HALT Act of 2020

I 116TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION H. R. 7260 To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United States, and for other purposes. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUNE 18, 2020 Mr. MCGOVERN (for himself, Ms. TITUS, and Mr. BLUMENAUER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Serv- ices, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consider- ation of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned A BILL To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United States, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Hastening Arms Limi- 4 tations Talks Act of 2020’’ or the ‘‘HALT Act of 2020’’. 5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6 Congress makes the following findings: 7 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:22 Jul 12, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7260.IH H7260 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 7260 IH (1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an exis- 1 tential threat to humanity, a fact that led President 2 Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorba- 3 chev to declare in a joint statement in 1987 that a 4 ‘‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 5 fought’’. 6 (2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 7 people attended the largest peace rally in United 8 States history, in support of a movement to freeze 9 and reverse the nuclear arms race, a movement that 10 helped to create the political will necessary for the 11 negotiation of several bilateral arms control treaties 12 between the United States and former Soviet Union, 13 and then the Russian Federation. Those treaties 14 contributed to strategic stability through mutual and 15 verifiable reciprocal nuclear weapons reductions. 16 (3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 17 1945, millions of people around the world have stood 18 up to demand meaningful, immediate international 19 action to halt, reduce, and eliminate the threats 20 posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing, 21 and nuclear war, to humankind and the planet. 22 (4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera- 23 tion of Nuclear Weapons done at Washington, Lon- 24 don, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483) (com- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:22 Jul 12, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7260.IH H7260 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 7260 IH monly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation 1 Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’), entered into force, which 2 includes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weap- 3 on states (commonly referred to as the ‘‘P5’’), 4 among other things, ‘‘to pursue negotiations in good 5 faith on effective measures relating to the cessation 6 of the nuclear arms race . . . and to nuclear disar- 7 mament’’. 8 (5) Bipartisan United States global leadership 9 has curbed the growth in the number of countries 10 possessing nuclear weapons and has slowed overall 11 vertical proliferation among countries already pos- 12 sessing nuclear weapons, as is highlighted by a more 13 than 85-percent reduction in the United States nu- 14 clear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of 15 31,255 in 1967. 16 (6) The United States testing of nuclear weap- 17 ons is no longer necessary as a result of the fol- 18 lowing major technical developments since the Sen- 19 ate’s consideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear- 20 Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to as the 21 ‘‘CTBT’’) in 1999: 22 (A) The verification architecture of the 23 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Orga- 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:22 Jul 12, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7260.IH H7260 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 7260 IH nization (commonly referred to as the 1 ‘‘CTBTO’’)— 2 (i) has made significant advance- 3 ments, as seen through its network of 300 4 International Monitoring Stations and its 5 International Data Centre, which together 6 provide for the near instantaneous detec- 7 tion of nuclear explosives tests, including 8 all 6 such tests conducted by North Korea 9 between 2006 and 2017; and 10 (ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 11 days a week. 12 (B) Since the United States signed the 13 CTBT, confidence has grown in the science- 14 based Stockpile Stewardship and Management 15 Plan of the Department of Energy, which forms 16 the basis of annual certifications to the Presi- 17 dent regarding the continual safety, security, 18 and effectiveness of the United States nuclear 19 deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, 20 leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest 21 Moniz to remark in 2015 that ‘‘lab directors 22 today now state that they certainly understand 23 much more about how nuclear weapons work 24 than during the period of nuclear testing’’. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:22 Jul 12, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7260.IH H7260 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 7260 IH (7) Despite the progress made to reduce the 1 number and role of, and risks posed by, nuclear 2 weapons, and to halt the Cold War-era nuclear arms 3 race, tensions between countries that possess nuclear 4 weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk reduction 5 treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles of 6 weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a quali- 7 tative global nuclear arms race is now underway 8 with each of the countries that possess nuclear 9 weapons spending tens of billions of dollars each 10 year to maintain and improve their arsenals. 11 (8) The United States and the Russian Federa- 12 tion are both pursuing the development of desta- 13 bilizing types of nuclear weapons, including new 14 lower-yield nuclear weapons that are more usable, 15 and the People’s Republic of China, India, Pakistan, 16 and North Korea have each taken concerning steps 17 to diversify their more modest, but nonetheless very 18 deadly, nuclear arsenals. 19 (9) Since January 2017, President Donald 20 Trump has taken the following actions, which have 21 run counter to the objectives of the Creating an En- 22 vironment for Nuclear Disarmament (commonly re- 23 ferred to as ‘‘CEND’’) initiative that his administra- 24 tion launched in 2018: 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:22 Jul 12, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7260.IH H7260 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 7260 IH (A) The release of the 2018 Nuclear Pos- 1 ture Review on February 5, 2018, which low- 2 ered the threshold for nuclear weapons use and 3 called for the development of the following new 4 nuclear weapons: 5 (i) A low-yield warhead on a sub- 6 marine-launched ballistic missile, which 7 was deployed before the date of the enact- 8 ment of this Act. 9 (ii) A sea-launched cruise missile, still 10 under development on the date of the en- 11 actment of this Act. 12 (B) The unilateral United States with- 13 drawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 14 Action (commonly referred to as the ‘‘JCPOA’’) 15 announced on May 8, 2018, which may lead to 16 the complete collapse of an agreement that had 17 verifiably closed of each of Iran’s pathways to 18 a nuclear weapon. 19 (C) The unilateral United States with- 20 drawal, completed on August 2, 2019, from the 21 Treaty Between the United States of America 22 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 23 the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 24 and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Wash- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:22 Jul 12, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7260.IH H7260 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 7 •HR 7260 IH ington December 8, 1987, and entered into 1 force June 1, 1988 (commonly referred to as 2 the ‘‘Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Trea- 3 ty’’ or the ‘‘INF Treaty’’), in response to the 4 material breach by the Russian Federation of 5 its obligations under that Treaty, which has re- 6 moved all legal constraints on the testing, pro- 7 curement, and deployment of ground-based 8 shorter-range and intermediate-range missiles, 9 increasing the risk of a missile arms race in the 10 Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. 11 (D) The unilateral United States with- 12 drawal, announced on May 22, 2020, from the 13 Treaty on Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 14 24, 1992, and entered into force January 1, 15 2002 (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Open Skies 16 Treaty’’), which is likely to deny to United 17 States allies and partners a key confidence- 18 building measure and one of the few remaining 19 operational diplomatic forums, through the 20 Open Skies Consultative Commission, to engage 21 with the Russian Federation. 22 (10) During a May 15, 2020, National Security 23 Council meeting, one or more senior officials of the 24 Trump administration reportedly advocated that the 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:22 Jul 12, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7260.IH H7260 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 8 •HR 7260 IH United States conduct its first nuclear explosives 1 test since 1992, as part of an effort to bring the 2 Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of 3 China into negotiations on a trilateral arms control 4 agreement. 5 (11) A move by the United States to break its 6 moratorium on nuclear explosives testing would con- 7 flict with United Nations Security Council Resolu- 8 tion 2310, led by the United States and adopted in 9 2016, which states that any nuclear explosives test 10 would defeat the ‘‘object and purpose’’ of the CTBT 11 and called on all countries to maintain their respec- 12 tive moratoriums on such tests. 13 (12) In light of moves by the United States and 14 other countries to increase their reliance on nuclear 15 weapons, the 21st century nuclear freeze movement 16 would seek to halt the new nuclear arms race by 17 seeking conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable 18 freeze on the testing, deployment, and production of 19 nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for such weap- 20 ons. 21 (13) The United States would benefit from con- 22 clusion of a comprehensive nuclear arms agreement 23 with each of the nuclear-weapon state parties to the 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:22 Jul 12, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7260.IH H7260 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 9 •HR 7260 IH NPT and potentially all countries that possess nu- 1 clear weapons. 2 (14) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons 3 employment strategy of the United States submitted 4 under section 492 of title 10, United States Code, 5 determined that it is possible to ensure the security 6 of the United States and allies and partners of the 7 United States and maintain a strong and credible 8 strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a 1⁄3 9 reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level 10 established in the Treaty between the United States 11 of America and the Russian Federation on Measures 12 for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Stra- 13 tegic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and en- 14 tered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly re- 15 ferred to as the ‘‘New START Treaty’’). 16 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 17 It is the policy of the United States that: 18 (1) The United States should build upon its 19 decades long, bipartisan efforts to reduce the num- 20 ber and salience of nuclear weapons by leading inter- 21 national negotiations on specific arms-reduction 22 measures as part of a 21st century global nuclear 23 freeze movement. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:22 Jul 12, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7260.IH H7260 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 10 •HR 7260 IH (2) The United States should immediately agree 1 to extend the New START Treaty for 5 years, until 2 February 5, 2026, through mutual agreement with 3 the Russian Federation to provide continued insight 4 into the location, movement, and disposition of stra- 5 tegic delivery vehicles and deployed warheads belong- 6 ing to the Russian Federation, which would be an 7 important first step to building momentum for a 8 multilateral arms control initiative. 9 (3) Upon the successful extension of the New 10 START Treaty, the United States should engage 11 with all other countries that possess nuclear weapons 12 to negotiate and conclude future multilateral arms 13 control, disarmament, and risk reduction agree- 14 ments, which should contain some or all of the fol- 15 lowing provisions: 16 (A) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on 17 the testing, production, and further deployment 18 of all nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for 19 such weapons. 20 (B) An agreement that establishes a 21 verifiable numerical ceiling on the deployed 22 shorter-range and intermediate-range and stra- 23 tegic delivery systems (as defined by the INF 24 Treaty and the New START Treaty, respec- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:22 Jul 12, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7260.IH H7260 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 11 •HR 7260 IH tively) and the nuclear warheads associated 1 with such systems belonging to the P5, and to 2 the extent possible, all countries that possess 3 nuclear weapons, at August 2, 2019, levels. 4 (C) An agreement by each country to 5 adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weap- 6 ons. 7 (D) An agreement on a proactive United 8 Nations Security Council resolution that ex- 9 pands access by the International Atomic En- 10 ergy Agency to any country found by the Board 11 of Governors of that Agency to be noncompliant 12 with its obligations under the NPT. 13 (E) An agreement to refrain from config- 14 uring nuclear forces in a ‘‘launch on warning’’ 15 nuclear posture allowing a country to launch a 16 ballistic missile attack in response to detection 17 by an early-warning satellite or sensor of a sus- 18 pected incoming ballistic missile. 19 (F) An agreement not to target or inter- 20 fere in the nuclear command, control, and com- 21 munications (commonly referred to as ‘‘NC3’’) 22 infrastructure of another country through a 23 cyberattack. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:22 Jul 12, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7260.IH H7260 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 12 •HR 7260 IH (G) An agreement on transparency meas- 1 ures or verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic 2 cruise missiles and glide vehicles that are 3 mounted on ballistic missiles. 4 (H) An agreement to provide a baseline 5 and continuous exchanges detailing the aggre- 6 gate number of active nuclear weapons and as- 7 sociated systems possessed by each country. 8 (4) The United States should rejuvenate efforts 9 in t [Text truncated for display. 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