SAVE Act

II 116TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION S. 1285 To require certifications and reporting in an unclassified form related to the national security implications of the New START Treaty, to provide for arms limitations in the event of the treaty’s non-renewal, and for other purposes. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MAY 2, 2019 Mr. MARKEY (for himself, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Ms. WARREN, Mr. LEAHY, and Mr. BROWN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and re- ferred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To require certifications and reporting in an unclassified form related to the national security implications of the New START Treaty, to provide for arms limitations in the event of the treaty’s non-renewal, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Save Arms control and 4 Verification Efforts Act of 2019’’ or ‘‘SAVE Act’’. 5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6 Congress makes the following findings: 7 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:12 May 07, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1285.IS S1285 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 2 •S 1285 IS (1) Every United States president since John 1 F. Kennedy has successfully concluded at least one 2 agreement with Russia to reduce nuclear dangers. 3 (2) If the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces 4 Treaty is terminated, and the New START Treaty 5 is not extended, or a new treaty is not negotiated 6 and ratified before 2021, there would be no legally 7 binding, verifiable limits on the United States or 8 Russian nuclear arsenals for the first time since 9 1972. 10 (3) For both the United States and the Russian 11 Federation, the New START Treaty’s transparency 12 and verification measures provide invaluable insight 13 into the size, capabilities, and operations of both 14 countries’ nuclear forces beyond that provided by 15 more traditional intelligence collection and assess- 16 ment methods, helping create a mutually beneficial 17 environment of stability and predictability. 18 (4) Former Republican and Democratic na- 19 tional security leaders, including George Shultz, Wil- 20 liam Perry, Richard Burt, Sam Nunn, Richard 21 Lugar, and others, have expressed support for a 22 prompt decision to extend the New START Treaty. 23 (5) United States military leaders continue to 24 see value in the New START Treaty, including Gen. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:12 May 07, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1285.IS S1285 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 3 •S 1285 IS John Hyten, Commander of United States Strategic 1 Command, who told Congress in March 2018 that 2 ‘‘bilateral, verifiable arms control agreements are es- 3 sential to our ability to provide an effective deter- 4 rent,’’ and testified before Congress in February 5 2019 that the New START Treaty is important be- 6 cause it provides to the United States ‘‘a cap on 7 [Russia’s] strategic baseline nuclear weapons, and 8 their ballistic missiles, both submarine and ICBM, 9 as well as their bombers’’ and ‘‘just as important it 10 gives me insight through the verification regime to 11 their Russia’s real capabilities’’. 12 (6) The United States NATO allies have con- 13 sistently expressed support for a decision by the 14 United States and the Russian Federation to extend 15 New START before the scheduled expiration date in 16 2021. 17 (7) Russian President Vladimir Putin said in 18 July 2018 that ‘‘I reassured President Trump that 19 Russia stands ready to extend this treaty, to prolong 20 it, but we have to agree on the specifics . . .’’. 21 (8) The Department of Defense Report on the 22 Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation 23 submitted pursuant to section 1240 of the National 24 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:26 May 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1285.IS S1285 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 4 •S 1285 IS (Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 1643) determined 1 that Russia ‘‘would not be able to achieve a mili- 2 tarily significant advantage by any plausible expan- 3 sion of its strategic nuclear forces, even in a cheat- 4 ing or breakout scenario under the New START 5 Treaty, primarily because of the inherent surviv- 6 ability of the planned United States strategic force 7 structure, particularly the Ohio-class ballistic missile 8 submarines, a number of which are at sea at any 9 given time’’. 10 (9) For as long as it must exist, the United 11 States nuclear arsenal must be maintained and mod- 12 ernized in a cost-effective manner to ensure it re- 13 mains a safe, secure, and reliable effective nuclear 14 force that can continue to deter nuclear attack on 15 the United States and its allies, and so that the 16 United States can continue to pursue further 17 verifiable reduction in global nuclear stockpiles con- 18 sistent with its obligations under the Nuclear Non- 19 proliferation Treaty. 20 (10) The New START Treaty created a Bilat- 21 eral Consultative Commission to resolve issues re- 22 lated to implementation of the New START Treaty, 23 and Article II of the New START Treaty states, 24 ‘‘When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:12 May 07, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1285.IS S1285 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 5 •S 1285 IS offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the 1 right to raise the question of such a strategic offen- 2 sive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consult- 3 ative Commission.’’ 4 SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE SENATE. 5 It is the sense of the Senate that— 6 (1) extending the New START Treaty by a pe- 7 riod of five years is in the national security interest 8 of the United States, so long as the Russian Federa- 9 tion continues to meet the central limits of the trea- 10 ty; 11 (2) the United States should immediately seek 12 to begin discussions with the Russian Federation on 13 agreeing to a 5-year extension of the New START 14 Treaty; 15 (3) the United States should use the Bilateral 16 Consultative Commission mechanism within the New 17 START Treaty to address issues related to new 18 Russian strategic nuclear weapons it believes may 19 fall under New START treaty limits; 20 (4) extending the New START Treaty would 21 facilitate efforts by the United States to pursue ad- 22 ditional arms control efforts with the Russian Fed- 23 eration, including efforts to address the Russian 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:26 May 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1285.IS S1285 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 6 •S 1285 IS Federation’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons and 1 emerging technologies such as hypersonic weapons; 2 (5) the United States should resume more reg- 3 ular talks on strategic stability with Russia, as well 4 as additional bilateral and multilateral arms control 5 efforts worldwide to address a changing global secu- 6 rity environment; and 7 (6) extending the New START Treaty would 8 facilitate efforts by the United States to engage with 9 the People’s Republic of China to reduce dangers as- 10 sociated with its nuclear arsenal, which is fundamen- 11 tally different than the Russian Federation’s and re- 12 quires a separate, focused arms control effort. 13 SEC. 4. CERTIFICATIONS IN EVENT NEW START TREATY IS 14 NOT EXTENDED. 15 Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact- 16 ment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, if the 17 parties to the New START Treaty have not completed the 18 procedures outlined in the treaty and its related protocols 19 and annexes to extend the treaty’s effective date by up 20 to five years beyond February 5, 2021— 21 (1) the President, the Secretary of Defense, and 22 the Secretary of State shall separately submit to the 23 appropriate congressional committees a justification 24 for why New START has not been extended and a 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:26 May 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1285.IS S1285 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 7 •S 1285 IS certification that the absence of an extension of the 1 treaty is in the national security interest of the 2 United States; and 3 (2) the Director of National Intelligence shall 4 submit to the appropriate congressional commit- 5 tees— 6 (A) an intelligence community-coordinated 7 assessment of why the New START Treaty has 8 not been extended; 9 (B) a certification that the absence of an 10 extension of the treaty is in the national secu- 11 rity interest of the United States; and 12 (C)(i) a certification that the United 13 States is not losing intelligence insight into the 14 Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear pro- 15 gram; or 16 (ii) a report detailing how the Director of 17 National Intelligence and the intelligence com- 18 munity will account for any lost intelligence ca- 19 pabilities. 20 SEC. 5. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE. 21 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 22 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 23 Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional 24 committees a National Intelligence Estimate, consisting of 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:26 May 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1285.IS S1285 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 8 •S 1285 IS an unclassified executive summary and judgments and a 1 more detailed, classified report on the Russian Federa- 2 tion’s compliance with the New START Treaty and the 3 impact to the intelligence collection capabilities of the 4 United States if the New START Treaty and its related 5 information exchanges and associated inspections regimes 6 were to lapse. The report shall include the following ele- 7 ments: 8 (1) A description of the Russian Federation’s 9 compliance with the New START Treaty. 10 (2) An assessment of the Russian Federation’s 11 intentions with regard to extending the New START 12 Treaty. 13 (3) A description of the intelligence collection 14 benefits gained as a result of the ratification and im- 15 plementation of the New START Treaty. 16 (4) An assessment of what specific capabilities 17 the United States intelligence community would have 18 to develop and deploy to ensure that no loss of col- 19 lection capability would occur in the event of the 20 lapse of the New START Treaty. 21 (5) A cost estimate and estimated timeline for 22 developing these new or additional capabilities, and 23 a description of how new intelligence gathering re- 24 quirements related to the Russian Federation’s nu- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:26 May 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1285.IS S1285 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 9 •S 1285 IS clear forces may affect other United States intel- 1 ligence gathering needs. 2 (6) An assessment of projections for Russian 3 Federation nuclear and non-nuclear force size, struc- 4 ture, and composition with the New START Treaty 5 limitations in place and without the limitations in 6 place. 7 (7) An assessment of Russian Federation ac- 8 tions, intentions, and likely responses to the United 9 States withdrawing from, suspending its obligations 10 under, or allowing to lapse the New START Treaty 11 and subsequently developing platforms and weapons 12 beyond the New START Treaty’s limitations. 13 (b) BRIEFINGS.—The Director of National Intel- 14 ligence shall brief the appropriate congressional commit- 15 tees on the elements set forth in subsection (a) when the 16 National Intelligence Estimate is submitted under such 17 subsection and every 120 days thereafter. 18 SEC. 6. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. 19 (a) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.— 20 (1) REPORT ON EXPECTED FORCE STRUCTURE 21 CHANGES IN EVENT OF TREATY LAPSE.—Not later 22 than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this 23 Act, and not later than February 5, 2021, if the 24 New START Treaty is allowed to lapse, the Sec- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:12 May 07, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1285.IS S1285 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 10 •S 1285 IS retary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate 1 congressional committees a report discussing 2 changes to the expected force structure of the 3 United States Armed Forces if the New START 4 Treaty is no longer in place and estimating the ex- 5 pected costs necessary to make such changes. 6 (2) REPORT ON IMPACTS TO MODERNIZATION 7 PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the 8 enactment of this Act, and not later than February 9 5, 2021, if the New START Treaty is allowed to 10 lapse, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 11 Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate con- 12 gressional committees a report on how the current 13 program of record to replace and upgrade United 14 States nuclear weapons delivery systems and war- 15 heads, which anticipates the continued existence of 16 the New START Treaty, would be modified without 17 the existence of the New START Treaty. The report 18 shall include the information required to be sub- 19 mitted in the report required by section 1043 of the 20 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 21 2012 (Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 1576) and 22 shall include— 23 (A) a separate 10-year cost estimate from 24 the Department of Defense to implement a nu- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:12 May 07, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1285.IS S1285 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS 11 •S 1285 IS clear sustainment plan that does and does not 1 anticipate the continued existence of the New 2 START Treaty, including possible costs associ- 3 ated with conversion or uploading of strategic 4 delivery vehicles and warheads; 5 (B) a separate 10-year cost estimate from 6 the Department of Energy to implement a nu- 7 clear sustainment and modernization plan that 8 does and does not anticipate the continued ex- 9 istence of the New START Treaty, including 10 uploading warheads previously withdrawn from 11 service; 12 (C) a description of how the absence of the 13 New START Treaty limits would impact the 14 schedule and cost of Department of Energy’s 15 Stockpile Stewardship management plan; and 16 (D) an assessment of the potential impacts 17 on how these changes will impact the Depart- 18 ment of Energy’s nuclear weapons complex. 19 (b) DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—Not later than 90 20 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not 21 later than February 5, 2021, if the New START Treaty 22 is allowed to lapse, the Secretary of State shall submit 23 to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 24 the likely foreign policy implications of and potential im- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 0 [Text truncated for display. 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