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II
116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
S. 3843
To establish a positive agenda and framework for the future of arms control
with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MAY 21, 2020
Mr. MENENDEZ introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
A BILL
To establish a positive agenda and framework for the future
of arms control with the Russian Federation and the
People’s Republic of China.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
1
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
3
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Future of Arms Con-
4
trol Act’’.
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SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
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In this Act:
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(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
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TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
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mittees’’ means—
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(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
1
the Committee on Armed Services, and the Se-
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lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
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and
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(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
5
Committee on Armed Services, and the Perma-
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nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
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House of Representatives.
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(2) NEW
START.—The term ‘‘New START’’
9
means the Treaty between the United States and the
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Russian Federation on Measures for the Further
11
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
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Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered into force
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February 5, 2011 (commonly known as the ‘‘New
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START Treaty’’).
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SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
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Congress makes the following findings:
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(1) Since the end of World War II, the United
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States has relied on a robust and effective nuclear
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deterrent as part of its national defense, particularly
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against the Soviet Union and its successor state, the
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Russian Federation.
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(2) In tandem with its nuclear deterrent, the
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United States pursued a number of arms control,
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disarmament, and nonproliferation agreements with
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the Soviet Union as a means of ensuring strategic
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stability, providing transparency into the Soviet
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Union’s nuclear forces, reducing United States nu-
3
clear expenditures, and defending the United States,
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including the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and
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the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
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(3) After the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
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the United States continued to pursue arms control
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with the Russian Federation along with a credible
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nuclear deterrent as a means of ensuring United
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States security from nuclear attack.
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(4) The New START Treaty, ratified with bi-
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partisan support on December 22, 2010, remains an
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important tool for limiting and verifying the Russian
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Federation’s strategic nuclear arsenal.
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(5) The New START Treaty, which expires in
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February 2021, can be extended until February
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2026 if both parties agree to such an extension.
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(6) The United States engages in robust,
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verifiable arms control because it fundamentally pro-
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tects United States and allied security interests.
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(7) On April 17, 2020, Secretary of State Mike
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Pompeo met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
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Lavrov, and in those talks asserted that any future
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arms control talks must include the People’s Repub-
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lic of China.
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(8) The Government of the People’s Republic of
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China has signaled that it has no intention of engag-
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ing in trilateral arms control talks with the United
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States and the Russian Federation.
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(9) Since 1964, the People’s Republic of China
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has been a nuclear weapons state and has developed
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strategic and tactical systems capable of threatening
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the United States, United States allies and partners,
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and United States and alliance assets in the Indo-
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Pacific region.
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(10) Today, the People’s Republic of China re-
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tains a limited but survivable nuclear deterrent with
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an extensive modernization program which, accord-
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ing to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2019 China
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Military Power Report, will make its arsenal ‘‘more
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mobile, responsive, and accurate’’.
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(11) It is in the security interests of the United
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States to engage with the People’s Republic of China
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on relevant arms control issues, whether in a bilat-
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eral or multilateral format, through a coherent, co-
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ordinated strategy.
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SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
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It is the policy of the United States that—
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(1) unless the President determines and so in-
1
forms Congress that the Russian Federation is not
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in material compliance with New START such that
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the object and purpose of the Treaty is significantly
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undermined, and that efforts to resolve any such
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material noncompliance have been undertaken and
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not resolved such noncompliance, the United States
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shall extend New START from its initial termi-
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nation date in February 2021 to February 2026, as
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permitted under Article XIV of the Treaty;
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(2) if the President has not extended New
11
START by November 3, 2020, the United States
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Government should encourage the Government of
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the Russian Federation not to exceed or prepare to
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exceed the limitations of the New START Treaty
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prior to the expiration of the Treaty on February 5,
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2021, providing an opportunity from January 20,
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2021, until February 5, 2021, for the United States
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and the Russian Federation to negotiate an exten-
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sion to and continued implementation of the treaty;
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(3) if the President does not extend the New
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START Treaty by November 3, 2020, no action or
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activity should be taken by any United States offi-
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cial, agency, or department that would violate or
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lead to the violation of the treaty while the treaty re-
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mains in force;
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(4) the United States must maintain a credible
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nuclear deterrent capable of defending the homeland
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and United States allies covered under extended de-
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terrence;
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(5) the United States, in conjunction with New
7
START’s extension, should pursue additional arms
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control frameworks with the Russian Federation
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that limit the possibility of purposeful or accidental
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nuclear war and advance United States security, in-
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cluding—
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(A) further reductions to the Russian Fed-
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eration’s strategic nuclear arsenal, including the
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number of its warheads and deployed delivery
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systems;
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(B) limitations or elimination of the Rus-
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sian Federation’s tactical and intermediate
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range systems that directly threaten United
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States allies and partners in Europe and the
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Indo-Pacific;
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(C) control, limitation, or elimination of
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the Russian Federation’s novel nuclear weap-
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ons, such as hypersonic weapons, undersea nu-
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clear weapons, or other delivery systems;
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(D) transparency and confidence-building
1
measures to avoid, manage, or control nuclear,
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conventional, and unconventional military esca-
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lation between the United States and the Rus-
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sian Federation;
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(E) areas of potential dialogue between the
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governments of the United States and the Rus-
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sian Federation on space, cyberspace, and con-
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ventional forces, as well as other strategic do-
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mains, which could reduce the likelihood of war,
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limit escalation if a conflict were to occur, and
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constrain a destabilizing arms race; and
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(F) rigorous inspection and monitoring
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mechanisms to verify compliance with any fu-
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ture arms control framework; and
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(6) the United States Government should for-
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mulate a coherent strategy to engage the Govern-
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ment of the People’s Republic of China on relevant
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bilateral issues that lays the groundwork for bring-
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ing the People’s Republic of China into an arms con-
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trol framework, including—
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(A) fostering bilateral dialogue on arms
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control leading to the convening of bilateral
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strategic stability talks;
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(B) negotiating norms for outer space;
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(C) developing pre-launch notification re-
1
gimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation;
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and
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(D) expanding lines of communication be-
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tween both governments for the purposes of re-
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ducing the risks of conventional war and in-
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creasing transparency.
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SEC. 5. RESTRICTION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY.
8
(a) IN GENERAL.—If the President does not extend
9
the New START Treaty by November 3, 2020, no action
10
or activity may be taken by any United States official,
11
agency, or department that would violate or lead to the
12
violation of the treaty until March 1, 2021.
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(b) WAIVER.—
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(1) IN
GENERAL.—The President may waive
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the restriction in subsection (a) 15 days after certi-
16
fying to the appropriate congressional committees
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that the Government of the Russian Federation has
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materially violated the New START Treaty such
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that the security of the United States has been
20
gravely threatened. The certification shall include
21
the reasons for making such determination. The cer-
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tification shall be unclassified to the maximum ex-
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tent possible, but may include a classified annex.
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(2) EFFECTIVENESS.—
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(A) IN
GENERAL.—A waiver under sub-
1
section (a) shall take effect if, at the end of 15
2
days after the President makes the certification
3
described under such subsection, Congress has
4
not enacted a joint resolution of disapproval.
5
(B) CONSIDERATION
OF
JOINT
RESOLU-
6
TION OF DISAPPROVAL.—A joint resolution in-
7
troduced pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be
8
considered in the Senate in accordance with the
9
provisions of section 601(b) of the International
10
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control
11
Act of 1976 (Public Law 94–329; 90 Stat.
12
765).
13
SEC. 6. REPORTS.
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(a) IMPLEMENTATION
OF UNITED STATES POL-
15
ICY.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact-
16
ment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination
17
with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appro-
18
priate congressional committees a report, and a separate
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classified annex, detailing the United States Government’s
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plans for implementing the policy of the United States
21
stated in section 4 with respect to the Russian Federation.
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(b) ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH
THE RUSSIAN
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FEDERATION AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—
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Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
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of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with
1
the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate
2
congressional committees a report that describes—
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(1) a concrete plan for arms control talks that
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includes both the People’s Republic of China and the
5
Russian Federation;
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(2) if trilateral arms control dialogue does not
7
arise, what alternative plans the Department of
8
State envisages for ensuring United States security
9
from Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons;
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(3) efforts at engaging the People’s Republic of
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China to join arms control talks, whether on a bilat-
12
eral or multilateral basis; and
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(4) the interest level of the Government of the
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People’s Republic of China in joining arms control
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talks, whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis.
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(c) EXTENSION OF NEW START.—Not later than 90
17
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
18
retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-
19
fense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall sub-
20
mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report,
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and a separate classified annex, that includes the following
22
elements:
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(1) The strategy behind the decision to extend
24
or not extend New START.
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(2) If New START is set to expire, an assess-
1
ment whether such an expiration is in the national
2
security interests of the United States, including the
3
specific reasons for such conclusion.
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(3) An examination of the effects of the expira-
5
tion of New START on—
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(A) strategic stability with the Russian
7
Federation;
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(B) the United States nuclear budget;
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(C) spending on United States conven-
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tional forces as a result of increased nuclear
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spending; and
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(D) international nuclear nonproliferation
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efforts.
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(4) An assessment of how the Government of
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the Russian Federation will modify its nuclear forces
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in an unconstrained environment and how the
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United States Government will respond if the Gov-
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ernment of the Russian Federation expands its arse-
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nal.
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(5) An assessment of how the United States
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Government will need to alter intelligence capabili-
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ties and spending to regain, if possible, the knowl-
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edge of the Russian Federation’s arsenal that is cur-
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rently provided by the inspection and verification
1
mechanisms inherent to New START.
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Æ
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