Strategic Arctic Naval Focus Act of 2019

II 116TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION S. 3080 To state the policy of the United States regarding the need for strategic placement of military assets in the Arctic, and for other purposes. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES DECEMBER 18, 2019 Mr. SULLIVAN (for himself, Mr. KING, and Ms. MURKOWSKI) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services A BILL To state the policy of the United States regarding the need for strategic placement of military assets in the Arctic, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Strategic Arctic Naval 4 Focus Act of 2019’’. 5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6 Congress makes the following findings: 7 (1) The strategic importance of the Arctic con- 8 tinues to increase as the United States and other 9 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:14 Dec 24, 2019 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3080.IS S3080 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 2 •S 3080 IS countries recognize the military significance of the 1 sea lanes and choke points within the region and un- 2 derstand the potential for power projection from the 3 Arctic into multiple regions. 4 (2) On January 19, 2018, Secretary of Defense 5 James Mattis released the ‘‘2018 National Defense 6 Strategy of the United States of America’’ in which 7 the Secretary outlined the reemergence of long-term, 8 strategic competition by countries classified by the 9 National Security Strategy as revisionist powers 10 such as China and Russia. 11 (3) Russia and China have conducted military 12 exercises together in the Arctic, have agreed to con- 13 nect the Northern Sea Route, claimed by Russia, 14 with China’s Maritime Silk Road, and are working 15 together in developing natural gas resources in the 16 Arctic. 17 (4) The Government of the Russian Federa- 18 tion— 19 (A) has prioritized the development of Arc- 20 tic capabilities and has made significant invest- 21 ments in military infrastructure in the Arctic, 22 including the creation of a new Arctic Com- 23 mand and the construction or refurbishment of 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:14 Dec 24, 2019 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3080.IS S3080 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 3 •S 3080 IS 16 deepwater ports and 14 airfields in the re- 1 gion; 2 (B) has approximately 40 icebreakers as of 3 May 2019, including several nuclear-powered 4 icebreakers, is currently constructing four ice- 5 breakers, and is planning to build an additional 6 eight icebreakers; and 7 (C) conducted the largest military exercise 8 since the 1980s, Vostok 2018, which included— 9 (i) 300,000 troops; 10 (ii) 1,000 aircraft; 11 (iii) 80 ships; 12 (iv) 36,000 vehicles; and 13 (v) notably, 3,200 Chinese troops, 30 14 Chinese rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, and 15 900 Chinese tanks. 16 (5) The Government of the People’s Republic of 17 China— 18 (A) released, in January 2018, its new 19 Arctic Strategy, the Polar Silk Road, in which 20 it declares itself as a ‘‘near-Arctic state’’, even 21 though its nearest territory to the Arctic is 900 22 miles away; 23 (B) has publicly stated that it seeks to ex- 24 pand its ‘‘Belt and Road Initiative’’ to the Arc- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:14 Dec 24, 2019 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3080.IS S3080 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 4 •S 3080 IS tic region, including current investment in the 1 natural gas fields in the Yamal Peninsula in 2 Russia, rare-earth element mines in Greenland, 3 and the real estate, alternative energy, and fish- 4 eries in Iceland; and 5 (C) has shown great interest in expanding 6 its Arctic presence, including through— 7 (i) the operation of research vessels in 8 the region; 9 (ii) the recent construction of the 10 Xuelong 2, or Snow Dragon II, the only 11 polar research boat vessel in the world that 12 can break ice while going forward or back- 13 ward; 14 (iii) a freedom of navigation operation 15 in the Aleutian Islands in 2015; and 16 (iv) its recent plans to develop a 17 33,000 ton nuclear-powered icebreaker. 18 (6) The economic significance of the Arctic con- 19 tinues to grow as countries around the globe begin 20 to understand the magnitude of the natural re- 21 sources in the Arctic, the potential for maritime 22 transportation through, and economic and trade de- 23 velopment in, the region. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:14 Dec 24, 2019 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3080.IS S3080 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 5 •S 3080 IS (7) The Arctic is home to 13 percent of the 1 world’s undiscovered oil, 30 percent of its undis- 2 covered gas, an abundance of uranium, rare earth 3 minerals, gold, diamonds, and millions of square 4 miles of untapped resources, including abundant 5 fisheries. 6 (8) The Bering Strait is experiencing signifi- 7 cant increases in international traffic from vessels 8 transiting the Northern Sea Route, increases which 9 are projected to continue if decreases in sea ice cov- 10 erage continue. 11 (9) Along a future ice-free Arctic shipping 12 route, a ship sailing from South Korea to Germany 13 would have an average travel time of just 23 days, 14 compared to 34 days via the Suez Canal and 46 15 days via the Cape of Good Hope. 16 (10) In a speech at the Arctic Forum in Sep- 17 tember 2011, Russian Federation President Vladi- 18 mir Putin highlighted the Northern Sea Route as a 19 potential alternative to the Suez Canal and has pub- 20 licly stated plans to invest $11,400,000,000 along 21 the Northern Sea Route by 2024. 22 (11) Increases in human, maritime, and re- 23 source development activity in the Arctic region cre- 24 ate additional mission requirements for the Depart- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:14 Dec 24, 2019 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3080.IS S3080 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 6 •S 3080 IS ment of Defense and the Department of Homeland 1 Security, given— 2 (A) the strategic focus of the Government 3 of the Russian Federation and the Government 4 of the People’s Republic of China on the Arctic; 5 (B) overlapping territorial claims; and 6 (C) the potential for maritime accidents, 7 oil spills, and illegal fishing near the exclusive 8 economic zone of the United States. 9 (12) The increasing role of the United States in 10 the Arctic has been highlighted in each of the last 11 four National Defense Authorization Acts. 12 (13) Section 1068 of the National Defense Au- 13 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 14 114–92; 129 Stat. 992) required a new Department 15 of Defense strategy to protect United States na- 16 tional security interests in the Arctic region. 17 (14) Section 1095 of the National Defense Au- 18 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 19 114–328; 130 Stat. 2438) required the Department 20 of Defense to create criteria to designate a Depart- 21 ment of Defense Strategic Arctic Port. 22 (15) Section 122 of the National Defense Au- 23 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:14 Dec 24, 2019 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3080.IS S3080 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 7 •S 3080 IS 115–91; 131 Stat. 1310) authorized the procure- 1 ment of one polar-class heavy icebreaker vessel. 2 (16) Section 151 of the John S. McCain Na- 3 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 4 2019 (Public Law 115–232; 132 Stat. 1671) author- 5 ized the procurement of five additional polar-class 6 icebreaker vessels and expressed that the Coast 7 Guard should— 8 (A) maintain an inventory of not fewer 9 than six polar-class icebreaker vessels; 10 (B) award a contract for the first new 11 polar-class icebreaker not later than fiscal year 12 2019 and deliver the icebreaker not later than 13 fiscal year 2023; and 14 (C) deliver the second through sixth polar- 15 class icebreakers at a rate of one vessel per 16 year in fiscal years 2025 through 2029. 17 (17) In January 2017, the Department of De- 18 fense released a report entitled ‘‘Report to Congress 19 on Strategy to Protect United States National Secu- 20 rity Interests in the Arctic Region’’ to update ‘‘the 21 ways and means’’ the Department of Defense in- 22 tends to use to achieve its objectives as it imple- 23 ments the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Re- 24 gion, including— 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:14 Dec 24, 2019 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3080.IS S3080 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 8 •S 3080 IS (A) enhancing the capability of United 1 States forces to defend the homeland and exer- 2 cise sovereignty; 3 (B) strengthening deterrence at home and 4 abroad; 5 (C) preserving freedom of the seas in the 6 Arctic; and 7 (D) evolving the infrastructure and capa- 8 bilities of the Department in the Arctic con- 9 sistent with changing conditions and needs. 10 (18) The United States Coast Guard Arctic 11 Strategic Outlook released in April 2019 states that 12 ‘‘[d]emonstrating commitment to operational pres- 13 ence, Canada, Denmark, and Norway have made 14 strategic investments in ice-capable patrol ships 15 charged with national or homeland security missions. 16 [The United States] is the only Arctic State that 17 has not made similar investments in ice-capable sur- 18 face maritime security assets. This limits the ability 19 of the Coast Guard, and the Nation, to credibly up- 20 hold sovereignty or respond to contingencies in the 21 Arctic’’. 22 (19) On July 16, 2019, Secretary of Defense 23 Mark Esper stated that ‘‘[t]he Arctic is strategic 24 terrain for the United States. The region has signifi- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:14 Dec 24, 2019 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3080.IS S3080 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 9 •S 3080 IS cant economic opportunity, and must remain free 1 and open. It is also growing more complicated as 2 strategic competitors—Russia and, increasingly, 3 China—seek to enhance their position in the region. 4 It is critical that the Arctic remain a secure and sta- 5 ble region where U.S. national interests are safe- 6 guarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations 7 work together to address challenges’’. 8 (20) On January 9, 2019, Secretary of the Air 9 Force Heather Wilson and Chief of Staff of the Air 10 Force General David Goldfein wrote that ‘‘. . . the 11 Arctic has become even more important to the na- 12 tion. Both a northern approach to the United 13 States, as well as a critical location for projecting 14 American power, its geo-strategic significance is dif- 15 ficult to overstate’’. 16 (21) On February 26, 2019, General John 17 Hyten, Commander of the United States Strategic 18 Command, stated that ‘‘[i]n particular, the Arctic is 19 an area that we really need to focus on and really 20 look at investing. That is no longer a buffer zone. 21 We need to be able to operate there. We need to be 22 able to communicate there. We need to have a pres- 23 ence there that we have not invested in in the same 24 way that our adversaries have. And they see that as 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:14 Dec 24, 2019 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3080.IS S3080 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 10 •S 3080 IS a vulnerability from us, whereas it is becoming a 1 strength for them and it is a weakness for us, we 2 need to flip that equation’’. 3 (22) On February 26, 2019, General Terrence 4 O’Shaughnessy, Commander of the United States 5 Northern Command stated that ‘‘[i]t has become 6 clear that defense of the homeland depends on our 7 ability to detect and defeat threats operating both in 8 the Arctic and passing through the Arctic. Russia’s 9 fielding of advanced, long-range cruise missiles capa- 10 ble of flying through the northern approaches and 11 striking targets in the United States and Canada 12 has emerged as the dominant military threat in the 13 Arctic. . . . Meanwhile, China has declared that it 14 is not content to remain a mere observer in the Arc- 15 tic and has taken action to normalize its naval and 16 commercial presence in the region in order to in- 17 crease its access to lucrative resources and shipping 18 routes. I view the Arctic as the front line in the de- 19 fense of the United States and Canada . . .’’. 20 (23) On May 6, 2019, Admiral Karl Schultz, 21 Commandant of the Coast Guard stated that ‘‘[w]e 22 talk about the Arctic as a competitive space. We’ve 23 seen China, we see Russia investing extensively. 24 China built icebreakers in the time since we updated 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:14 Dec 24, 2019 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3080.IS S3080 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 11 •S 3080 IS our strategy. China’s been operating off the Alaskan 1 Arctic for a good part of the last six years on an an- 2 nual basis. [The Coast Guard is] championing in- 3 creased capabilities in the Arctic . . . better commu- 4 nications, better domain awareness . . . I want to 5 see the Arctic remain a peaceful domain. China’s a 6 self-declared Arctic state. They’re not one of the 7 eight Arctic nations, so for me, for the service, its 8 presence equals influence’’. 9 (24) On May 6, 2019, Secretary of State Mike 10 Pompeo stated that— 11 (A) the Arctic ‘‘has become an arena for 12 power and for competition’’, and the United 13 States is ‘‘entering a new age of strategic en- 14 gagement in the Arctic, complete with new 15 threats to the Arctic and its real estate, and to 16 all of our interests in that region’’; 17 (B) ‘‘Arctic sea lanes could become the 18 21st century Suez and Panama Canals’’; 19 (C) ‘‘[w]e’re concerned about Russia’s 20 claim over the international waters of the 21 Northern Sea Route, including its newly an- 22 nounced plans to connect it with China’s Mari- 23 time Silk Road’’; 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:14 Dec 24, 2019 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3080.IS S3080 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 12 •S 3080 IS (D) ‘‘[i]n the Northern Sea Route, Moscow 1 already illegally demands other nations request 2 permission to pass, requires Russian maritime 3 pilots to be aboard foreign ships, and threatens 4 to use military force to sink any that fail to 5 comply with their demands’’; 6 (E) there is a ‘‘pattern of aggressive Rus- 7 sian behavior here in the Arctic’’ and ‘‘we know 8 Russian territorial ambitions can turn violent’’; 9 and 10 (F) we do not want ‘‘the Arctic Ocean to 11 transform into a new South China Sea, fraught 12 with militarization and competing territorial 13 claims’’, nor do we want ‘‘the fragile Arctic en- 14 vironment exposed to the same ecological devas- 15 tation caused by [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]