Iran Sanctions Preservation Act

II 117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION S. 1950 To impose strict conditions on the lifting of sanctions imposed with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MAY 27, 2021 Mr. LANKFORD (for himself, Mr. CORNYN, and Mr. SCOTT of South Carolina) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs A BILL To impose strict conditions on the lifting of sanctions imposed with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Iran Sanctions Preser- 4 vation Act’’. 5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6 Congress makes the following findings: 7 (1) The Islamic Republic of Iran is the world’s 8 leading state sponsor of terrorism and has been des- 9 VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:41 Jun 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1950.IS S1950 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 2 •S 1950 IS ignated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the 1 United States since 1984. 2 (2) Iran’s support for terrorism, development of 3 nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and gross vio- 4 lations of human rights are a threat to the security 5 interests of the United States and the rules-based 6 international order. 7 (3) Iran has given ballistic missiles, conven- 8 tional weapons, and technical support to Hamas, the 9 Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Taliban, Ansar Allah 10 (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Houthis’’) in Yemen, 11 Shia militias in Iraq, the Assad regime in Syria, and 12 Hezbollah in Lebanon, which those proxies have 13 used to implement terrorist attacks throughout the 14 world that have killed citizens of the United States 15 and its allies. 16 (4) Iran continues to hold United States citi- 17 zens hostage, including Bob Levinson, Baquer and 18 Siamak Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, and Emad Shargi, 19 while also serving as a safe harbor for senior leaders 20 of al Qaeda such as Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi. 21 (5) The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 22 (commonly referred to as the ‘‘JCPOA’’), which was 23 finalized by President Barack Obama and the re- 24 spective governments of the United Kingdom, Ger- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:41 Jun 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1950.IS S1950 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 3 •S 1950 IS many, France, the People’s Republic of China, and 1 the Russian Federation (commonly referred to as 2 the ‘‘P5+1’’) on July 14, 2015, permitted Iran to 3 continue uranium enrichment at 3.67 percent levels 4 and possess more 6,000 IR–1 centrifuges, thereby 5 failing to eliminate Iran’s pathway to a nuclear 6 weapon. 7 (6) The JCPOA contained sunset provisions 8 that allow Iran to increase its number of IR–1 cen- 9 trifuges and resume operation of IR–2 centrifuges 10 after 10 years, and exceed the 3.67 percent uranium 11 enrichment threshold after 15 years. 12 (7) The verification and compliance mecha- 13 nisms of the JCPOA were insufficient to ensure and 14 enforce compliance, allowing the International Atom- 15 ic Energy Agency only limited access to select facili- 16 ties and establishing a protracted process to request 17 access to sites suspected of hosting activity incon- 18 sistent with Iran’s obligations under the JCPOA. 19 (8) Iran repeatedly violated numerous provi- 20 sions of the JCPOA by maintaining more advanced 21 centrifuges than was permitted, exceeding the limits 22 on heavy water stocks, and refusing to grant inter- 23 national inspectors access to nuclear research and 24 military facilities, among other violations. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:41 Jun 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1950.IS S1950 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 4 •S 1950 IS (9) A central strategic flaw of the JCPOA was 1 its exclusive focus on Iran’s nuclear program apart 2 from its support for terrorism, which was bolstered 3 by the more than $100,000,000,000 in sanctions re- 4 lief it received under the deal. 5 (10) The JCPOA contained no provisions ad- 6 dressing Iran’s development of ballistic and cruise 7 missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. 8 (11) The JCPOA failed to address the human 9 rights record of the Iranian regime, including the re- 10 gime’s suppression of free speech, a free press, 11 peaceful assembly, and the free exercise of religion. 12 (12) Iran is one of the world’s worst human 13 rights violators, having received a 16 out of 100 14 ‘‘Global Freedom Score’’ and a 15 out of 100 15 ‘‘Internet Freedom Score’’ from Freedom House, 16 and has been designated as a country of particular 17 concern for religious freedom under section 18 402(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the International Religious Free- 19 dom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6442(b)(1)(A)(ii)) for 20 its suppression of religious freedom since 1999. 21 (13) On May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump 22 announced that the United States would withdraw 23 from the JCPOA and resumed the application of 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:41 Jun 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1950.IS S1950 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 5 •S 1950 IS sanctions against Iranian actors, thereby depriving 1 the regime of revenue to support terrorism. 2 (14) On May 21, 2018, Secretary of State Mike 3 Pompeo announced that the Trump administration 4 would ‘‘apply unprecedented financial pressure on 5 the Iranian regime’’ and laid out 12 steps that Iran 6 must take to receive sanctions relief and reestablish 7 normal relations with the United States, including— 8 (A) providing the International Atomic En- 9 ergy Agency a full account of the prior military 10 dimensions of its nuclear program and perma- 11 nently and verifiably abandoning such work in 12 perpetuity; 13 (B) stopping enrichment of plutonium re- 14 processing and committing to refrain from re- 15 suming such work; 16 (C) permitting the International Atomic 17 Energy Agency to access all sites throughout 18 the entire country; 19 (D) ending its proliferation of ballistic mis- 20 siles and ceasing further development of such 21 systems; 22 (E) releasing all United States citizens, as 23 well as citizens of United States partners and 24 allies, who are currently detained; 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:41 Jun 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1950.IS S1950 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 6 •S 1950 IS (F) discontinuing its support for terrorist 1 groups in the Middle East, including Hezbollah, 2 Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad; 3 (G) respecting the sovereignty of Iraq by 4 ending its support for Shia militias; 5 (H) ending its military support for the 6 Ansar Allah in Yemen; 7 (I) withdrawing all forces under Iranian 8 command from the entirety of Syria; 9 (J) ending support for the Taliban in Af- 10 ghanistan and for senior al Qaeda leaders 11 around the region; 12 (K) ending the Iranian Revolutionary 13 Guard Corp’s support for terrorist groups and 14 proxies worldwide; and 15 (L) ceasing its threatening behavior 16 against its neighbors, many of which are allies 17 of the United States. 18 (15) The financial sector of Iran, including the 19 Central Bank of Iran, is designated as a primary 20 money laundering concern under section 5318A of 21 title 31, United States Code, because of the threat 22 to government and financial institutions resulting 23 from the illicit activities of the Government of Iran, 24 including its pursuit of nuclear weapons, support for 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:41 Jun 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1950.IS S1950 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 7 •S 1950 IS international terrorism, and efforts to deceive re- 1 sponsible financial institutions and evade sanctions. 2 (16) On April 22, 2019, President Trump an- 3 nounced that the United States would no longer 4 issue exemptions under section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the 5 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 6 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(D)), inhibiting the 7 ability of countries to purchase Iranian petroleum 8 products or conduct transactions with the Central 9 Bank of Iran as a result of the exposure to sanc- 10 tions. 11 (17) Following the decision to discontinue 12 issuance of those exemptions, Iran’s average daily 13 sales of crude oil declined from an estimated 14 2,400,000 barrels per day in May 2018 to an esti- 15 mated 1,300,000 in 2020. 16 (18) The decline in revenue and decrease in ex- 17 ports have reportedly forced the Iranian energy sec- 18 tor to cut the number of newly drilled oil wells from 19 300 in 2018 to 11 in 2020. 20 (19) Iran has reportedly stockpiled 60,000,000 21 barrels of crude oil and is preparing to return to 22 production levels of nearly 4,000,000 barrels a day 23 should sanctions relief be provided. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:41 Jun 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1950.IS S1950 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 8 •S 1950 IS (20) On December 31, 2019, Iranian President 1 Hassan Rouhani admitted that Iran had lost 2 $200,000,000,000 in revenue because of United 3 States sanctions. 4 (21) Iran’s 2019 defense budget cut defense 5 spending by 28 percent, including a 17 percent cut 6 to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a 7 designated foreign terrorist organization. 8 (22) Following United States withdrawal from 9 the JCPOA, the value of Iran’s currency reached 10 historical lows, with the rial losing around 70 per- 11 cent of its value. 12 (23) According to the International Monetary 13 Fund, Iran’s accessible foreign exchange reserves de- 14 creased by more 96 percent to $4,000,000,000 in 15 2020 from $123,000,000,000 in 2018, depleting the 16 revenue stream for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 17 Corps, Hezbollah, and Iranian-backed militias. 18 (24) During the maximum pressure campaign, 19 the United States was able to secure the release of 20 2 hostages in Iran, Xiyue Wang and Michael White, 21 without lifting sanctions or transferring cash to 22 Iran. 23 (25) President Joe Biden has reportedly offered 24 to lift sanctions, including sanctions on the Central 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:41 Jun 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1950.IS S1950 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 9 •S 1950 IS Bank of Iran, if the Government of Iran agrees to 1 return to the JCPOA. 2 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 3 It is the sense of Congress that the United States 4 should not offer preemptive sanctions relief that benefits 5 Iran’s oil industry, financial services sector, or supporters 6 of terrorism unless and until the Senate provides advice 7 and consent under section 2 of article II of the Constitu- 8 tion of the United States to a treaty addressing Iran’s de- 9 stabilizing activities. 10 SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON SANCTIONS RELIEF FOR PETRO- 11 LEUM PURCHASES FROM IRAN. 12 Section 1245(d) of the National Defense Authoriza- 13 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)) is 14 amended by striking paragraphs (4) and (5) and inserting 15 the following: 16 ‘‘(4) NO AUTHORITY TO WAIVE.—On and after 17 the date of the enactment of the Iran Sanctions 18 Preservation Act, the President may not issue any 19 waiver of sanctions with respect to or license to au- 20 thorize the purchase of petroleum or petroleum 21 products from Iran.’’. 22 VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:41 Jun 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1950.IS S1950 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 10 •S 1950 IS SEC. 5. CONDITIONS ON SANCTIONS RELIEF FOR SUP- 1 PORTERS OF IRAN’S MALIGN ACTIVITIES. 2 (a) IN GENERAL.—An Iranian person may not be re- 3 moved from the SDN list unless the President submits 4 to the appropriate congressional committees a certification 5 that the individual has not provided financial, material, 6 or technical support or contributions to— 7 (1) a terrorist organization or in support of ter- 8 rorism; or 9 (2) the development of nuclear weapons or their 10 means of delivery (including missiles capable of de- 11 livering such weapons) by the Government of Iran. 12 (b) FORM OF CERTIFICATION.—A certification under 13 subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but 14 may include a classified annex. 15 SEC. 6. CONDITIONS ON SANCTIONS RELIEF FOR IRANIAN 16 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. 17 (a) CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN.—The Central Bank of 18 Iran may not be removed from the SDN list until the ter- 19 mination date described in section 8. 20 (b) IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—An Iranian 21 financial institution may not be removed from the SDN 22 list unless the President submits to the appropriate con- 23 gressional committees a certification that the Iranian fi- 24 nancial institution has not facilitated a transaction or pro- 25 vided material support to— 26 VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:41 Jun 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1950.IS S1950 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 11 •S 1950 IS (1) the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; 1 (2) any foreign terrorist organization; or 2 (3) any Iranian person the property or interests 3 in property of which are blocked pursuant to the 4 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 5 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). 6 (c) JURISDICTIONS OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUN- 7 DERING CONCERN.—The designation of Iran as a jurisdic- 8 tion of primary money laundering concern pursuant to sec- 9 tion 5318A of title 31, United States Code, may not be 10 revoked unless the President submits to the appropriate 11 congressional committees a certification that Iran is no 12 longer engaged in— 13 (1) any illicit financial activities, including sup- 14 port for terrorism; 15 (2) nuclear proliferation activities; or 16 (3) ballistic missile acquisition or development. 17 (d) FORM OF CERTIFICATION.—A certification under 18 subsection (b) or (c) shall be submitted in unclassified 19 form but may include a classified annex. 20 SEC. 7. SUPPORT FOR THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. 21 It shall be the policy of the United States— 22 (1) to support the rights of the people of Iran 23 to exercise the freedom of speech, assembly, religion, 24 and the press; 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:41 Jun 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1950.IS S1950 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 12 •S 1950 IS (2) to condemn Iran’s destabilizing activities, 1 including the suppression of protests and demonstra- 2 tions in Iran; 3 (3) to promote a free and open internet in Iran 4 by supporting internet freedom programs and invest- 5 ing in firewall circumvention technologies; 6 (4) to defend the rights of women in Iran; and 7 (5) to hold leader [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]