Responsible Withdrawal from Syria Act

I 116TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 914 To limit the use of funds to reduce the total number of members of the Armed Forces serving on active duty who are deployed to Syria, and for other purposes. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 30, 2019 Mr. MALINOWSKI (for himself, Mr. TAYLOR, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. GALLAGHER, Mr. KIM, Ms. STEFANIK, Mr. ROSE of New York, and Mr. HURD of Texas) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services A BILL To limit the use of funds to reduce the total number of members of the Armed Forces serving on active duty who are deployed to Syria, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Responsible With- 4 drawal from Syria Act’’. 5 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:27 Feb 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H914.IH H914 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 914 IH SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS TO REDUCE THE 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF THE 2 ARMED FORCES SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY 3 WHO ARE DEPLOYED TO SYRIA. 4 (a) LIMITATION.—None of the funds made available 5 to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2019 may 6 be used to reduce the total number of members of the 7 United States Armed Forces serving on active duty who 8 are deployed to Syria below 1,500, unless and until the 9 Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Di- 10 rector of National Intelligence submit to the relevant con- 11 gressional committees a report that addresses the fol- 12 lowing: 13 (1) The current strength and regenerative ca- 14 pacity of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 15 including an assessment of how many fighters ISIS 16 fields in Syria and Iraq, the threat it continues to 17 pose to the United States and its allies, its likely re- 18 action to the withdrawal of United States and coali- 19 tion forces, and of the operational risks involved 20 with conducting counter-ISIS operations following a 21 withdrawal. 22 (2) The Administration’s military and political 23 strategy for meeting any remaining threat from 24 ISIS. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:27 Feb 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H914.IH H914 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 914 IH (3) The viability of the Syrian Democratic 1 Forces (SDF) to remain a viable fighting force in 2 the absence of a United States military presence in 3 Syria. 4 (4) Whether the Euphrates will remain the aer- 5 ial and land deconfliction line between United 6 States-backed forces and Assad regime forces and 7 their allies, and if so, how will the Administration 8 ensure it will be respected. 9 (5) Actions the Administration plans to take to 10 ensure the safety of Syrian nationals who took part 11 in or provided support to the coalition to defeat 12 ISIS, including members of the SDF, and the form 13 and amount of assistance the Administration plans 14 to provide to the SDF following a withdrawal of 15 United States and coalition forces. 16 (6) The likelihood that the Assad regime and 17 its allies, including Hezbollah and Iranian forces, 18 will retake areas where United States personnel and 19 Syrian allies have operated or created demilitarized 20 zones, and the actions the Administration plans to 21 take to ensure the safety, and prevent the exodus, 22 of civilians living in those areas. 23 (7) The actions the Administration plans to 24 take to ensure the safety of civilians living in refugee 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:27 Feb 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H914.IH H914 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 914 IH camps that may fall under the control of the Assad 1 regime following withdrawal of United States forces, 2 including Rubkan Camp, and to ensure access by 3 humanitarian organizations to areas being vacated 4 by United States forces and Syrian allies. 5 (8) The expected windfall in oil revenue the 6 Assad regime is likely to gain if the regime or its al- 7 lies retake areas currently held by United States-al- 8 lied groups. 9 (9) The impact a withdrawal from Syria would 10 have on Iranian power and influence in the Middle 11 East, including an assessment of the current status 12 of Iranian backed forces in Syria, whether with- 13 drawal is likely to make easier Iranian advanced 14 weapon transfers to Syria and Lebanon, the impact 15 on the security of Israel, the prospect of large scale 16 conflict between Israel and Iran in Syria and Leb- 17 anon, and a strategy to counter any such threats. 18 (10) The impact any United States withdrawal 19 from Syria would have on Russian power and influ- 20 ence in the Middle East. 21 (11) The impact any United States withdrawal 22 from Syria would have on diplomatic efforts to end 23 the Syrian conflict, and on United States influence 24 on those efforts, including a statement of the Ad- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:27 Feb 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H914.IH H914 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 914 IH ministration’s current diplomatic objectives in that 1 process. 2 (12) The commitments, if any, Turkey has ex- 3 tended with respect to fighting ISIS and refraining 4 from military action against the Kurds following a 5 withdrawal of United States forces. 6 (13) The commitments, if any, Saudi Arabia or 7 any coalition partners have made to assist in Syria’s 8 reconstruction, including any plans to ensure that 9 funding of these efforts are transparent and ac- 10 countable. 11 (14) Any efforts the Administration plans to 12 undertake to support legitimate, effective and demo- 13 cratic local governance in areas from which United 14 States and coalition forces are withdrawing, to di- 15 minish the likelihood that extremist forces will re- 16 turn. 17 (15) Any consultations that have taken place 18 with coalition allies in Operation Inherent Resolve 19 about withdrawal of forces from Syria, including 20 how the governments of Israel, Jordan, Saudi Ara- 21 bia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Russia, Iran, 22 the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Turkey 23 and the Kurdistan Regional Government are likely 24 to respond to any withdrawal. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:27 Feb 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H914.IH H914 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 914 IH (16) The assurances, if any, that religious and 1 ethnic minority communities will be secure from 2 ISIS threats. 3 (b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) 4 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain 5 a classified annex. 6 (c) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Defense may waive 7 the limitation under subsection (a) if, upon advice of the 8 relevant military commanders, the Secretary determines 9 that the waiver is necessary due to an imminent and ex- 10 traordinary threat to members of the United States 11 Armed Forces in Syria. 12 (d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act 13 may be construed to obstruct or prevent the normal rota- 14 tion of United States Armed Forces into and out of Syria. 15 (e) RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE- 16 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘relevant congressional 17 committees’’ means— 18 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 19 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep- 20 resentatives; and 21 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 22 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. 23 Æ VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:27 Feb 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6301 E:\BILLS\H914.IH H914 pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS