Richard G. Lugar and Ellen O. Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nuclear Forces

I 116TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 2529 To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating to the expiration of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY 7, 2019 Mr. ENGEL (for himself and Mr. MCCAUL) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the com- mittee concerned A BILL To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating to the expiration of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Richard G. Lugar and 4 Ellen O. Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nu- 5 clear Forces’’. 6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 7 Congress makes the following findings: 8 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:31 May 14, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2529.IH H2529 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 2529 IH (1) Since the end of World War II, the United 1 States has relied on a robust and effective nuclear 2 deterrent as part of its national defense, particularly 3 against the Soviet Union and its successor state, the 4 Russian Federation. 5 (2) The United States nuclear arsenal must re- 6 main, safe, secure, and reliable such that it can ef- 7 fectively ensure the security of the United States 8 and its allies. 9 (3) Along with its nuclear deterrent, the United 10 States has pursued a number of arms control, disar- 11 mament, and nonproliferation agreements with the 12 Soviet Union and Russia to ensure strategic stability 13 and the protection of the United States homeland, 14 such as— 15 (A) the Interim Agreement Between the 16 United States of America and the Union of So- 17 viet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures 18 with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Of- 19 fensive Arms, signed on May 26, 1972 (com- 20 monly referred to as SALT I); and 21 (B) the Treaty Between the United States 22 of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 23 Republics on Strategic Offensive Reductions, 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:31 May 14, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2529.IH H2529 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 2529 IH signed on July 31, 1991 (commonly referred to 1 as START I). 2 (4) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet 3 Union, the United States continues to rely on a com- 4 bination of nuclear deterrence and strategic arms 5 control to help protect the United States from nu- 6 clear attack. 7 (5) On April 8, 2010, the United States and 8 the Russia signed the Treaty between the United 9 States of America and the Russian Federation on 10 Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 11 of Strategic Offensive Arms (commonly referred to 12 as ‘‘New Start Treaty’’). 13 (6) In an op-ed to the Washington Post dated 14 December 2, 2010, former Secretaries of State 15 Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, James A. 16 Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin L. 17 Powell urged the Senate to ratify the Treaty, stating 18 that it was in ‘‘the national interest to ratify’’. 19 (7) During the ratification process, the Treaty 20 garnered bipartisan support, and the United States 21 Senate approved the Treaty on December 22, 2010, 22 by a 71–26 vote. 23 (8) The Treaty entered into force on February 24 5, 2011, placing numerical limits on United States 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:31 May 14, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2529.IH H2529 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 2529 IH and Russian strategic systems, including interconti- 1 nental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic 2 missiles, and heavy bombers, as well as warheads. 3 (9) On February 5, 2018, the Treaty’s central 4 limits on strategic arms took effect. 5 (10) Through the Treaty’s verification regime, 6 which includes short-notice, on-site inspections at 7 military bases and facilities, the United States is 8 able to verify the data provided by Russia regarding 9 its strategic nuclear arsenal. The verification regime 10 provides both countries insight into each other’s 11 strategic nuclear delivery systems, warheads, and fa- 12 cilities, as well as data exchanges to track the status 13 and makeup of nuclear weapons systems. 14 (11) During a February 26, 2019, hearing on 15 nuclear deterrence requirements of the Senate 16 Armed Services Committee, Commander of the 17 United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) 18 General John Hyten voiced his support for the Trea- 19 ty, saying he was ‘‘a big supporter of the New 20 START agreement’’ and stating, ‘‘The New START 21 treaty’’ provides ‘‘insights into the Russians capa- 22 bilities. Those are hugely beneficial to me.’’. 23 (12) During a March 2017 hearing on nuclear 24 deterrence requirements of the House Armed Serv- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:31 May 14, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2529.IH H2529 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 2529 IH ices Committee, Air Force General Paul Selva, the 1 Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also en- 2 dorsed the New START Treaty, saying the Treaty 3 is ‘‘a bilateral, verifiable agreement that gives us 4 some degree of predictability on what our potential 5 adversaries look like’’. 6 (13) Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the 7 Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deter- 8 rence and Nuclear Integration, asserted that the 9 New START Treaty was of ‘‘huge value’’ to United 10 States security. 11 (14) During a September 2018 hearing before 12 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Deputy 13 Secretary of Defense for Policy David Trachtenberg 14 stated that ‘‘the transparency and verification re- 15 quirements of the New START Treaty are a ben- 16 efit’’ to the security of the United States and, in re- 17 sponse to a question regarding missile defense, as- 18 serted that the Treaty had ‘‘no’’ effect on limiting 19 United States missile defense capabilities. 20 (15) In a March 2017 hearing of the Strategic 21 Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services 22 Committee, Retired Air Force General and former 23 commander of United States Strategic Command 24 Robert Kehler stated, ‘‘I think that we have gotten 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:31 May 14, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2529.IH H2529 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 2529 IH tremendous benefit out of those kinds of agreements 1 with the Russians over the years, provided that the 2 Russians comply,’’ regarding the importance of the 3 New START Treaty. 4 (16) The Department of State confirmed in 5 February 2018 that Russia had met the Treaty’s 6 central limits on strategic arms and stated that ‘‘im- 7 plementation of the New START Treaty enhances 8 the safety and security of the United States’’. 9 (17) The Nuclear Posture Review states that 10 arms control agreements can ‘‘foster transparency, 11 understanding, and predictability in adversary rela- 12 tions, thereby reducing the risk of misunderstanding 13 and miscalculation’’. 14 (18) The New START Treaty strengthens 15 United States nuclear security and strategic stability 16 by reducing the number of strategic systems in Rus- 17 sia’s nuclear arsenal and provides the United States 18 with the inspection and monitoring tools necessary 19 to confidently verify Russian compliance with the 20 Treaty. 21 (19) The New START Treaty does not restrict 22 United States nuclear modernization programs or 23 limit United States missile defense efforts. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:31 May 14, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2529.IH H2529 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 7 •HR 2529 IH (20) If the New START Treaty is not extended 1 or replaced before it expires in 2021, the United 2 States runs the risk of having no legally binding, 3 verifiable limits on Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal 4 for the first time since 1972. 5 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 6 It is the sense of Congress that the United States 7 should seek to extend the New START Treaty from its 8 initial termination date in February 2021 to February 9 2026, as provided for under Article XIV of the Treaty, 10 unless the President determines and informs the appro- 11 priate congressional committees that— 12 (1) Russia is in material breach of the Treaty; 13 or 14 (2) the United States and Russia have entered 15 into a new arms control agreement to replace the 16 Treaty that provides equal or greater constraints, 17 transparency, and verification measures with regard 18 to Russia’s nuclear forces. 19 SEC. 4. REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESS. 20 (a) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—Not 21 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 22 this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 23 to the appropriate congressional committees an intel- 24 ligence assessment based on all sources of the national se- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:31 May 14, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2529.IH H2529 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 8 •HR 2529 IH curity and intelligence implications of the expiration of the 1 New START Treaty without the United States and Rus- 2 sia having entered into a new arms control agreement to 3 replace the Treaty that provides equal or greater con- 4 straints, transparency, and verification measures with re- 5 gard to Russia’s nuclear forces. The assessment shall be 6 submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a clas- 7 sified annex, and shall include the following elements: 8 (1) A description of the size and posture of 9 Russia’s nuclear forces and strategic delivery vehi- 10 cles, as well as predicted force levels through Feb- 11 ruary 2026 under each of the following potential sce- 12 narios: 13 (A) The Treaty expires in February 2021 14 without such a replacement agreement. 15 (B) The Treaty is extended until February 16 2026. 17 (2) An assessment of how strategic stability 18 would be impacted if the Treaty is not extended or 19 such a replacement agreement is not concluded. 20 (3) An assessment of the impact on United 21 States allies if the limitations on Russia’s nuclear 22 forces are dissolved if the Treaty is not extended or 23 such a replacement agreement is not concluded. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:31 May 14, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2529.IH H2529 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 9 •HR 2529 IH (4) A description of the intelligence collection 1 benefits of the Treaty. 2 (5) An assessment of how the United States in- 3 telligence community’s confidence in its assessments 4 of Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal and future nu- 5 clear force levels would be impacted if the Treaty is 6 not extended or such a replacement agreement is not 7 concluded. 8 (6) An assessment of what specific capabilities 9 the United States intelligence community would have 10 to develop, deploy, or realign to ensure no loss of 11 collection capability occurs if the Treaty is not ex- 12 tended or such a replacement agreement is not con- 13 cluded. 14 (b) SECRETARY OF STATE.— 15 (1) RELATING TO NATO, NATO MEMBER COUN- 16 TRIES, AND OTHER UNITED STATES ALLIES.—Not 17 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 18 of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 19 with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report, 20 which shall be in an unclassified form, but may con- 21 tain a classified annex, and provide a briefing to the 22 appropriate congressional committees that includes 23 an assessment of the likely reactions of the North 24 Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NATO mem- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:31 May 14, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2529.IH H2529 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 10 •HR 2529 IH ber countries, and other United States allies to a 1 United States decision not to extend the New 2 START Treaty or enter into a new arms control 3 agreement with Russia to replace the Treaty that 4 provides equal or greater constraints, transparency, 5 and verification measures with regard to Russia’s 6 nuclear forces. 7 (2) RELATING TO OTHER MATTERS.—Not later 8 than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 9 Act, and every 180 days thereafter until the New 10 START Treaty is extended or expires, the Secretary 11 of State, in consultation with the Secretary of De- 12 fense, shall provide a briefing to the appropriate 13 congressional committees that includes the following 14 elements: 15 (A) A description of any discussions with 16 Russia on the Treaty or a similar agreement on 17 the reduction and limitation of strategic offen- 18 sive arms at the Assistant Secretary, Ambassa- 19 dorial level or higher. 20 (B) The dates, locations, discussion topics, 21 agenda, outcomes, and Russian interlocutors in- 22 volved in those discussions. 23 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:31 May 14, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2529.IH H2529 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 11 •HR 2529 IH (C) An identification of the United States 1 Government departments and agencies involved 2 in the discussions. 3 (D) The types of systems, both nuclear 4 and nonnuclear, discussed by either side in such 5 discussions. 6 (E) Whether an offer of extension of the 7 Treaty, of any length of time, has been offered 8 by either side. 9 SEC. 5. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION IN EVENT OF EXPI- 10 RATION OF NEW START TREATY. 11 If the New START Treaty is allowed to expire before 12 the United States and Russia enter into a new arms con- 13 trol agreement to replace the Treaty that provides equal 14 or greater constraints, transparency, and verification 15 measures with regard to Russia’s nuclear forces, not later 16 than 30 days after such expiration the President shall sub- 17 mit to the appropriate congressional committees— 18 (1) a justification for why the New START 19 Treaty was allowed to expire; and 20 (2) a certification that extending the Treaty 21 was not in the national security interest of the 22 United States. 23 SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS. 24 In this Act: 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:31 May 14, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2529.IH H2529 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 12 •HR 2529 IH (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT- 1 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com- 2 mittees’’ means— 3 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 4 Committee on Armed Services, and the Perma- [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]