Federal
Expressing the sense of Congress that the activities of Russian national Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities pose a threat to the national interests and security of the United States and of its allies and partners.
Source: Congress.gov ·
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H. Res. 996
In the House of Representatives, U. S.,
December 3, 2020.
Whereas Yevgeniy Prigozhin is a Russian national who has
maintained close personal ties with President Vladimir
Putin since the early 2000s;
Whereas Yevgeniy Prigozhin is the patron and funder of the
Wagner Group, also known as the Private Military Com-
pany (PMC) Wagner, a Russian mercenary organization
staffed by current and former military and intelligence
officers, and the Internet Research Agency (IRA), an or-
ganization engaged in online influence operations;
Whereas the IRA has conducted online information oper-
ations against the United States in an attempt to sow di-
vision and discord among the American electorate, as well
as the electorates of our European allies and partners;
Whereas entities funded by Yevgeniy Prigozhin have been
used by the Government of the Russian Federation to
conduct military action, subversive operations, and
disinformation campaigns on its behalf while giving it an
appearance of plausible deniability;
Whereas the Wagner Group was involved in the Russian Fed-
eration’s military invasion and attempted annexation of
Ukraine’s Crimea region in February and March 2014,
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•HRES 996 EH
and in the subsequent insurgencies in the eastern
Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk;
Whereas the Wagner Group has been providing military sup-
port to the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria since
2015, fighting alongside its forces and helping it recap-
ture significant parts of the country;
Whereas, on February 7, 2018, the Wagner Group led an
armed assault on United States troops near the city of
Deir al-Zour in eastern Syria, prompting a United States
counterattack, in what has been described as ‘‘the dead-
liest U.S.-Russia clash since the Cold War’’;
Whereas the Wagner Group has supported Khalifa Haftar
and his‘‘Libyan National Army’’ by providing merce-
naries, artillery, tanks, drones, and ammunition, with
Yevgeniy Prigozhin personally attending a meeting be-
tween Haftar and Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Shoigu in Moscow on November 7, 2018;
Whereas a United Nations report made public on May 6,
2020, concluded that the Wagner Group has operated up
to 1,200 military contractors in Libya, including snipers
and specialized military teams, serving as ‘‘an effective
force multiplier’’ for Haftar’s army.
Whereas mercenaries from the Wagner Group were deployed
to Venezuela in January 2019 to provide support for the
regime of Nicolas Maduro in the face of popular protests
against his dictatorship;
Whereas Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities have
spearheaded operations with the intent to influence polit-
ical processes in Africa on behalf of the Government of
the Russian Federation in several countries, including
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Madagascar, South Africa, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and the
Central African Republic;
Whereas the Wagner Group has deployed mercenaries to the
Central African Republic since 2018 and has provided se-
curity detail for Central African Republic President
Faustin-Archange Touadera, including Russian national
Valery Zakharov, a former security official with close ties
to the Wagner Group, who serves as the National Secu-
rity Adviser;
Whereas, on July 31, 2018, Russian journalists Orkhan
Dzhemal, Kirill Radchenko, and Alexander Rastorguyev
were murdered in the Central African Republic while
working on a documentary about the activities of the
Wagner Group in that country;
Whereas according to an investigation by the London-based
Dossier Center, the journalists had been tracked by offi-
cers of the Central African Republic gendarmerie who
were in close communication with Russian nationals tied
to the Wagner Group, including Valery Zakharov and
Alexander Sotov;
Whereas associates of Yevgeniy Prigozhin were reported to
discuss plans to set up camps ‘‘for combat prep and
training in sabotage’’ with the goal of stoking racial vio-
lence and carrying out domestic terror attacks in the
United States in the run-up to the November 3, 2020,
presidential election;
Whereas associates of Yevgeniy Prigozhin have set up online
influence operations based in Ghana and Nigeria to tar-
get social media audiences in the United States with the
goal of inflaming racial tensions and provoking social un-
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rest in the run-up to the November 3, 2020, presidential
election;
Whereas, on December 20, 2016, the Department of the
Treasury designated Yevgeniy Prigozhin under Executive
Order 13661, ‘‘Blocking Property of Additional Persons
Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine’’, for having
‘‘materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or serv-
ices in support of, senior officials of the Russian Federa-
tion’’;
Whereas, on June 20, 2017, the Department of the Treasury
designated the Wagner Group under Executive Order
13660, ‘‘Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contrib-
uting to the Situation in Ukraine’’, for being ‘‘responsible
for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indi-
rectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, secu-
rity, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of
Ukraine’’;
Whereas, on March 15, 2018, the Department of the Treas-
ury designated Yevgeniy Prigozhin, his affiliated entities,
including the Internet Research Agency, and his subordi-
nates under Executive Order 13694, ‘‘Blocking the Prop-
erty of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Mali-
cious Cyber- Enabled Activities,’’ for being ‘‘involved in
interfering with [U.S.] election processes or institutions’’;
Whereas on July 15, 2020, under Executive Orders 13848,
13694 (as amended), and 13661, the Department of the
Treasury designated entities located in Sudan, Hong
Kong, and Thailand that have enabled Yevgeniy
Prigozhin’s ability to evade United States sanctions as
well as Prigozhin-linked entities that have attempted to
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suppress and discredit protestors seeking reforms in
Sudan;
Whereas, on September 23, 2020, pursuant to Executive Or-
ders 13848, 13694 (as amended), and 13661, the De-
partment of the Treasury designated a network of enti-
ties and individuals working on behalf of Yevgeniy
Prigozhin seeking to advance Russia’s influence in the
Central African Republic;
Whereas, on October 15, 2020, the European Union sanc-
tioned Yevgeniy Prigozhin for engaging in ‘‘and providing
support for Wagner Group’s activities in Libya, which
threaten the country’s peace, stability and security’’; and
Whereas current and former Administration officials have af-
firmed that the malign activities of Yevgeniy Prigozhin
around the world pose a significant threat to United
States national security interests: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the House of Representatives—
(1) condemns any and all attempts by the Govern-
ment of the Russian Federation and associated actors to
influence the domestic politics of other countries and sow
division among their peoples, particularly the United
States and its allies and partners;
(2) condemns the activities of Russian national
Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities that pose
a threat to the democratic values, democratic institu-
tions, and security of the United States and its allies
and partners;
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(3) urges countries and entities engaging with
Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities in business
or advisory capacities to cease these engagements;
(4) supports the additional designations made by
the Department of the Treasury on September 23, 2020,
and by the European Union on October 15, 2020, and
calls on the United States Government and the Euro-
pean Union to continue to target the ability of Yevgeniy
Prigozhin and his affiliated entities to conduct oper-
ations globally and to interfere in the democratic proc-
esses of the United States and its allies and partners;
and
(5) calls for close coordination between the United
States Government and the governments of United
States allies and partners to ensure that sanctions re-
gimes against Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated enti-
ties are enforced and coordinated.
Attest:
Clerk.
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