Taiwan Defense Act of 2021

II 117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION S. 2073 To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES JUNE 16, 2021 Mr. HAWLEY (for himself, Mr. TILLIS, Mr. TUBERVILLE, Mr. DAINES, and Mr. CORNYN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and re- ferred to the Committee on Armed Services A BILL To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Defense Act 4 of 2021’’. 5 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 6 In this Act: 7 (1) DENY.—The term ‘‘deny’’ means to use 8 combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ul- 9 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:12 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2073.IS S2073 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 2 •S 2073 IS timately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic 1 of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, 2 resulting in— 3 (A) the termination of hostilities or at 4 least the attempted fait accompli; or 5 (B) the neutralization of the ability of the 6 People’s Republic of China to execute a fait 7 accompli against Taiwan. 8 (2) FAIT ACCOMPLI.—The term ‘‘fait accompli’’ 9 refers to the strategy of the People’s Republic of 10 China for invading and seizing control of Taiwan be- 11 fore the United States Armed Forces can respond 12 effectively, while simultaneously deterring an effec- 13 tive combined joint response by the United States 14 Armed Forces by convincing the United States that 15 mounting such a response would be prohibitively dif- 16 ficult or costly. 17 SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 18 Congress makes the following findings: 19 (1) Taiwan is a beacon of democracy in Asia 20 and a steadfast partner of the United States in the 21 common pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific re- 22 gion in which— 23 (A) all societies enjoy sovereign autonomy; 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:12 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2073.IS S2073 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 3 •S 2073 IS (B) the people of the region live securely, 1 prosperously, and with dignity; and 2 (C) the societies of the region rise and fall 3 not by coercion but on the basis of peaceful 4 competition. 5 (2) If the People’s Republic of China were to 6 use military force to compel the unification of Tai- 7 wan with the People’s Republic of China— 8 (A) the world would lose one of the great 9 exemplars of freedom and democracy; 10 (B) the United States and allies and part- 11 ners of the United States would face severe dif- 12 ficulty in maintaining favorable balances of 13 power relative to the People’s Republic of China 14 in Northeast and Southeast Asia; and 15 (C) as the balance of power in the Indo- 16 Pacific region shifted in favor of the People’s 17 Republic of China, the People’s Republic of 18 China would possess an increasing ability to— 19 (i) impose its will throughout the 20 Indo-Pacific region, including by threat- 21 ening or using force against Japan, South 22 Korea, the Philippines, and other allies 23 and partners of the United States; and 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:12 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2073.IS S2073 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 4 •S 2073 IS (ii) restrict United States access to 1 key trade routes and markets in the Indo- 2 Pacific region, thereby imposing economic 3 hardship on middle-class and working-class 4 Americans and increasing the ability of the 5 People’s Republic of China to intrude into 6 political life in the United States. 7 (3) There is growing concern that the Govern- 8 ment of the People’s Republic of China may con- 9 clude that the cross-Strait military balance has tilted 10 in its favor and launch an invasion of Taiwan sooner 11 than previously anticipated, including as follows: 12 (A) Former Assistant to the President for 13 National Security Affairs H.R. McMaster testi- 14 fied in March 2021 that Taiwan is ‘‘the most 15 significant flashpoint now’’ between the United 16 States and the People’s Republic of China. 17 (B) Commander of United States Indo-Pa- 18 cific Command Admiral John Aquilino testified 19 in March 2021 that the threat of an invasion 20 by the People’s Republic of China of Taiwan is 21 ‘‘much closer to us than most think’’ and could 22 materialize well before 2035. 23 (C) Former Commander of United States 24 Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Phil Davidson 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:12 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2073.IS S2073 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 5 •S 2073 IS testified in March 2021 that the threat of an 1 invasion by the People’s Republic of China of 2 Taiwan ‘‘is manifest during this decade, in fact 3 in the next six years’’. 4 (4) Defense policymakers and analysts across 5 multiple administrations have found that, if the Peo- 6 ple’s Republic of China does invade Taiwan, the in- 7 vasion will likely take the form of a fait accompli, 8 including as follows: 9 (A) The Defense Science Board assessed in 10 June 2018 that the People’s Republic of China 11 ‘‘will attempt to achieve a decisive outcome very 12 quickly, presenting the United States and its al- 13 lies with a fait accompli,’’ in the event of con- 14 flict. 15 (B) The Department of Defense Indo-Pa- 16 cific Strategy Report released in June 2019 17 found that— 18 (i) if the People’s Republic of China 19 or another strategic competitor in the 20 Indo-Pacific region decides ‘‘to advance 21 their interests through force, they are like- 22 ly to enjoy a local military advantage at 23 the onset of conflict. In a fait accompli sce- 24 nario, competitors would seek to employ 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:12 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2073.IS S2073 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 6 •S 2073 IS their capabilities quickly to achieve limited 1 objectives and forestall a response from the 2 United States, and its allies and partners’’; 3 and 4 (ii) an attempted fait accompli by the 5 People’s Republic of China or another 6 strategy competitor would constitute one of 7 the ‘‘most stressing potential scenarios’’ 8 facing the United States Armed Forces. 9 (C) The Tri-Service Maritime Strategy re- 10 leased by the United States Navy, United 11 States Marine Corps, and United States Coast 12 Guard in December 2020 stated, ‘‘In the event 13 of conflict, China . . . will likely attempt to 14 seize territory before the United States and its 15 allies can mount an effective response—leading 16 to a fait accompli.’’. 17 (D) The Army Multi-Domain Trans- 18 formation strategic guidance released by Army 19 Chief of Staff General James McConville in 20 March 2021 stated that China and other adver- 21 saries of the United States will seek to ‘‘seize 22 their objectives quickly as a fait accompli,’’ if 23 the Joint Force ‘‘cannot present credible deter- 24 rent options’’. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:12 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2073.IS S2073 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 7 •S 2073 IS (E) Then-Acting Secretary of Defense Pat- 1 rick Shanahan testified in March 2019 that the 2 Government of the People’s Republic of China 3 is developing capabilities that could be used to 4 ‘‘achieve a ‘fait accompli’ that would make re- 5 versing Chinese gains more difficult, militarily 6 and politically’’. 7 (F) Special Assistant to the Secretary of 8 Defense for China Ely Ratner assessed in Jan- 9 uary 2020 that ‘‘China has made significant in- 10 vestments in long-range ISR and strike assets’’ 11 and ‘‘China hopes the threat of these attacks 12 will deter U.S. intervention by negating a sub- 13 stantial portion of U.S. airpower early in a con- 14 flict, thereby creating time and space for a fait 15 accompli’’. 16 (G) Former Under Secretary of Defense 17 for Policy Miche`le Flournoy warned in June 18 2020 that the Government of the People’s Re- 19 public of China may believe the United States 20 ‘‘lack[s] the military capabilities that might be 21 effective in the face of A2/AD’’ and ‘‘conclude 22 that China should move on Taiwan sooner rath- 23 er than later, a fait accompli that a weakened 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:12 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2073.IS S2073 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 8 •S 2073 IS and distracted United States would have to ac- 1 cept’’. 2 (5) There is broad agreement that the United 3 States should maintain the ability of the United 4 States Armed Forces to defeat a fait accompli by the 5 People’s Republic of China, including as follows: 6 (A) The National Defense Strategy Com- 7 mission assessed in November 2018 that com- 8 peting successfully in ‘‘the Indo-Pacific region, 9 while also managing escalation dynamics, re- 10 quires positioning substantial capability forward 11 . . . to deter and prevent a fait accompli by an 12 agile, opportunistic adversary’’. 13 (B) Then-Acting Secretary of Defense Pat- 14 rick Shanahan testified in March 2019 that im- 15 plementation of the 2018 National Defense 16 Strategy was required to ensure the United 17 States had ‘‘the capabilities, posture, and em- 18 ployment of forces’’ necessary to prevent a fait 19 accompli by the People’s Republic of China. 20 (C) Assistant to the President for National 21 Security Affairs Jake Sullivan and Deputy As- 22 sistant to the President and Coordinator for 23 Indo-Pacific Affairs on the National Security 24 Council Kurt Campbell warned in September 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:12 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2073.IS S2073 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 9 •S 2073 IS 2019 that ‘‘Beijing cannot be allowed to use the 1 threat of force to pursue a fait accompli in ter- 2 ritorial disputes’’. 3 (D) Former Under Secretary of Defense 4 for Policy James Miller wrote in October 2020 5 that ‘‘U.S. defense planners must maintain a 6 laser focus on a scenario for which U.S. forces 7 are ill-prepared today, in which China . . . 8 see[s] the opportunity for a quick invasion of a 9 U.S. partner or ally and attempt[s] to impose 10 a fait accompli that would be costly and risky 11 to reverse’’. 12 (E) In January 2021, Secretary of Defense 13 Lloyd Austin upheld the assessment by the 14 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report that Department 15 of Defense ‘‘initiatives on force employment, 16 crisis response, force and concept development, 17 and collaboration with allies and partners’’ 18 should be ‘‘aimed to help address this critical 19 challenge’’ of a potential fait accompli scenario 20 involving the People’s Republic of China. 21 (F) Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen 22 Hicks testified in February 2021 that the Peo- 23 ple’s Republic of China is ‘‘less likely’’ to at- 24 tempt a fait accompli against Taiwan if it 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:12 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2073.IS S2073 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 10 •S 2073 IS knows that the United States will be able to de- 1 feat such an attempt, and that the United 2 States should therefore maintain the ability to 3 defeat a fait accompli by the People’s Republic 4 of China against Taiwan. 5 (G) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 6 Colin Kahl, Admiral Aquilino, and Admiral Da- 7 vidson testified in March 2021 that they agreed 8 with the testimony by Deputy Secretary Hicks, 9 and that the United States should maintain the 10 ability to defeat a fait accompli by the People’s 11 Republic of China against Taiwan in order to 12 strengthen deterrence against such a contin- 13 gency. 14 (H) Former Assistant to the President and 15 Deputy National Security Advisor Matt 16 Pottinger testified in June 2021 that ‘‘the De- 17 partment of Defense must ensure that it can 18 deny China’s ability to forcibly subordinate Tai- 19 wan, including through a fait accompli at- 20 tempt,’’ and that ‘‘time is running short’’ to do 21 so. 22 (I) Secretary Austin testified in June 2021 23 that the United States should maintain its abil- 24 ity to defeat a Chinese fait accompli against 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:12 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2073.IS S2073 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 11 •S 2073 IS Taiwan, including by maintaining a combat- 1 credible forward deterrent posture. 2 (6) There is likewise broad agreement that a 3 strategy of denial is essential to deter or defeat a 4 fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China 5 against Taiwan, including as follows: 6 (A) The 2018 National Defense Strategy 7 tasked the Department of Defense with pos- 8 turing and employing forces to ‘‘delay, degrade, 9 or deny adversary aggression’’. 10 (B) Secretary Austin argued in January 11 2021 that a ‘‘combat-credible, forward deter- 12 rent posture is instrumental to the United 13 States military’s ability to deter, and if nec- 14 essary, deny a fait accompli scenario’’. 15 (C) Deputy Secretary Hicks, Under Sec- 16 retary Kahl, Admiral Aquilino, and Admiral 17 Davidson reaffirmed the emphasis by Secretary 18 Austin on denial and testified that a strategy of 19 denial is essential for deterring Chinese aggres- 20 sion. 21 (D) The Joint Operating Concept for De- 22 terrence Operations released in December 2017 23 states that forward-deployed forces contribute 24 to ‘‘denying benefits’’ and thereby reduce ‘‘the 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:12 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2073.IS S2073 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 12 •S 2073 IS likelihood of an adversary achieving strategic or 1 tactical surprise, thus helping to prevent adver- 2 sary decision makers from concluding they 3 might achieve a military fait accompli that 4 could be extremely costly for the US to reverse 5 by force’’. 6 (E) The United States Army’s Multi-Do- 7 main Operations concept document released in 8 December 2018 states that Army forces must 9 demonstrate the capability ‘‘to immediately 10 deny a fait accompli’’ in order to deter a near- 11 peer adversary. 12 (F) The Marine Corps Force Design 2030 13 report released in March 2020 states that for- 14 ward-deployed forces possess the capability to 15 ‘‘attrite adversary forces, enable joint force ac- 16 cess requirements, complicate targeting and 17 consume adversary ISR resources, and prevent 18 fait accompli scenarios’’. 19 (G) The Tri-Service Maritime Strategy di- 20 rects the United States Navy, United States [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]