HALT Act of 2021

I 117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 3837 To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United States, and for other purposes. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUNE 11, 2021 Mr. MCGOVERN (for himself, Mr. BEYER, Mr. BLUMENAUER, and Mr. GARAMENDI) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on For- eign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the juris- diction of the committee concerned A BILL To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United States, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Hastening Arms Limi- 4 tations Talks Act of 2021’’ or the ‘‘HALT Act of 2021’’. 5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6 Congress makes the following findings: 7 VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:28 Jun 29, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3837.IH H3837 lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 3837 IH (1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an exis- 1 tential threat to humanity, a fact that led President 2 Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorba- 3 chev to declare in a joint statement in 1987 that a 4 ‘‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 5 fought’’. 6 (2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 7 people attended the largest peace rally in United 8 States history, in support of a movement to freeze 9 and reverse the nuclear arms race, a movement that 10 helped to create the political will necessary for the 11 negotiation of several bilateral arms control treaties 12 between the United States and former Soviet Union, 13 and then the Russian Federation. Those treaties 14 contributed to strategic stability through mutual and 15 verifiable reciprocal nuclear weapons reductions. 16 (3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 17 1945, millions of people around the world have stood 18 up to demand meaningful, immediate international 19 action to halt, reduce, and eliminate the threats 20 posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing, 21 and nuclear war, to humankind and the planet. 22 (4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera- 23 tion of Nuclear Weapons done at Washington, Lon- 24 don, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483) (com- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:28 Jun 29, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3837.IH H3837 lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 3837 IH monly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation 1 Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’) entered into force, which in- 2 cludes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weapon 3 states (commonly referred to as the ‘‘P5’’), among 4 other things, ‘‘to pursue negotiations in good faith 5 on effective measures relating to the cessation of the 6 nuclear arms race . . . and to nuclear disar- 7 mament’’. 8 (5) Bipartisan United States global leadership 9 has curbed the growth in the number of countries 10 possessing nuclear weapons and has slowed overall 11 vertical proliferation among countries already pos- 12 sessing nuclear weapons, as is highlighted by a more 13 than 85-percent reduction in the United States nu- 14 clear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of 15 31,255 in 1967. 16 (6) The United States testing of nuclear weap- 17 ons is no longer necessary as a result of the fol- 18 lowing major technical developments since the Sen- 19 ate’s consideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear- 20 Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to as the 21 ‘‘CTBT’’) in 1999: 22 (A) The verification architecture of the 23 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Orga- 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:28 Jun 29, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3837.IH H3837 lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 3837 IH nization (commonly referred to as the 1 ‘‘CTBTO’’)— 2 (i) has made significant advance- 3 ments, as seen through its network of 300 4 International Monitoring Stations and its 5 International Data Centre, which together 6 provide for the near instantaneous detec- 7 tion of nuclear explosives tests, including 8 all 6 such tests conducted by North Korea 9 between 2006 and 2017; and 10 (ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 11 days a week. 12 (B) Since the United States signed the 13 CTBT, confidence has grown in the science- 14 based Stockpile Stewardship and Management 15 Plan of the Department of Energy, which forms 16 the basis of annual certifications to the Presi- 17 dent regarding the continual safety, security, 18 and effectiveness of the United States nuclear 19 deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, 20 leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest 21 Moniz to remark in 2015 that ‘‘lab directors 22 today now state that they certainly understand 23 much more about how nuclear weapons work 24 than during the period of nuclear testing’’. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:28 Jun 29, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3837.IH H3837 lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 3837 IH (7) Despite the progress made to reduce the 1 number and role of, and risks posed by, nuclear 2 weapons, and to halt the Cold War-era nuclear arms 3 race, tensions between countries that possess nuclear 4 weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk reduction 5 treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles of 6 weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a quali- 7 tative global nuclear arms race is now underway 8 with each of the countries that possess nuclear 9 weapons spending tens of billions of dollars each 10 year to maintain and improve their arsenals. 11 (8) The Russian Federation is pursuing the de- 12 velopment of destabilizing types of nuclear weapons 13 that are not presently covered under any existing 14 arms control treaty or agreement and the People’s 15 Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and North 16 Korea have each taken concerning steps to diversify 17 their more modest sized, but nonetheless very dead- 18 ly, nuclear arsenals. 19 (9) Former President Donald J. Trump’s 2018 20 Nuclear Posture Review called for the development 21 two new nuclear weapons capabilities, which have 22 the effect of lowering the threshold for nuclear weap- 23 ons use: 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:28 Jun 29, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3837.IH H3837 lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 3837 IH (A) A low-yield warhead on a submarine- 1 launched ballistic missile, which was deployed 2 before the date of the enactment of this Act. 3 (B) A sea-launched cruise missile, still 4 under development on the date of the enact- 5 ment of this Act. 6 (10) On February 3, 2021, President Joseph R. 7 Biden preserved binding and verifiable limits on the 8 deployed and non-deployed strategic forces of the 9 largest two nuclear weapons powers through the 10 five-year extension of the Treaty between the United 11 States of America and the Russian Federation on 12 Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 13 of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, 14 and entered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly 15 referred to as the ‘‘New START Treaty’’). 16 (11) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons 17 employment strategy of the United States submitted 18 under section 492 of title 10, United States Code, 19 determined that it is possible to ensure the security 20 of the United States and allies and partners of the 21 United States and maintain a strong and credible 22 strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a 1⁄3 23 reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level 24 established in the New START Treaty. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:28 Jun 29, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3837.IH H3837 lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with BILLS 7 •HR 3837 IH (12) On January 12, 2017, then-Vice President 1 Biden stated, ‘‘[G]iven our non-nuclear capabilities 2 and the nature of today’s threats—it’s hard to envi- 3 sion a plausible scenario in which the first use of nu- 4 clear weapons by the United States would be nec- 5 essary. Or make sense.’’. 6 (13) In light of moves by the United States and 7 other countries to increase their reliance on nuclear 8 weapons, a global nuclear freeze would seek to halt 9 the new nuclear arms race by seeking conclusion of 10 a comprehensive and verifiable freeze on the testing, 11 deployment, and production of nuclear weapons and 12 delivery vehicles for such weapons. 13 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 14 The following is the policy of the United States: 15 (1) The United States should build upon its 16 decades long, bipartisan efforts to reduce the num- 17 ber and salience of nuclear weapons by leading inter- 18 national negotiations on specific arms-reduction 19 measures as part of a 21st century global nuclear 20 freeze movement. 21 (2) Building on the successful extension of the 22 New START Treaty, the United States should en- 23 gage with all other countries that possess nuclear 24 weapons to seek to negotiate and conclude future 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:28 Jun 29, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3837.IH H3837 lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with BILLS 8 •HR 3837 IH multilateral arms control, disarmament, and risk re- 1 duction agreements, which should contain some or 2 all of the following provisions: 3 (A) An agreement by the United States 4 and the Russian Federation on a follow-on trea- 5 ty or agreement to the New START Treaty 6 that may lower the central limits of the Treaty 7 and cover new kinds of strategic delivery vehi- 8 cles or non-strategic nuclear weapons. 9 (B) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on 10 the testing, production, and further deployment 11 of all nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for 12 such weapons. 13 (C) An agreement that establishes a 14 verifiable numerical ceiling on the deployed 15 shorter-range and intermediate-range and stra- 16 tegic delivery systems (as defined by the INF 17 Treaty and the New START Treaty, respec- 18 tively) and the nuclear warheads associated 19 with such systems belonging to the P5, and to 20 the extent possible, all countries that possess 21 nuclear weapons, at August 2, 2019, levels. 22 (D) An agreement by each country to 23 adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weap- 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:28 Jun 29, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3837.IH H3837 lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with BILLS 9 •HR 3837 IH ons or provide transparency into its nuclear de- 1 claratory policy. 2 (E) An agreement on a proactive United 3 Nations Security Council resolution that ex- 4 pands access by the International Atomic En- 5 ergy Agency to any country found by the Board 6 of Governors of that Agency to be noncompliant 7 with its obligations under the NPT. 8 (F) An agreement to refrain from config- 9 uring nuclear forces in a ‘‘launch on warning’’ 10 or ‘‘launch under warning’’ nuclear posture, 11 which may prompt a nuclear armed country to 12 launch a ballistic missile attack in response to 13 detection by an early-warning satellite or sensor 14 of a suspected incoming ballistic missile. 15 (G) An agreement not to target or inter- 16 fere in the nuclear command, control, and com- 17 munications (commonly referred to as ‘‘NC3’’) 18 infrastructure of another country through a ki- 19 netic attack or a cyberattack. 20 (H) An agreement on transparency meas- 21 ures or verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic 22 cruise missiles and glide vehicles that are fired 23 from sea-based, ground, and air platforms. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:28 Jun 29, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3837.IH H3837 lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with BILLS 10 •HR 3837 IH (I) An agreement to provide a baseline and 1 continuous exchanges detailing the aggregate 2 number of active nuclear weapons and associ- 3 ated systems possessed by each country. 4 (3) The United States should rejuvenate efforts 5 in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament 6 toward the negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Mate- 7 rial Treaty or Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, or 8 move negotiations to another international body or 9 fora, such as a meeting of the P5. Successful conclu- 10 sion of such a treaty would verifiably prevent any 11 country’s production of highly enriched uranium and 12 plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. 13 (4) The United States should convene a series 14 of head-of-state level summits on nuclear disar- 15 mament modeled on the Nuclear Security Summits 16 process, which saw the elimination of the equivalent 17 of 3,000 nuclear weapons. 18 (5) The President should seek ratification by 19 the Senate of the CTBT and mobilize all countries 20 covered by Annex 2 of the CTBT to pursue similar 21 action to hasten entry into force of the CTBT. The 22 entry into force of the CTBT, for which ratification 23 by the United States will provide critical momentum, 24 will activate the CTBT’s onsite inspection provision 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:28 Jun 29, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3837.IH H3837 lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with BILLS 11 •HR 3837 IH to investigate allegations that any country that is a 1 party to the CTBT has conducted a nuclear test of 2 any yield. 3 (6) The President should make the accession of 4 North Korea to the CTBT a component of any final 5 agreement in fulfilling the pledges the Government 6 of North Korea made in Singapore, as North Korea 7 is reportedly the only country to have conducted a 8 nuclear explosive test since 1998. 9 (7) The United States should— 10 (A) refrain from developing any new de- 11 signs for nuclear warheads or bombs, but espe- 12 cially designs that could add a level of technical 13 uncertainty into the United States stockpile and 14 thus renew calls to resume nuclear explosive 15 testing in order to test that new design; and 16 (B) seek reciprocal commitments from 17 other countries that possess nuclear weapons. 18 SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR 19 TEST EXPLOSIONS. 20 (a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds authorized to 21 be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 22 2022 or any fiscal year thereafter, or authorized to be ap- 23 propriated or otherwise made available for any fiscal year 24 before fiscal year 2022 and available for obligation as of 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:28 Jun 29, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3837.IH H3837 lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with BILLS 12 •HR 3837 IH the date of the enactment of this Act, may be obligated 1 or expended to conduct or make preparations for any ex- 2 plosive nuclear weapons test that produces any y [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]