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I
116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION H. R. 1678
To create a task force within the Department of Education to address the
threat of foreign government influence and threats to academic research
integrity on college campuses, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MARCH 12, 2019
Mr. BANKS (for himself, Mr. KELLY of Mississippi, Mr. COOK, and Mr.
BACON) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Com-
mittee on Education and Labor, and in addition to the Committees on
Intelligence (Permanent Select), Armed Services, and Science, Space, and
Technology, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker,
in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the juris-
diction of the committee concerned
A BILL
To create a task force within the Department of Education
to address the threat of foreign government influence
and threats to academic research integrity on college
campuses, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
1
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
3
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protect Our Univer-
4
sities Act of 2019’’.
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SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
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Congress finds the following:
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(1) Adversaries of the United States take ad-
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vantage of a largely vulnerable academic system.
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Academia is a place of uniquely free thought; how-
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ever, adversaries take advantage of access to feder-
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ally funded sensitive research that takes place on the
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campuses of institutions of higher education.
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(2) As stated in a 2018 report by the White
9
House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy,
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‘‘More than 300,000 Chinese nationals annually at-
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tend U.S. universities or find employment at U.S.
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national laboratories, innovation centers, incubators,
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and think tanks. Chinese nationals now account for
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approximately one third of foreign university and
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college students in the United States and about 25
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percent of graduate students specializing in science,
17
technology, engineering, or math (STEM).’’.
18
(3) International students from nations that are
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adversarial to the United States could face undue
20
pressure or incentives to divulge technology to their
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home nation or to use sensitive information to nega-
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tively impact the United States. According to the
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same 2018 White House Report, ‘‘The national and
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economic security risks are that the Chinese State
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may seek to manipulate or pressure even unwitting
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•HR 1678 IH
or unwilling Chinese nationals into becoming non-
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traditional information collectors that serve Beijing’s
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military and strategic ambitions.’’.
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(4) Technology and information that could be
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deemed sensitive to the national security interests of
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the United States should be given increased scrutiny
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to determine if access should be restricted in a re-
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search environment.
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(5) An open federally funded research environ-
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ment exposes the United States to the possibility of
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exchanging research affiliated with current or future
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critical military technological systems.
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(6) In Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
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Director Wray’s view, Chinese non-traditional intel-
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ligence collectors ‘‘are exploiting the very open re-
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search and development environment that we have,
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which we all revere. But they‘re taking advantage of
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it, so one of the things we’re trying to do is view the
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China threat as not just the whole-of-government
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threat, but a whole-of-society threat on their end,
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and I think it’s going to take a whole-of-society re-
21
sponse by us.’’.
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(7) As stated in the January 2018 China’s
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Technology Transfer Strategy report by the Defense
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Innovation Unit, ‘‘Academia is an opportune envi-
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•HR 1678 IH
ronment for learning about science and technology
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since the cultural values of U.S. educational institu-
2
tions reflect an open and free exchange of ideas. As
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a result, Chinese science and engineering students
4
frequently master technologies that later become
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critical to key military systems, amounting over time
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to unintentional violations of U.S. export control
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laws.’’.
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SEC. 3. TASK FORCE.
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(a) TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED.—Not later than one
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year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary
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of Education, in consultation with the Secretary of De-
12
fense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall es-
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tablish the National Security Technology Task Force
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(hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘Task Force’’) within the
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Department of Education to address the threat of espio-
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nage at institutions of higher education.
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(b) MEMBERSHIP.—
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(1) DESIGNATION.—The Task Force shall in-
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clude not more than 30 members, of which—
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(A) at least 1 representative shall be from
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the Department of Defense, designated by the
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Secretary of Defense;
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•HR 1678 IH
(B) at least 1 representative shall be from
1
the intelligence community, designated by the
2
Director of National Intelligence;
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(C) at least 1 representative shall be from
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the Department of Justice, designated by the
5
United States Attorney General;
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(D) at least 1 representative shall be from
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the Department of Energy, designated by the
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Secretary of Energy; and
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(E) at least 1 representative shall be from
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each of the following offices of the Department
11
of Education, as appointed and named by the
12
Secretary of Education:
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(i) Office of Postsecondary Education.
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(ii) Office of Planning, Evaluation,
15
and Policy Development.
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(iii) Office of the General Counsel.
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(iv) Any other office the Secretary of
18
Education determines to be appropriate.
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(2) MEMBERSHIP
LIST.—Not later than 10
20
days after the first meeting of the Task Force, the
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Task Force shall submit to Congress a list identi-
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fying each member of the Task Force.
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(c) SENSITIVE
RESEARCH
PROJECT
LIST.—The
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Task Force shall, in consultation with the Office of the
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Director of National Intelligence, actively maintain a list
1
of sensitive research projects. Such list shall—
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(1) be referred to as the Sensitive Research
3
Projects List; and
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(2) for each project included on the list, indi-
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cate—
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(A) the qualified funding agency that is
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funding the project;
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(B) whether the project is open to student
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participation; and
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(C) whether the project is related to—
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(i) an item listed on the Commerce
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Control List (CCL) maintained by the De-
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partment of Commerce;
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(ii) an item listed on the United
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States Munitions List maintained by the
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Department of State; or
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(iii) technology designated by the Sec-
18
retary of Defense as having a technology
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readiness level of 1, 2, or 3.
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(d) CONSULTATION WITH OIG.—The Task Force
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shall periodically, but no less than annually, consult with
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the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of
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Education, which shall include annual reports to the Of-
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fice of the Inspector General on the activities of the Task
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•HR 1678 IH
Force, with an opportunity for the Office of the Inspector
1
General to provide active feedback related to such activi-
2
ties.
3
(e) INSTRUCTION
TO INSTITUTIONS
OF HIGHER
4
EDUCATION.—Not less than once every six months, the
5
Task Force shall provide relevant instruction to institu-
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tions of higher education at which research projects on
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the Sensitive Research Project List are being carried out.
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Such instruction shall provide the institutions of higher
9
education with information related to the threat posed by
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espionage, best practices identified by the Task Force,
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and, to the extent possible, any specific risks that the in-
12
telligence community, the qualified funding agency, or law
13
enforcement entities determine appropriate to share with
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the institutions.
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(f) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than one year
16
after the date of enactment of this Act, and every six
17
months thereafter, the Task Force shall provide a report
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to the Committee on Education and Labor, the Committee
19
on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee
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on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and to
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the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pen-
22
sions, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select
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Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, regarding the
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threat of espionage at institutions of higher education. In
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•HR 1678 IH
each such briefing, the Task Force shall identify actions
1
that may be taken to reduce espionage carried out through
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student participation in sensitive research projects. The
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Task Force shall also include in this report an assessment
4
of whether the current licensing regulations relating to the
5
International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Export
6
Administration Regulations are sufficient to protect the
7
security of the projects listed on the Sensitive Research
8
Project List.
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SEC. 4. FOREIGN STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN SENSITIVE
10
RESEARCH PROJECTS.
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(a) APPROVAL OF FOREIGN STUDENT PARTICIPA-
12
TION REQUIRED.—Beginning on the date that is one year
13
after the date of enactment of this Act, for each project
14
on the Sensitive Research Project List that is open to stu-
15
dent participation, the head of such project at the institu-
16
tion of higher education at which the project is being car-
17
ried out shall ensure that each student participating in
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such project shall be required to provide proof of citizen-
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ship before the student is permitted to participate in such
20
project. A student who is a citizen of a country identified
21
in subsection (b) shall be permitted to participate in such
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a project only if—
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(1) the student applies for, and receives ap-
24
proval from, the Director of National Intelligence to
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•HR 1678 IH
participate in such project, based on a background
1
check and any other information the Director deter-
2
mines to be appropriate; and
3
(2) in the case of such a project that is related
4
to an item or technology described in subparagraph
5
(C) of section 3(c)(2), the student applies for, and
6
receives approval from, the head of the qualified
7
funding agency, to participate in such project.
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(b) LIST OF CITIZENSHIP REQUIRING APPROVAL.—
9
Approval under subsection (a) shall be required for any
10
student who is a citizen of a country that is one of the
11
following:
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(1) The People’s Republic of China.
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(2) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
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(3) The Russian Federation.
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(4) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
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(5) Any country identified by the head of the
17
qualified funding agency as requiring approval for
18
the purposes of this section.
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SEC. 5. FOREIGN ENTITIES.
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(a) LIST OF FOREIGN ENTITIES THAT POSE AN IN-
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TELLIGENCE THREAT.—Not later than one year after the
22
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
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Intelligence shall identify foreign entities, including gov-
24
ernments, corporations, non-profit and for-profit organiza-
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•HR 1678 IH
tions, and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity,
1
that the Director determines pose a threat of espionage
2
with respect to sensitive research projects, and shall de-
3
velop and maintain a list of such entities. The Director
4
may add or remove entities from such list at any time.
5
The initial list developed by the Director shall include the
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following entities (including any subsidiary or affiliate):
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(1) Huawei Technologies Company.
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(2) ZTE Corporation.
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(3) Hytera Communications Corporation.
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(4) Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology
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Company.
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(5) Dahua Technology Company.
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(6) Kaspersky Lab.
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(7) Any entity that is owned or controlled by,
15
or otherwise has demonstrated financial ties to, the
16
government of a country identified under section
17
4(b).
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(b) NOTICE
TO INSTITUTIONS
OF HIGHER EDU-
19
CATION.—The Director of National Intelligence shall
20
make the initial list required under subsection (a), and
21
any changes to such list, available to the Secretary of Edu-
22
cation, the Task Force, and the head of each qualified
23
funding agency as soon as practicable. The Secretary of
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Education shall provide such initial list and subsequent
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amendments to each institution of higher education at
1
which a project on the Sensitive Research Project List is
2
being carried out.
3
(c) PROHIBITION
ON
USE
OF
CERTAIN
TECH-
4
NOLOGIES.—Beginning on the date that is one year after
5
the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each
6
sensitive research project shall, as a condition of receipt
7
of funds from a qualified funding agency, provide an as-
8
surance to such qualified funding agency that, beginning
9
on the date that is two years after the date of the enact-
10
ment of this Act, any technology developed by an entity
11
included on the list maintained under subsection (a) shall
12
not be utilized in carrying out the sensitive research
13
project.
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SEC. 6. ENFORCEMENT.
15
The head of each qualified funding agency shall take
16
such steps as may be necessary to enforce the provisions
17
of sections 4 and 5 of this Act. Upon determination that
18
the head of a sensitive research project has failed to meet
19
the requirements of either section 4 or section 5, the head
20
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