COVID–19 Vaccine Protection Act

II 116TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION S. 3837 To require a thorough national security evaluation and clearance by the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation of all Chinese student visa holders currently in the United States before issuing any new student visas to nationals of the People’s Republic of China. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MAY 21, 2020 Mr. SCOTT of Florida (for himself, Mr. BRAUN, Mrs. BLACKBURN, Ms. ERNST, Ms. MCSALLY, Mr. COTTON, and Mr. CRUZ) introduced the fol- lowing bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary A BILL To require a thorough national security evaluation and clear- ance by the Department of Homeland Security, the De- partment of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion of all Chinese student visa holders currently in the United States before issuing any new student visas to nationals of the People’s Republic of China. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘COVID–19 Vaccine 4 Protection Act’’. 5 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:45 Jun 08, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3837.IS S3837 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 2 •S 3837 IS SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 1 Congress finds the following: 2 (1) On May 13, 2020, the Federal Bureau of 3 Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and In- 4 frastructure Security Agency (CISA) announced that 5 cyber actors and non-traditional collectors affiliated 6 with the People’s Republic of China have been ob- 7 served attempting to identify and illicitly obtain val- 8 uable intellectual property and public health data re- 9 lated to vaccines, treatments, and testing from net- 10 works and personnel affiliated with COVID–19-re- 11 lated research. 12 (2) The potential theft of the data referred to 13 in paragraph (1) jeopardizes the delivery of secure, 14 effective, and efficient treatment options. 15 (3) The announcement referred to in paragraph 16 (1) urged all organizations conducting COVID–19- 17 related research to maintain dedicated cybersecurity 18 and insider threat practices to prevent surreptitious 19 review or theft of COVID–19-related material. 20 (4) According to the Institute of International 21 Education, 369,548 Chinese nationals attended col- 22 leges, universities, and professional schools during 23 the 2018–19 academic year. 24 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 25 In this Act: 26 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:45 Jun 08, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3837.IS S3837 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 3 •S 3837 IS (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT- 1 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com- 2 mittees’’ means— 3 (A) the Committee on Homeland Security 4 and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; 5 (B) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 6 Senate; 7 (C) the Committee on Homeland Security 8 of the House of Representatives; and 9 (D) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 10 House of Representatives. 11 (2) CONTINUOUS VETTING.—The term ‘‘contin- 12 uous vetting’’ means— 13 (A) regular checks with the institutions or 14 organizations with which a nonimmigrant is af- 15 filiated; 16 (B) periodic interviews with colleagues or 17 superiors at such institutions or organizations; 18 and 19 (C) any other examination that the Sec- 20 retary of Homeland Security considers nec- 21 essary to make a determination under section 22 4(d)(2). 23 (3) ENHANCED VETTING.—The term ‘‘enhanced 24 vetting’’ means a comprehensive background check 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:45 Jun 08, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3837.IS S3837 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 4 •S 3837 IS process developed by the Secretary of Homeland Se- 1 curity, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, 2 the FBI Director, the Director of National Intel- 3 ligence, and the Secretary of Health and Human 4 Services. 5 SEC. 4. COVID–19-RELATED RESEARCH CYBERSECURITY 6 REVIEW. 7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the 8 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Home- 9 land Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 10 the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau 11 of Investigation, the Director of the Cybersecurity and In- 12 frastructure Security Agency, the Director of U.S. Citizen- 13 ship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Office of the 14 Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the Sec- 15 retary of Health and Human Services, shall complete a 16 review, which shall consist of enhanced vetting of nationals 17 of the People’s Republic of China residing in the United 18 States as nonimmigrants described in subparagraph (F), 19 (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and 20 Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)) (except for non- 21 immigrants who are enrolled at an elementary or sec- 22 ondary school) to determine if any such nonimmigrants 23 are engaging in any attempt to illegally obtain information 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:45 Jun 08, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3837.IS S3837 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 5 •S 3837 IS related to COVID–19 vaccine research or are otherwise 1 a national security threat. 2 (b) EXTENSION.—If the Secretary of Homeland Se- 3 curity is unable to complete the review described in sub- 4 section (a) by the deadline set forth in such subsection, 5 the Secretary shall— 6 (1) complete such review not later than 60 days 7 after the deadlines set forth in subsection (a); and 8 (2) before the deadline set forth in subsection 9 (a), notify the appropriate congressional committees 10 of the reasons such review could not be completed by 11 the original deadline. 12 (c) CONTINUOUS VETTING.—The Secretary of Home- 13 land Security, in consultation with the agencies listed 14 under subsection (a), shall conduct continuous vetting of 15 all nonimmigrants residing in the United States who are— 16 (1) described in subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) 17 of section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Na- 18 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)); 19 (2) not enrolled at an elementary or secondary 20 school; 21 (3) nationals of the People’s Republic of China; 22 and 23 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:45 Jun 08, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3837.IS S3837 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 6 •S 3837 IS (4) engaged in, or have access to, research of 1 any potential COVID–19 vaccine or COVID–19 re- 2 lated material. 3 (d) REPORT.—Upon the completion of the review re- 4 quired under this section, the Secretary of Homeland Se- 5 curity shall submit a report to the appropriate congres- 6 sional committees that— 7 (1) contains the results of such review; and 8 (2) indicates whether any of the Chinese na- 9 tionals vetted under subsection (a) pose a threat to 10 the national security or public health of the United 11 States. 12 SEC. 5. TEMPORARY DELAY IN THE ISSUANCE OF STUDENT 13 VISAS TO CHINESE NATIONALS. 14 During the period beginning on the date of the enact- 15 ment of this Act and ending on the date on which the 16 Secretary of Homeland Security submits the report re- 17 quired under section 4(c), the Department of State may 18 not issue, to a national of the People’s Republic of China, 19 any student visa to a nonimmigrant described in subpara- 20 graph (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of the Immi- 21 gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)). 22 Æ VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:45 Jun 08, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6301 E:\BILLS\S3837.IS S3837 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS