Democracy Technology Partnership Act

I 117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 3426 To authorize the establishment of a Technology Partnership among democratic countries, and for other purposes. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY 20, 2021 Mr. MOULTON (for himself, Mr. KEATING, and Mr. KINZINGER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs A BILL To authorize the establishment of a Technology Partnership among democratic countries, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Democracy Technology 4 Partnership Act’’. 5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6 Congress finds the following: 7 (1) The 21st century will increasingly be de- 8 fined by economic competition rooted in techno- 9 logical advances. Leaders in adopting emerging tech- 10 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 3426 IH nologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum 1 computing, biotechnology, and next-generation tele- 2 communications, and those who shape the use of 3 such technologies, will garner economic, military, 4 and political strength for decades. 5 (2) These technologies offer opportunities for 6 the empowerment of citizens, but also and challenges 7 to basic norms of democratic governance and inter- 8 nationally recognized human rights. The collection 9 and analysis of data from individuals allows govern- 10 ments to know more about their residents’ behaviors, 11 preferences, interests, and activities than was pos- 12 sible years ago. The concentration of this data in 13 key technologies, such as smart phones, search data- 14 bases, and facial recognition databases, along with 15 the sharing of data among governments, creates 16 pressing concerns about individuals’ scope to exer- 17 cise their fundamental political and social rights. 18 (3) This challenge arises as the integrity and 19 efficacy of post-World War II international institu- 20 tions are increasingly challenged. New approaches to 21 multilateral cooperation and arrangements are need- 22 ed to tackle the challenges ahead to ensure that the 23 United States continues to lead in critical tech- 24 nologies. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 3426 IH (4) As information and communications tech- 1 nologies have matured and increasingly mediate 2 large swathes of social, political and economic activ- 3 ity, it is incumbent on democratic governments to 4 address the ways in which these technologies have 5 undermined democratic values, consumer protec- 6 tions, and social cohesion. Moreover, as authori- 7 tarian regimes increasingly shape and deploy tech- 8 nologies to bolster repression, stifle free expression, 9 and interfere with free and fair elections in other 10 countries, the world’s advanced democracies will 11 need to shape technology standards so that emerging 12 and critical technologies reflect democratic values, 13 including freedom of expression and privacy. 14 (5) Technological leadership by the world’s 15 major liberal-democratic nations collectively will be 16 essential to safeguarding democratic institutions, 17 norms, and values, and contributing to global peace 18 and prosperity, especially as authoritarian govern- 19 ments seek to promote closed information systems 20 and technology that is not interoperable, often 21 through trade and investment practices that are in- 22 compatible with global norms. A unified approach by 23 like-minded nations is needed to counteract growing 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 3426 IH investments in, and deployments of, emerging tech- 1 nologies by authoritarian powers. 2 (6) In addition to the development of emerging 3 technologies, democratic nations must lead in shap- 4 ing expectations for the responsible use of such tech- 5 nologies and push back against laissez faire ap- 6 proaches and authoritarian interests on internet gov- 7 ernance advanced in multilateral forums by— 8 (A) advocating against efforts to crim- 9 inalize or limit political dissent and freedom of 10 speech online, such as those spearheaded by the 11 Russian Federation, which seek to undermine 12 the Council of Europe’s Convention on 13 Cybercrime, done at Budapest November 23, 14 2001, in favor of a statist alternative; and 15 (B) prioritizing protections for elections, 16 and other processes essential for healthy democ- 17 racies, from cyber-attack. 18 (7) The world’s leading democracies must also 19 confront new challenges to their market-driven eco- 20 nomic systems to ensure their continued leadership 21 in technology and innovation. The People’s Republic 22 of China (referred to in this Act as the ‘‘PRC’’) is 23 pursuing an industrial policy to achieve dominance 24 in key technologies, including 5G, artificial intel- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 3426 IH ligence (referred to in this section as ‘‘AI’’), quan- 1 tum computing, hypersonics, biotechnology, space 2 capabilities, and autonomous vehicles. 3 (8) The PRC seeks to use technological superi- 4 ority for national security, military-civil fusion, and 5 economic gains, according to its strategic plans, in- 6 cluding— 7 (A) the Made in China 2025 strategy; 8 (B) the Five-Year Plan for Standardiza- 9 tion and China Standards 2035; 10 (C) the 2006 Medium-to-Long Term S&T 11 Plan; 12 (D) the 2010 State Council Decision on 13 Accelerating the Development of Strategic 14 Emerging Industries; and 15 (E) the 13th Five-Year Plan for the Devel- 16 opment of Strategic Emerging Industries. 17 (9) The PRC seeks to advance in areas in 18 which democratic countries currently have a techno- 19 logical advantage and move ahead in emerging tech- 20 nologies where China seeks a unique opportunity to 21 overtake such countries. 22 (10) For many years, the PRC has pursued in- 23 dustrial policies and discriminatory trade practices 24 that include— 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 3426 IH (A) heavily subsidizing Chinese companies, 1 restricting foreign competition, conducting 2 forced technology transfers, and using both licit 3 and illicit means to access research and devel- 4 opment around technologies in order to advan- 5 tage Chinese companies in specific technology 6 fields; 7 (B) providing significant government fund- 8 ing for research and development in the PRC in 9 specific technologies to build future competitive- 10 ness; 11 (C) seeking to ensure global adoption of 12 Chinese technologies, and the success of Chi- 13 nese firms, especially in emerging and strategic 14 markets, through significant foreign direct in- 15 vestment, low-cost financing and comprehensive 16 services for foreign development projects, 17 through initiatives such as the Belt and Road 18 Initiative, which includes the Digital Silk Road 19 and the Health Silk Road, as well as the Smart 20 City Initiative, efforts centered on promoting 21 the use of Chinese exports by offering far 22 cheaper rates and bundling these deals into 23 larger development and aid packages; 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 7 •HR 3426 IH (D) aiding the adoption of Chinese-led 1 standards for digital technologies and products 2 through compensating Chinese firms that sub- 3 mit standards and flooding forums with tech- 4 nical experts; and 5 (E) leveraging the international standard 6 setting bodies to advance the vision of the PRC 7 regarding standards and technologies. 8 (11) As a result of these practices in support of 9 Chinese companies, the PRC is increasing its influ- 10 ence in AI, 5G, and a wide range of other science 11 and technology disciplines that constitute long-term 12 economic and security threats to the United States, 13 its allies, and like-minded partners. According to 14 market research firm Dell’Oro Group, Huawei’s 15 share of worldwide telecommunications revenue 16 equipment grew from 20 percent in 2014 to 31 per- 17 cent in 2020. 18 (12) While the United States semiconductor in- 19 dustry is the worldwide industry leader with approxi- 20 mately 50 percent of global market share and sales 21 of $193,000,000,000 in 2019, the situation may be 22 changing. In 2019, all 6 of the new semiconductor 23 fabrication plants that opened worldwide were lo- 24 cated outside of the United States, with 4 of these 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 8 •HR 3426 IH plants built in China. The Government of the PRC 1 plans to spend $150,000,000,000 on its computer 2 chip industry during the next 10 years. 3 (13) The PRC uses technologies, such as AI, 4 facial recognition, and biometrics, to increase control 5 over its population, facilitating mass surveillance, 6 scalable censorship, and technology-enabled social 7 control, including against ethnic and religious mi- 8 norities including Tibetans, Uyghurs, ethnic 9 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim mi- 10 nority groups. 11 (14) The PRC uses its economic power to co- 12 erce and censor companies, individuals and coun- 13 tries. 14 (15) In the past decade, the Government of the 15 PRC— 16 (A) blocked exports of rare earth elements 17 to Japan; 18 (B) threatened to curtail domestic sales of 19 German cars; 20 (C) cut off tourism to South Korea; 21 (D) restricted banana imports from the 22 Philippines; and 23 (E) imposed large tariffs on Australian 24 barley exports. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 9 •HR 3426 IH (16) The Government of the PRC— 1 (A) has banned United States technology 2 companies, including Facebook, Google, and 3 Twitter; 4 (B) has pressured movie studios based in 5 the United States to alter content in movies 6 that it deemed objectionable; and 7 (C) has retaliated against a range of 8 American companies for actual or perceived 9 support for a range of political positions, in- 10 cluding recognizing territorial claims of coun- 11 tries in border disputes with China, recognizing 12 Tibet, and more. 13 (17) Third countries have become particular 14 targets of Chinese investments in technology. These 15 third country investments provide access to innova- 16 tion, data that allows Chinese companies to refine 17 their own systems, and influence over the policies of 18 these governments. The terms on which Chinese in- 19 vestments are made often are attractive in the short- 20 term but create conditions for Chinese ownership of, 21 or influence over, major industries in those coun- 22 tries. 23 (18) After decades of being the world leader in 24 key technologies, the United States is at risk of fall- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 10 •HR 3426 IH ing behind the PRC in key technologies of the fu- 1 ture. While private-sector research and development 2 investments have steadily increased in the United 3 States, Federal Government spending has declined 4 as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product from ap- 5 proximately 1.2 percent in 1976 to approximately 6 0.7 percent in 2018. The decline has been even 7 steeper in the physical sciences. The Federal Gov- 8 ernment plays a unique and critical role in Amer- 9 ica’s innovation ecosystem. Government research and 10 development spending spurs private-sector invest- 11 ments, and the United States Government remains 12 the largest source of basic research funding, which 13 is foundational to game-changing technological 14 achievements. 15 (19) During the past several years, the PRC 16 has quadrupled its research and development spend- 17 ing and is on the brink of surpassing the United 18 States in total investments in key technologies, with 19 its growth in research and development spending 20 doubling the United States Government’s spending 21 increase in this area. Chinese patent publications 22 have surged in the fields of artificial intelligence, 23 machine learning, and deep learning. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 11 •HR 3426 IH (20) The United States is highly dependent on 1 China for key components of critical technologies in 2 its supply chains, such as rare earths. 3 (21) The United States remains a leader in the 4 science and technology areas of engineering and biol- 5 ogy as well as key components, including tele- 6 communications equipment and semiconductors. The 7 United States does not have a domestic manufac- 8 turer of radio access network equipment for 5G net- 9 works, but is well-positioned to lead in 6G tele- 10 communications, which depend on software and 11 semiconductors, areas of United States strength. 12 (22) Other countries have unique knowledge, 13 expertise, and capabilities in numerous cutting edge 14 technologies, including semiconductor manufacturing 15 equipment, such as extreme ultraviolet lithography 16 machines for semiconductor fabrication and machine 17 tools for fabrication of custom components. In order 18 to successfully compete against the PRC, the United 19 States must partner with such countries. 20 (23) The private sector in the United States 21 and partner countries, including Japan, Korea, Aus- 22 tralia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the 23 European Union has considerable expertise in both 24 technology and in standard setting, given the role of 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 12 •HR 3426 IH the private sector in international standard setting 1 bodies, but this expertise can be better leveraged in 2 shaping United States technology policy. 3 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 4 It is the sense of Congress that— 5 (1) emerging technology governance regimes 6 driven by undemocratic governments that do not re- 7 flect demo [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]