What This Bill Does
This bill allows the President to impose sanctions against Chinese government officials and institutions if China does not allow an international investigation into the origins of COVID-19 at laboratories in Wuhan within 90 days of the law taking effect. The sanctions include freezing assets, denying visas, and blocking federal research funding with Chinese institutions.
Who It Affects
Leaders of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and its affiliated institutes. Chinese Communist Party officials, People's Liberation Army officials, and Chinese government officials from specific agencies who were involved in concealing or obstructing information about the COVID-19 outbreak. United States researchers and institutions that receive federal funding. United States citizens and permanent residents.
Key Provisions
• The President must impose sanctions on Chinese officials if China does not allow a transparent international investigation of suspect laboratories in Wuhan within 90 days of enactment (Sec. 2(a)).
• Sanctions include freezing and blocking all transactions involving the property and financial interests of targeted individuals if that property is in the United States or controlled by a United States person (Sec. 2(c)(1)).
• The President must deny visas and entry to the United States for all individuals targeted by sanctions, and must revoke any existing visas they hold (Sec. 2(c)(2)).
• Federal funding is prohibited for any joint research projects between United States and Chinese Academy of Sciences researchers (Sec. 2(a)(2)).
• United States researchers and institutions receiving federal funding cannot participate in gain-of-function research collaborations with Chinese institutions (Sec. 2(a)(3)).
What Changes
If China does not allow the investigation described in the bill, the President will be required to freeze the assets of targeted Chinese officials, deny them entry to the United States, and cut off federal funding for collaborative research between American and Chinese Academy of Sciences researchers. These measures remain in place until China allows and completes a transparent investigation that meets the detailed requirements specified in the bill.
Important Definitions
"Gain-of-function research of concern" means genetic engineering or laboratory methods reasonably expected to increase a virus's ability to spread to humans or cause disease in humans, or serial passage methods in laboratory cultures or animals with the same expected results, or certain laboratory research on dangerous pathogens conducted at biosafety level three or lower (Sec. 2(f)(2)).
"Transparent international forensic investigation" means an objective, data-driven investigation with broad expertise and independent oversight that requires China to open all relevant records and facilities to an international team, grant unfettered access to personnel and sites, provide epidemiological and virological data including early COVID-19 cases in Wuhan from fall and winter 2019, allow full forensic examination of multiple Wuhan laboratories, and permit the team to review laboratory logs, notebooks, virus cultures, genetic sequences, databases, and patient specimens from 2007 onward, including access to approximately 22,000 samples and virus sequences previously taken offline in September 2019 (Sec. 2(f)(3)).
Effective Date
The President has 90 days after the date the law takes effect to certify that China has allowed the investigation. If no certification is made within that timeframe, sanctions must be imposed (Sec. 2(a)).
II
118TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
S. 588
To impose sanctions and other measures in response to the failure of the
Government of the People’s Republic of China to allow an investigation
into the origins of COVID–19 at suspect laboratories in Wuhan.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MARCH 1, 2023
Mr. RUBIO (for himself, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. MARSHALL, Mr. LANKFORD, Mr.
CRAMER, Mr. WICKER, Ms. LUMMIS, Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mr. TILLIS, Mr.
HOEVEN, Mr. DAINES, Mr. BRAUN, Mrs. HYDE-SMITH, Mr. SCOTT of
South Carolina, and Mr. SCOTT of Florida) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
A BILL
To impose sanctions and other measures in response to the
failure of the Government of the People’s Republic of
China to allow an investigation into the origins of
COVID–19 at suspect laboratories in Wuhan.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
1
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
3
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Coronavirus Origin
4
Validation, Investigation, and Determination Act of 2023’’
5
or the ‘‘COVID Act of 2023’’.
6
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SEC. 2. MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO FAILURE OF THE GOV-
1
ERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
2
CHINA TO ALLOW AN INVESTIGATION OF SUS-
3
PECT LABORATORIES IN WUHAN.
4
(a) IN GENERAL.—If, by not later than the date that
5
is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
6
the President is unable to certify that the Government of
7
the People’s Republic of China has allowed a transparent
8
international forensic investigation of suspect laboratories
9
in Wuhan to commence, including of the Wuhan Institute
10
of Virology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (in this
11
section referred to as ‘‘CAS’’), the President shall—
12
(1) impose the sanctions described in subsection
13
(c) with respect to—
14
(A) individuals who hold positions of lead-
15
ership in the state-run CAS, including its affili-
16
ated institutes and laboratories, local branches,
17
and universities; and
18
(B) individuals who—
19
(i) are officials of the Chinese Com-
20
munist Party, the People’s Liberation
21
Army, or the State Council of the People’s
22
Republic of China, including its subordi-
23
nate agencies, such as the Ministry of
24
Science and Technology, the National
25
Health Commission, the Chinese Center
26
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•S 588 IS
for Disease Control and Prevention, the
1
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry
2
of Emergency Management, and the Min-
3
istry of Public Security; and
4
(ii) were involved in concealing the
5
initial outbreak of COVID–19 in the Peo-
6
ple’s Republic of China from the inter-
7
national community, restricting the release
8
of information related to the outbreak, un-
9
derstating the severity of the outbreak, or
10
obstructing an international investigation
11
into the origin of the outbreak;
12
(2) prohibit Federal funding for any joint re-
13
search or other collaborative projects between United
14
States-based researchers and CAS researchers
15
across all academic fields, including those employed
16
by the affiliated institutes and laboratories of CAS,
17
its local branches or universities, or the science and
18
technology enterprises based in the People’s Repub-
19
lic of China that were created by CAS or founded
20
with CAS investment; and
21
(3) prohibit United States-based researchers
22
and institutions that receive Federal funding from
23
engaging in collaborative projects involving gain-of-
24
function research of concern on viruses with individ-
25
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uals or institutions based in the People’s Republic of
1
China.
2
(b) TERMINATION.—The requirements of subsection
3
(a) shall terminate on the date on which the Government
4
of the People’s Republic of China allows the transparent
5
international forensic investigation described in that sub-
6
section to be conducted and concluded without—
7
(1) imposition of restrictions on the scope or
8
subject matter of the investigation; or
9
(2) limitations on the access of investigators to
10
physical sites, persons of interest, information on
11
laboratory biosafety incidents, or relevant molecular,
12
genetic, epidemiological, serological, and virological
13
data.
14
(c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions to be
15
imposed under subsection (a)(1) are the following:
16
(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—
17
(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall ex-
18
ercise all of the powers granted to the President
19
under the International Emergency Economic
20
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the ex-
21
tent necessary to block and prohibit all trans-
22
actions in property and interests in property de-
23
scribed in subparagraph (B) if such property
24
and interests in property are in the United
25
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States, come within the United States, or are or
1
come within the possession or control of a
2
United States person.
3
(B) PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROP-
4
ERTY DESCRIBED.—The property and interests
5
in property described in this subparagraph are
6
property or interests in property of—
7
(i) an individual described in sub-
8
section (a)(1); or
9
(ii) any family member or associate
10
acting for or on behalf of an individual de-
11
scribed in subsection (a)(1) and to whom
12
that individual transfers such property or
13
interests in property after the date on
14
which the President designates the indi-
15
vidual for the imposition of sanctions
16
under that subsection.
17
(2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR
18
PAROLE.—
19
(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An
20
alien described in subsection (a)(1) is—
21
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
22
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
23
documentation to enter the United States;
24
and
25
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(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
1
or paroled into the United States or to re-
2
ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-
3
tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et
4
seq.).
5
(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—
6
(i) IN GENERAL.—An alien described
7
in subsection (a)(1) is subject to revocation
8
of any visa or other entry documentation
9
regardless of when the visa or other entry
10
documentation is or was issued.
11
(ii) IMMEDIATE
EFFECT.—A revoca-
12
tion under clause (i) shall—
13
(I) take effect immediately; and
14
(II) automatically cancel any
15
other valid visa or entry documenta-
16
tion that is in the alien’s possession.
17
(d) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—
18
(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex-
19
ercise the authorities provided to the President
20
under sections 203 and 205 of the International
21
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702
22
and 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out this
23
section.
24
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(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at-
1
tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a
2
violation of subsection (c)(1) or any regulation, li-
3
cense, or order issued to carry out that subsection
4
shall be subject to the penalties set forth in sub-
5
sections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter-
6
national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
7
U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that
8
commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a)
9
of that section.
10
(e) EXCEPTIONS.—
11
(1) EXCEPTION
FOR
INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVI-
12
TIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply
13
to any activity subject to the reporting requirements
14
under title V of the National Security Act of 1947
15
(50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intel-
16
ligence activities of the United States.
17
(2) EXCEPTION
TO
COMPLY
WITH
INTER-
18
NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND FOR LAW ENFORCE-
19
MENT
ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions
under
subsection
20
(c)(2) shall not apply with respect to an alien if ad-
21
mitting or paroling the alien into the United States
22
is necessary—
23
(A) to permit the United States to comply
24
with the Agreement regarding the Head-
25
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•S 588 IS
quarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake
1
Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force
2
November 21, 1947, between the United Na-
3
tions and the United States, or other applicable
4
international obligations; or
5
(B) to carry out or assist law enforcement
6
activity in the United States.
7
(3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF
8
GOODS.—
9
(A) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and re-
10
quirements to impose sanctions authorized
11
under this section shall not include the author-
12
ity or a requirement to impose sanctions on the
13
importation of goods.
14
(B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph,
15
the term ‘‘good’’ means any article, natural or
16
manmade substance, material, supply, or manu-
17
factured product, including inspection and test
18
equipment, and excluding technical data.
19
(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
20
(1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms
21
‘‘admission’’, ‘‘admitted’’, and ‘‘alien’’ have the
22
meanings given those terms in section 101 of the
23
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
24
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•S 588 IS
(2) GAIN-OF-FUNCTION
RESEARCH
OF
CON-
1
CERN.—The term ‘‘gain-of-function research of con-
2
cern’’ means, with respect to the study of viruses—
3
(A) the use of genetic engineering or nu-
4
cleic acid synthesis methods reasonably antici-
5
pated to increase a pathogen’s transmissibility,
6
or pathogenicity to humans, or to alter a patho-
7
gen’s host tropism to include humans;
8
(B) the use of serial passage methods in a
9
laboratory culture or in laboratory animals rea-
10
sonably anticipated to increase a pathogen’s
11
transmissibility, or pathogenicity to humans, or
12
to alter a pathogen’s host tropism to include
13
humans; or
14
(C) any research conducted in a laboratory
15
setting less than Biosafety Level Three that in-
16
volves pathogens or potential pathogens known
17
to be, or that can be reasonably anticipated to
18
be, infectious to humans through the inhalation
19
route of exposure, and known to cause, or that
20
can be reasonably anticipated to cause, serious
21
to fatal disease.
22
(3) TRANSPARENT
INTERNATIONAL
FORENSIC
23
INVESTIGATION.—The
term
‘‘transparent
inter-
24
national forensic investigation’’, with respect to in-
25
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•S 588 IS
vestigating the origin of SARS–CoV–2, means an in-
1
quiry that is objective, data-driven, inclusive of
2
broad expertise, subject to independent oversight,
3
and properly managed to exclude individuals with
4
conflicts of interest and under which the following
5
takes place:
6
(A) Relevant research funding agencies,
7
funding contractors, laboratories, and hospitals
8
open their records to examination by the inves-
9
tigative team and grant the investigative team
10
unfettered access to any and all facilities, per-
11
sonnel, and other sites of interest, and to any
12
and all forms of epidemiological or virological
13
data of interest, including serological records
14
pertaining to the earliest confirmed or sus-
15
pected cases of COVID–19, or cases of similar
16
illnesses that may have been misdiagnosed,
17
which appeared in and around Wuhan in the
18
fall and winter of 2019. Investigators document
19
the veracity and source of the data upon which
20
their analysis is based in a manner that allows
21
independent experts to reproduce their analysis
22
and validate any conclusions they may draw.
23
(B) The international team is allowed to
24
perform a full forensic investigation of the
25
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Wuhan Institute of Virology, the Wuhan Center
1
for Disease Prevention and Control, and the
2
Wuhan Institute of Biological Products, and all
3
other laboratories in Wuhan that the team
4
might identify as warranting examination. The
5
team is allowed to review the biosafety level
6
under which bat coronavirus research was con-
7
ducted, and to interview any and all personnel
8
currently or previously employed at those lab-
9
oratories, or related experts who may have in-
10
formation pertinent to the investigation. All lab-
11
oratory logs and notebooks kept by Shi Zhengli
12
and other researchers at the Wuhan Institute of
13
Virology who have conducted gain-of-function
14
experiments between 2007 and the date of the
15
enactment of this Act, as well as their published
16
and unpublished work in Chinese and English,
17
are presented in a full and unaltered condition
18
for examination by the team. The team is given
19
unlimited access to the full range of virus cul-
20
tures, isolates, genetic sequences, databases,
21
and patient specimens stored at these facilities
22
as well as all chimeric synthetic viruses grown
23
in vitro by cell culture passaging or engineered
24
by genomic editing between 2007 and the date
25
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of the enactment of this Act. Such access must
1
include the opportunity to examine the Wuhan
2
Institute of Virology’s database of approxi-
3
mately 22,000 samples and virus sequences, in-
4
cluding 15,000 taken from bats, which was pre-
5
viously available to the public but taken offline
6
in September 2019. The team is further allowed
7
to examine in full all training procedures in ef-
8
fect at the laboratory prior to the pandemic, in-
9
cluding those pertaining to record-keeping and
10
safety procedures and strategies to prevent the
11
accidental
[Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]