 today now state that they certainly understand 19 much more about how nuclear weapons work 20 than during the period of nuclear testing’’. 21 (7) Despite the progress made to reduce the 22 number and role of, and risks posed by, nuclear 23 weapons, and to halt the Cold War-era nuclear arms 24 race, tensions between countries that possess nuclear 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 06:41 Jul 09, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4045.IS S4045 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 5 •S 4045 IS weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk reduction 1 treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles of 2 weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a quali- 3 tative global nuclear arms race is now underway 4 with each of the countries that possess nuclear 5 weapons spending tens of billions of dollars each 6 year to maintain and improve their arsenals. 7 (8) The United States and the Russian Federa- 8 tion are both pursuing the development of desta- 9 bilizing types of nuclear weapons, including new 10 lower-yield nuclear weapons that are more usable, 11 and the People’s Republic of China, India, Pakistan, 12 and North Korea have each taken concerning steps 13 to diversify their more modest, but nonetheless very 14 deadly, nuclear arsenals. 15 (9) Since January 2017, President Donald 16 Trump has taken the following actions, which have 17 run counter to the objectives of the Creating an En- 18 vironment for Nuclear Disarmament (commonly re- 19 ferred to as ‘‘CEND’’) initiative that his administra- 20 tion launched in 2018: 21 (A) The release of the 2018 Nuclear Pos- 22 ture Review on February 5, 2018, which low- 23 ered the threshold for nuclear weapons use and 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 06:41 Jul 09, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4045.IS S4045 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 6 •S 4045 IS called for the development of the following new 1 nuclear weapons: 2 (i) A low-yield warhead on a sub- 3 marine-launched ballistic missile, which 4 was deployed before the date of the enact- 5 ment of this Act. 6 (ii) A sea-launched cruise missile, still 7 under development on the date of the en- 8 actment of this Act. 9 (B) The unilateral United States with- 10 drawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 11 Action (commonly referred to as the ‘‘JCPOA’’) 12 announced on May 8, 2018, which may lead to 13 the complete collapse of an agreement that had 14 verifiably closed of each of Iran’s pathways to 15 a nuclear weapon. 16 (C) The unilateral United States with- 17 drawal, completed on August 2, 2019, from the 18 Treaty Between the United States of America 19 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 20 the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 21 and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Wash- 22 ington December 8, 1987, and entered into 23 force June 1, 1988 (commonly referred to as 24 the ‘‘Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Trea- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 06:41 Jul 09, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4045.IS S4045 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 7 •S 4045 IS ty’’ or the ‘‘INF Treaty’’) in response to the 1 material breach by the Russian Federation of 2 its obligations under that Treaty, which has re- 3 moved all legal constraints on the testing, pro- 4 curement, and deployment of ground-based 5 shorter-range and intermediate-range missiles, 6 increasing the risk of a missile arms race in the 7 Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. 8 (D) The unilateral United States with- 9 drawal, announced on May 22, 2020, from the 10 Treaty on Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 11 24, 1992, and entered into force January 1, 12 2002 (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Open Skies 13 Treaty’’), which is likely to deny to United 14 States allies and partners a key confidence- 15 building measure and one of the few remaining 16 operational diplomatic forums, through the 17 Open Skies Consultative Commission, to engage 18 with the Russian Federation. 19 (10) During a May 15, 2020, National Security 20 Council meeting, one or more senior officials of the 21 Trump administration reportedly advocated that the 22 United States conduct its first nuclear explosives 23 test since 1992, as part of an effort to bring the 24 Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 06:41 Jul 09, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4045.IS S4045 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 8 •S 4045 IS China into negotiations on a trilateral arms control 1 agreement. 2 (11) A move by the United States to break its 3 moratorium on nuclear explosives testing would con- 4 flict with United Nations Security Council Resolu- 5 tion 2310, led by the United States and adopted in 6 2016, which states that any nuclear explosives test 7 would defeat the ‘‘object and purpose’’ of the CTBT 8 and called on all countries to maintain their respec- 9 tive moratoriums on such tests. 10 (12) In light of moves by the United States and 11 other countries to increase their reliance on nuclear 12 weapons, the 21st century nuclear freeze movement 13 would seek to halt the new nuclear arms race by 14 seeking conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable 15 freeze on the testing, deployment, and production of 16 nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for such weap- 17 ons. 18 (13) The United States would benefit from con- 19 clusion of a comprehensive nuclear arms agreement 20 with each of the nuclear-weapon state parties to the 21 NPT and potentially all countries that possess nu- 22 clear weapons. 23 (14) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons 24 employment strategy of the United States submitted 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 06:41 Jul 09, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4045.IS S4045 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 9 •S 4045 IS under section 492 of title 10, United States Code, 1 determined that it is possible to ensure the security 2 of the United States and allies and partners of the 3 United States and maintain a strong and credible 4 strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a 1⁄3 5 reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level 6 established in the Treaty between the United States 7 of America and the Russian Federation on Measures 8 for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Stra- 9 tegic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and en- 10 tered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly re- 11 ferred to as the ‘‘New START Treaty’’). 12 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 13 It is the policy of the United States that: 14 (1) The United States should build upon its 15 decades long, bipartisan efforts to reduce the num- 16 ber and salience of nuclear weapons by leading inter- 17 national negotiations on specific arms-reduction 18 measures as part of a 21st century global nuclear 19 freeze movement. 20 (2) The United States should immediately agree 21 to extend the New START Treaty for 5 years, until 22 February 5, 2026, through mutual agreement with 23 the Russian Federation to provide continued insight 24 into the location, movement, and disposition of stra- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 06:41 Jul 09, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4045.IS S4045 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 10 •S 4045 IS tegic delivery vehicles and deployed warheads belong- 1 ing to the Russian Federation, which would be an 2 important first step to building momentum for a 3 multilateral arms control initiative. 4 (3) Upon the successful extension of the New 5 START Treaty, the United States should engage 6 with all other countries that possess nuclear weapons 7 to negotiate and conclude future multilateral arms 8 control, disarmament, and risk reduction agree- 9 ments, which should contain some or all of the fol- 10 lowing provisions: 11 (A) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on 12 the testing, production, and further deployment 13 of all nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for 14 such weapons. 15 (B) An agreement that establishes a 16 verifiable numerical ceiling on the deployed 17 shorter-range and intermediate-range and stra- 18 tegic delivery systems (as defined by the INF 19 Treaty and the New START Treaty, respec- 20 tively) and the nuclear warheads associated 21 with such systems belonging to the P5, and to 22 the extent possible, all countries that possess 23 nuclear weapons, at August 2, 2019, levels. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 06:41 Jul 09, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4045.IS S4045 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 11 •S 4045 IS (C) An agreement by each country to 1 adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weap- 2 ons. 3 (D) An agreement on a proactive United 4 Nations Security Council resolution that ex- 5 pands access by the International Atomic En- 6 ergy Agency to any country found by the Board 7 of Governors of that Agency to be noncompliant 8 with its obligations under the NPT. 9 (E) An agreement to refrain from config- 10 uring nuclear forces in a ‘‘launch on warning’’ 11 nuclear posture allowing a country to launch a 12 ballistic missile attack in response to detection 13 by an early-warning satellite or sensor of a sus- 14 pected incoming ballistic missile. 15 (F) An agreement not to target or inter- 16 fere in the nuclear command, control, and com- 17 munications (commonly referred to as ‘‘NC3’’) 18 infrastructure of another country through a 19 cyberattack. 20 (G) An agreement on transparency meas- 21 ures or verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic 22 cruise missiles and glide vehicles that are 23 mounted on ballistic missiles. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 06:41 Jul 09, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4045.IS S4045 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 12 •S 4045 IS (H) An agreement to provide a baseline 1 and continuous exchanges detailing the aggre- 2 gate number of active nuclear weapons and as- 3 sociated systems possessed by each country. 4 (4) The United States should rejuvenate efforts 5 in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament 6 toward the negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Mate- 7 rial Treaty or Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, or 8 move negotiations to another international body or 9 f [Text truncated for display. 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