Richard G. Lugar and Ellen O. Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nuclear Forces

II 116TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION S. 2394 To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating to the expiration of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES JULY 31, 2019 Mr. VAN HOLLEN (for himself and Mr. YOUNG) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating to the expiration of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Richard G. Lugar and 4 Ellen O. Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nu- 5 clear Forces’’. 6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 7 Congress makes the following findings: 8 (1) Since the end of World War II, the United 9 States has relied on a robust and effective nuclear 10 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:10 Aug 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2394.IS S2394 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 2 •S 2394 IS deterrent as part of its national defense, particularly 1 against the Soviet Union and its successor state, the 2 Russian Federation. 3 (2) The United States nuclear arsenal must re- 4 main safe, secure, and reliable such that it can effec- 5 tively ensure the security of the United States and 6 its allies. 7 (3) Along with its nuclear deterrent, the United 8 States has pursued a number of arms control, disar- 9 mament, and nonproliferation agreements with the 10 Soviet Union and Russia to ensure strategic stability 11 and the protection of the United States homeland, 12 such as— 13 (A) the Interim Agreement Between the 14 United States of America and the Union of So- 15 viet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures 16 with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Of- 17 fensive Arms, done at Moscow May 26, 1972 18 (commonly referred to as ‘‘SALT I’’); and 19 (B) the Treaty Between the United States 20 of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 21 Republics on Strategic Offensive Reductions, 22 done at Moscow July 31, 1991 (commonly re- 23 ferred to as ‘‘START I’’). 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:45 Aug 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2394.IS S2394 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 3 •S 2394 IS (4) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet 1 Union, the United States continues to rely on a com- 2 bination of nuclear deterrence and strategic arms 3 control to help protect the United States from nu- 4 clear attack. 5 (5) On April 8, 2010, the United States and 6 Russia signed the Treaty between the United States 7 of America and the Russian Federation on Measures 8 for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Stra- 9 tegic Offensive Arms (commonly referred to as ‘‘New 10 START Treaty’’). 11 (6) In an op-ed to the Washington Post dated 12 December 2, 2010, former Secretaries of State 13 Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, James A. 14 Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin L. 15 Powell urged the Senate to ratify the New START 16 Treaty, stating that it was in ‘‘the national interest 17 to ratify’’. 18 (7) During the ratification process, the New 19 START Treaty garnered bipartisan support, and the 20 United States Senate approved the Treaty on De- 21 cember 22, 2010, by a 71–26 vote. 22 (8) The New START Treaty entered into force 23 on February 5, 2011, placing numerical limits on 24 United States and Russian strategic systems, includ- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:38 Aug 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2394.IS S2394 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 4 •S 2394 IS ing intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine 1 launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers, as 2 well as warheads. 3 (9) On February 5, 2018, the Treaty’s central 4 limits on strategic arms took effect. 5 (10) Through the New START Treaty’s 6 verification regime, which includes short-notice, on- 7 site inspections at military bases and facilities, the 8 United States is able to verify the data provided by 9 the Russian Federation regarding its strategic nu- 10 clear arsenal. The verification regime provides both 11 countries insight into each other’s strategic nuclear 12 delivery systems, warheads, and facilities, as well as 13 data exchanges to track the status and makeup of 14 nuclear weapons systems. 15 (11) During a February 26, 2019, hearing on 16 nuclear deterrence requirements of the Committee 17 on Armed Services of the Senate, Commander of the 18 United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) 19 General John Hyten voiced his support for the Trea- 20 ty, saying he was ‘‘a big supporter of the New 21 START agreement’’ and stating, ‘‘The New START 22 treaty’’ provides ‘‘insights into the Russians capa- 23 bilities. Those are hugely beneficial to me.’’. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:10 Aug 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2394.IS S2394 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 5 •S 2394 IS (12) During a March 2017 hearing on nuclear 1 deterrence requirements of the Committee on Armed 2 Services of the House of Representatives, Air Force 3 General Paul Selva, the Vice Chairman of the Joint 4 Chiefs of Staff, also endorsed the New START 5 Treaty, saying the Treaty is ‘‘a bilateral, verifiable 6 agreement that gives us some degree of predict- 7 ability on what our potential adversaries look like’’. 8 (13) Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the 9 Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deter- 10 rence and Nuclear Integration, asserted that the 11 New START Treaty was of ‘‘huge value’’ to United 12 States security. 13 (14) During a September 2018 hearing before 14 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, 15 Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy David 16 Trachtenberg stated that ‘‘the transparency and 17 verification requirements of the New START Treaty 18 are a benefit’’ to the security of the United States 19 and, in response to a question regarding missile de- 20 fense, asserted that the Treaty had ‘‘no’’ effect on 21 limiting United States missile defense capabilities. 22 (15) In a March 2017 hearing of the Strategic 23 Forces Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed 24 Services of the House of Representatives, Retired 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:10 Aug 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2394.IS S2394 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 6 •S 2394 IS Air Force General and former commander of United 1 States Strategic Command Robert Kehler stated, ‘‘I 2 think that we have gotten tremendous benefit out of 3 those kinds of agreements with the Russians over 4 the years, provided that the Russians comply,’’ re- 5 garding the importance of the New START Treaty. 6 (16) The Department of State confirmed in 7 February 2018 that the Russian Federation had met 8 the Treaty’s central limits on strategic arms and 9 stated that ‘‘implementation of the New START 10 Treaty enhances the safety and security of the 11 United States’’. 12 (17) The Nuclear Posture Review states that 13 arms control agreements can ‘‘foster transparency, 14 understanding, and predictability in adversary rela- 15 tions, thereby reducing the risk of misunderstanding 16 and miscalculation’’. 17 (18) The New START Treaty strengthens 18 United States nuclear security and strategic stability 19 by reducing the number of strategic systems in the 20 Russian Federation’s nuclear arsenal and provides 21 the United States with the inspection and moni- 22 toring tools necessary to confidently verify Russian 23 compliance with the Treaty. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:10 Aug 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2394.IS S2394 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 7 •S 2394 IS (19) The New START Treaty does not restrict 1 United States nuclear modernization programs or 2 limit United States missile defense efforts. 3 (20) If the New START Treaty is not extended 4 or replaced before it expires in 2021, the United 5 States runs the risk of having no legally binding, 6 verifiable limits on the Russian Federation’s stra- 7 tegic nuclear arsenal for the first time since 1972. 8 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 9 It is the sense of Congress that the United States 10 should seek to extend the New START Treaty from its 11 initial termination date in February 2021 to February 12 2026, as provided for under Article XIV of the Treaty, 13 unless the President determines and informs the appro- 14 priate congressional committees that— 15 (1) the Russian Federation is in material 16 breach of the Treaty; or 17 (2) the United States and the Russian Federa- 18 tion have entered into a new arms control agreement 19 to replace the Treaty that provides equal or greater 20 constraints, transparency, and verification measures 21 with regard to the Russian Federation’s nuclear 22 forces. 23 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:10 Aug 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2394.IS S2394 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 8 •S 2394 IS SEC. 4. REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESS. 1 (a) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESS- 2 MENTS.— 3 (1) RELATING TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION NU- 4 CLEAR FORCES.—Not later than 180 days after the 5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 6 National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate 7 congressional committees an intelligence assessment 8 based on all sources of the national security and in- 9 telligence implications of the expiration of the New 10 START Treaty without the United States and the 11 Russian Federation having entered into a new arms 12 control agreement to replace the Treaty that pro- 13 vides equal or greater constraints, transparency, and 14 verification measures with regard to the Russian 15 Federation’s nuclear forces. The assessment shall be 16 submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain 17 a classified annex, and shall include the following 18 elements: 19 (A) A description of the size and posture 20 of the Russian Federation’s nuclear forces and 21 strategic delivery vehicles, as well as predicted 22 force levels through February 2026 under each 23 of the following potential scenarios: 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:10 Aug 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2394.IS S2394 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 9 •S 2394 IS (i) The Treaty expires in February 1 2021 without such a replacement agree- 2 ment. 3 (ii) The Treaty is extended until Feb- 4 ruary 2026. 5 (B) An assessment of how strategic sta- 6 bility would be impacted if the Treaty is not ex- 7 tended or such a replacement agreement is not 8 concluded. 9 (C) An assessment of the impact on 10 United States allies if the limitations on the 11 Russian Federation’s nuclear forces are dis- 12 solved if the Treaty is not extended or such a 13 replacement agreement is not concluded. 14 (D) A description of the intelligence collec- 15 tion benefits of the Treaty. 16 (E) An assessment of how the United 17 States intelligence community’s confidence in 18 its assessments of the Russian Federation’s 19 strategic nuclear arsenal and future nuclear 20 force levels would be impacted if the Treaty is 21 not extended or such a replacement agreement 22 is not concluded. 23 (F) An assessment of what specific capa- 24 bilities the United States intelligence commu- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:10 Aug 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2394.IS S2394 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 10 •S 2394 IS nity would have to develop, deploy, or realign to 1 ensure no loss of collection capability occurs if 2 the Treaty is not extended or such a replace- 3 ment agreement is not concluded. 4 (2) RELATING TO PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 5 CHINA NUCLEAR FORCES.—Not later than 180 days 6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Di- 7 rector of National Intelligence shall submit to the 8 appropriate congressional committees an assessment 9 of the relative size and posture of the strategic nu- 10 clear forces of the People’s Republic of China com- 11 pared to that of the United States and the Russian 12 Federation. The assessment shall be submitted in an 13 unclassified form, but may contain a classified 14 annex, and shall include the following elements: 15 (A) An assessment of the size, force struc- 16 ture, and operational status of the People’s Re- 17 public of China’s long-range nuclear-capable de- 18 livery vehicles that meet the definitions of sys- 19 tems counted under the New START Treaty. 20 (B) An assessment of the number of nu- 21 clear warheads that the Government of the Peo- 22 ple’s Republic of China possesses. 23 (C) A description of the efforts of the Gov- 24 ernment of the People’s Republic of China to 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:10 Aug 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2394.IS S2394 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 11 •S 2394 IS modernize and modify its nuclear force struc- 1 ture. 2 (D) A description of the potential changes 3 to the nuclear force structure and posture of 4 the People’s Republic of China if the United 5 States and Russian Federation are no longer 6 bound by the limits in the New START Treaty. 7 (b) SECRETARY OF STATE.— 8 (1) RELATING TO NATO, NATO MEMBER COUN- 9 TRIES, AND OTHER UNITED STATES ALLIES.—Not 10 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 11 of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 12 with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report, 13 which shall be in an unclassified form, but may con- 14 tain a classified annex, and provide a briefing to the 15 appropriate congressional committees that includes 16 an assessment of the likely reactions of the North 17 Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NATO mem- 18 ber countries, and other United States allies to a 19 United States decision not to extend the New 20 START Treaty or enter into a new arms control 21 agreement with the Russian Federation to replace 22 the Treaty that provides equal or greater con- 23 straints, transparency, and verification measures 24 with regard to Russia’s nuclear forces. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:10 Aug 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2394.IS S2394 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 12 •S 2394 IS (2) RELATING TO OTHER MATTERS.—Not later 1 than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 2 Act, and every 180 days thereafter until the New 3 START Treaty is extended or expires, the Secretary 4 of State, in consultation with the Secretary of De- 5 fense, shall provide a briefing to the appropriate 6 congressional committees that includes the following 7 elements: 8 (A) A description of any discussions with 9 the Russian Federation on the Treaty or a 10 similar agreement on the reduction and lim [Text truncated for display. 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