Countering the Chinese Government and Communist Party's Political Influence Operations Act

I 116TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 1811 To require an unclassified interagency report on the political influence oper- ations of the Government of China and the Communist Party of China with respect to the United States, and for other purposes. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARCH 18, 2019 Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Mr. CUELLAR, Mrs. HARTZLER, Mr. GALLAGHER, Mr. RATCLIFFE, Mr. MEADOWS, and Mr. PERRY) intro- duced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consider- ation of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned A BILL To require an unclassified interagency report on the political influence operations of the Government of China and the Communist Party of China with respect to the United States, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Countering the Chinese 4 Government and Communist Party’s Political Influence 5 Operations Act’’. 6 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:23 Apr 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1811.IH H1811 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 1811 IH SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 1 In this Act: 2 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT- 3 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com- 4 mittees’’ means— 5 (A) the Committee on Appropriations of 6 the Senate; 7 (B) the Committee on Armed Services of 8 the Senate; 9 (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 10 the Senate; 11 (D) the Committee on Health, Education, 12 Labor, and Pensions of the Senate; 13 (E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 14 Senate; 15 (F) the Select Committee on Intelligence of 16 the Senate; 17 (G) the Committee on Banking, Housing, 18 and Urban Affairs of the Senate; 19 (H) the Committee on Appropriations of 20 the House of Representatives; 21 (I) the Committee on Armed Services of 22 the House of Representatives; 23 (J) the Committee on Education and 24 Labor of the House of Representatives; 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:23 Apr 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1811.IH H1811 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 1811 IH (K) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 1 the House of Representatives; 2 (L) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 3 House of Representatives; 4 (M) the Permanent Select Committee on 5 Intelligence of the House of Representatives; 6 and 7 (N) the Committee on Financial Services 8 of the House of Representatives. 9 (2) POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.—The 10 term ‘‘political influence operations’’ means the co- 11 ordinated and often concealed application of disin- 12 formation, press manipulation, economic coercion, 13 targeted investments, corruption, or academic cen- 14 sorship. Such efforts are often intended— 15 (A) to coerce and corrupt United States in- 16 terests, values, institutions, or individuals; and 17 (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, 18 or outcomes in the United States that support 19 the interests of the Government of the People’s 20 Republic of China or the Communist Party of 21 China. 22 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 23 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:23 Apr 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1811.IH H1811 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 1811 IH (1) The Government of China and the Com- 1 munist Party of China employ a wide range of polit- 2 ical, informational, and economic measures to influ- 3 ence, coerce, intimidate, or undermine the United 4 States interests or the interests of United States 5 partners and allies. 6 (2) The December 2017 National Security 7 Strategy of the United States of America states, 8 ‘‘Although the United States seeks to continue to co- 9 operate with China, China is using economic induce- 10 ments and penalties, influence operations, and im- 11 plied military threats to persuade other states to 12 heed its political and security agenda.’’. 13 (3) The political influence operations efforts of 14 the Government of China and the Communist Party 15 of China have received less scrutiny than similar ef- 16 forts of the Government of the Russian Federation, 17 but given China’s economic strength and the grow- 18 ing apparatus being used to spread its influence 19 globally, efforts to promote its authoritarian ideal 20 pose significant and consequential long-term chal- 21 lenges to United States interests and values. 22 (4) The Government of China and the Com- 23 munist Party of China use overt and covert means 24 to target the political and economic elite, the media 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:23 Apr 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1811.IH H1811 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 1811 IH and public opinion, civil society and academia, and 1 members of the Chinese diaspora. 2 (5) The Government of China and the Com- 3 munist Party of China employ an array of govern- 4 ment entities, friendship and exchange organiza- 5 tions, private entities and businesspeople, and gov- 6 ernment-funded foundations, think tanks, edu- 7 cational and other projects to carry out political in- 8 fluence operations, which is often referred to as 9 united front work. 10 (6) These political influence operations violate 11 national sovereignty, and as such, are fundamentally 12 different from traditional efforts by states to shape 13 international policy debates and improve their public 14 image through public diplomacy and strategic com- 15 munications campaigns. 16 (7) The aims of the political influence oper- 17 ations of the Government of China and the Com- 18 munist Party of China are— 19 (A) to protect the political security of the 20 Chinese Communist Party, both within China 21 and globally; 22 (B) to domestically and globally promote 23 the idea that the Chinese Communist Party’s 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:23 Apr 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1811.IH H1811 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 1811 IH political and economic model is superior to the 1 governments of Western democracies; and 2 (C) to promote the interests of the regime 3 globally. 4 (8) The political influence operations of the 5 Government of China and the Communist Party of 6 China take advantage of the open and democratic 7 nature of the United States, including— 8 (A) constitutional protections for free 9 speech and a free press; and 10 (B) the desire of some individuals or insti- 11 tutions to attract Chinese investment, gain ac- 12 cess to Chinese markets, or attain greater glob- 13 al influence. 14 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con- 15 gress that— 16 (1) the political influence operations of the Gov- 17 ernment of China and the Communist Party of 18 China are not ‘‘soft power’’ intended to persuade, 19 but ‘‘sharp power’’ intended— 20 (A) to penetrate or corrupt democratic 21 countries and undermine democratic institu- 22 tions and freedoms; 23 (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, laws, and 24 policies favorable to the Government of China’s 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:23 Apr 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1811.IH H1811 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS 7 •HR 1811 IH interest through disinformation, coercion, cor- 1 ruption, and other means; 2 (C) to widen the scope of Chinese authori- 3 tarian influence around the world, including— 4 (i) to suppress political opposition to 5 the Chinese Communist Party; and 6 (ii) to violate the internationally rec- 7 ognized human and civil rights of Chinese 8 citizens living in nations around the world; 9 and 10 (D) to undermine the strength of American 11 alliances around the world; and 12 (2) the American people need reliable and cur- 13 rent information— 14 (A) to identify the key institutions, individ- 15 uals, entities, and ministries that carry out such 16 operations; and 17 (B) to distinguish between malign political 18 influence operations intended to undermine core 19 American freedoms, democratic institutions, 20 and cultural, educational, business, and people- 21 to-people exchanges that may benefit the 22 United States and China. 23 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 24 United States— 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:23 Apr 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1811.IH H1811 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS 8 •HR 1811 IH (1) to clearly differentiate between the Chinese 1 people and culture and the Government of China 2 and the Communist Party of China in official state- 3 ments, media, and messaging, and to ensure that ef- 4 forts to curtail Beijing’s political influence oper- 5 ations do not lead to the targeting of Chinese-Ameri- 6 cans or the Chinese diaspora; 7 (2) to clearly differentiate between legal, inter- 8 nationally accepted public diplomacy and strategic 9 communications campaigns and illicit activities to 10 undermine democratic institutions or freedoms; 11 (3) to protect United States citizens and legal 12 residents from malign or coercive political influence 13 operations; 14 (4) to enhance cooperation and coordination 15 with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Taiwan (offi- 16 cially known as the ‘‘Republic of China’’), and Mon- 17 golia, whose governments and institutions have faced 18 acute pressure from the political influence operations 19 of the Government of China and the Communist 20 Party of China, and with other allies throughout the 21 world; 22 (5) to create strategies to ensure that countries 23 in Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast Asia, 24 and elsewhere are aware of China’s ‘‘sharp power’’ 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:23 Apr 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1811.IH H1811 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS 9 •HR 1811 IH and provide needed capacity to counter them effec- 1 tively; 2 (6) to implement more advanced transparency 3 requirements concerning collaboration with Chinese 4 actors for media agencies, universities, think tanks, 5 and government officials; 6 (7) to use various forums to raise awareness 7 about— 8 (A) the goals and methods of the political 9 influence operations of the Government of 10 China and the Communist Party of China; and 11 (B) common patterns and approaches used 12 by Chinese intelligence agencies or related ac- 13 tors; 14 (8) to require greater transparency for Confu- 15 cius Institutes, think tanks, academic programs, and 16 nongovernmental organizations funded primarily by 17 the Government of China, the Communist Party of 18 China, or by individuals or public or private organi- 19 zations with a demonstrable affiliation with the Gov- 20 ernment of China or the Communist Party of China 21 that are operating in the United States to register 22 through the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 23 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.) or a comparable mech- 24 anism; 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:23 Apr 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1811.IH H1811 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS 10 •HR 1811 IH (9) to seek ways to increase Chinese language 1 proficiency among mid-career professionals that do 2 not rely on funding linked to the Government of 3 China; 4 (10) to ensure that existing tools are suffi- 5 ciently screening for the risk of Chinese influence 6 operations; and 7 (11) to create more flexible tools, as needed, 8 with the goals of— 9 (A) screening investments from the Gov- 10 ernment of China or sources backed by the 11 Government of China to protect against the 12 takeover of United States companies by Chinese 13 state-owned or state-driven entities; and 14 (B) protecting institutions or business sec- 15 tors critically important to United States na- 16 tional security and the viability of democratic 17 institutions. 18 SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO COUNTER ‘‘SHARP POWER’’ POLIT- 19 ICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND TO PRO- 20 TECT UNITED STATES CITIZENS. 21 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi- 22 nation with all relevant Federal agencies shall develop a 23 long-term strategy— 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:23 Apr 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1811.IH H1811 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS 11 •HR 1811 IH (1) to carry out the policy statements set forth 1 in section 3(c); 2 (2) to effectively counter the ‘‘sharp power’’ po- 3 litical influence operations of the Chinese Com- 4 munist Party globally and in the United States; 5 (3) to ensure that United States citizens, par- 6 ticularly Chinese Americans and members of the 7 Chinese, Uyghur, and Tibetan diaspora who are who 8 are often the victims and primary targets of malign 9 political influence operations, are protected; 10 (4) to ensure that— 11 (A) the United States Government strategy 12 to protect the communities described in para- 13 graph (3) is clearly communicated by relevant 14 Federal officials; and 15 (B) secure outlets are created for reporting 16 on intimidation and surveillance; 17 (5) to ensure that Chinese nationals who are le- 18 gally studying, living, or working temporarily in the 19 United States know that intimidation or surveillance 20 by the Government of China and the Communist 21 Party of China is an unacceptable invasion of their 22 rights while they reside in the United States; and 23 (6) to provide secure outlets for reporting on in- 24 timidation and surveillance. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:23 Apr 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1811.IH H1811 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS 12 •HR 1811 IH (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 1 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, or 2 an appropriate high-ranking official, shall— 3 (1) submit an unclassified report containing the 4 strategy required under subsection (a) to the appro- 5 priate congressional committees; or 6 (2) describe the strategy required under sub- 7 section (a) through unclassified testimony before the 8 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or 9 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 10 Representatives. 11 SEC. 5. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPER- 12 ATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA AND 13 THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA. 14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Because it is important for Amer- 15 ican policymakers and the American people to be informed 16 about the influence operations described in section 3, not 17 later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of 18 this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 19 Director of National Intelligence, and in consul [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]