Strategic Competition Act of 2021

II Calendar No. 54 117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION S. 1169 To address issues involving the People’s Republic of China. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES APRIL 15, 2021 Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Mr. RISCH, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. COONS, Mr. KAINE, and Mr. VAN HOLLEN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations MAY 10, 2021 Reported by Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself and Mr. RISCH), with an amendment [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic] A BILL To address issues involving the People’s Republic of China. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 3 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 4 ‘‘Strategic Competition Act of 2021’’. 5 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 6 this Act is as follows: 7 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:25 May 10, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6401 E:\BILLS\S1169.RS S1169 pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS 2 •S 1169 RS Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Findings. Sec. 3. Definitions. Sec. 4. Statement of policy. Sec. 5. Sense of Congress. Sec. 6. Rules of construction. TITLE I—INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE Subtitle A—Science and Technology Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply chain diversification and management. Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure Development Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined. Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure investment standards. Sec. 113. United States support for infrastructure. Sec. 114. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network. Sec. 115. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure. Sec. 116. Report on China’s investments in foreign energy development. Subtitle C—Digital Technology and Connectivity Sec. 121. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues. Sec. 122. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership. Subtitle D—Countering Chinese Communist Party Influence Sec. 131. Short title. Sec. 132. Authorization. Sec. 133. Findings on Chinese information warfare and malign influence oper- ations. Sec. 134. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program. Sec. 135. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and discrimination. Sec. 136. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation. Sec. 137. Global engagement center. Sec. 138. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States of certain foreign gifts to and contracts with institutions of higher education. TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters Sec. 201. Appropriate congressional committees defined. Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. Sec. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad. Sec. 204. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN. Sec. 205. Sense of Congress on enhancing United States-ASEAN cooperation on technology issues with respect to the People’s Republic of China. Sec. 206. Report on Chinese influence in international organizations. Sec. 207. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners. Sec. 208. Technology partnership office at the Department of State. VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:25 May 10, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6411 E:\BILLS\S1169.RS S1169 pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS 3 •S 1169 RS Sec. 209. United States representation in standards-setting bodies. Sec. 210. Sense of Congress on centrality of sanctions and other restrictions to strategic competition with China. Sec. 211. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 countries on the People’s Republic of China. Sec. 212. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership. Sec. 213. Treatment of Taiwan government. Sec. 214. Report on origins of the COVID–19 pandemic. Sec. 215. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic engagement with Pacific island countries. Sec. 216. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources devoted to the Indo-Pacific. Sec. 217. Advancing United States leadership in the United Nations System. Subtitle B—International Security Matters Sec. 221. Definitions. Sec. 222. Findings. Sec. 223. Sense of Congress regarding bolstering security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. Sec. 224. Statement of policy. Sec. 225. Foreign military financing in the Indo-Pacific and authorization of appropriations for Southeast Asia maritime security programs and diplomatic outreach activities. Sec. 226. Foreign military financing compact pilot program in the Indo-Pacific. Sec. 227. Additional funding for international military education and training in the Indo-Pacific. Sec. 228. Prioritizing excess defense article transfers for the Indo-Pacific. Sec. 229. Prioritizing excess naval vessel transfers for the Indo-Pacific. Sec. 230. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in inter- national waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on ar- tificial land features in the South China Sea. Sec. 231. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners. Sec. 232. Report on national technology and industrial base. Sec. 233. Report on diplomatic outreach with respect to Chinese military instal- lations overseas. Sec. 234. Statement of policy regarding universal implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea. Sec. 235. Limitation on assistance to countries hosting Chinese military instal- lations. Subtitle C—Regional Strategies To Counter the People’s Republic of China Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners around the world with respect to the People’s Republic of China. PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE Sec. 245. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations. Sec. 246. Sense of Congress regarding the Government of China’s arbitrary im- prisonment of Canadian citizens. Sec. 247. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada. Sec. 248. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin America and the Carib- bean. VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:25 May 10, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6411 E:\BILLS\S1169.RS S1169 pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS 4 •S 1169 RS Sec. 249. Engagement in regional and international organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean. Sec. 250. Addressing China’s sovereign lending practices in Latin America and the Caribbean. Sec. 251. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean. Sec. 252. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of perva- sive surveillance technologies. PART II—TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on the Transatlantic Alliance. Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to the People’s Republic of China. Sec. 257. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private sector fi- nance. Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and be- tween China and Russia. PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia. Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia. PART IV—AFRICA Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of the People’s Republic of China in Africa. Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa. Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa. Sec. 274. Increasing personnel in United States embassies in sub-Saharan Afri- ca focused on the People’s Republic of China. Sec. 275. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative. Sec. 276. Africa broadcasting networks. PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the Middle East and North Africa. Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement. PART VI—ARCTIC REGION Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy. PART VII—OCEANIA Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania. Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap. TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES Sec. 301. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in Hong Kong. Sec. 302. Imposition of sanctions relating to forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:25 May 10, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6411 E:\BILLS\S1169.RS S1169 pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS 5 •S 1169 RS Sec. 303. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, coercive abor- tion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implanta- tion in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT Sec. 401. Findings and sense of Congress regarding the PRC’s industrial pol- icy. Sec. 402. Intellectual property violators list. Sec. 403. Government of the People’s Republic of China subsidies list. Sec. 404. Countering foreign corrupt practices. Sec. 405. Debt relief for countries eligible for assistance from the International Development Association. Sec. 406. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China ex- ploits Hong Kong to circumvent United States laws and pro- tections. Sec. 407. Annual review on the presence of Chinese companies in United States capital markets. TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY Sec. 501. Findings on strategic security and arms control. Sec. 502. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue. Sec. 503. Report on United States efforts to engage the People’s Republic of China on nuclear issues and ballistic missile issues. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 1 Congress makes the following findings: 2 (1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is 3 leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, mili- 4 tary, technological, and ideological power to become 5 a strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the 6 United States. The policies increasingly pursued by 7 the PRC in these domains are contrary to the inter- 8 ests and values of the United States, its partners, 9 and much of the rest of the world. 10 (2) The current policies being pursued by the 11 PRC— 12 (A) threaten the future character of the 13 international order and are shaping the rules, 14 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:25 May 10, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6401 E:\BILLS\S1169.RS S1169 pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS 6 •S 1169 RS norms, and institutions that govern relations 1 among states; 2 (B) will put at risk the ability of the 3 United States to secure its national interests; 4 and 5 (C) will put at risk the future peace, pros- 6 perity, and freedom of the international commu- 7 nity in the coming decades. 8 (3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with 9 the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked 10 to advance the PRC’s economic and social develop- 11 ment to ensure that it participated in, and benefitted 12 from, the free and open international order. The 13 United States pursued these goals and contributed 14 to the welfare of the Chinese people by— 15 (A) increasing the PRC’s trade relations 16 and access to global capital markets; 17 (B) promoting the PRC’s accession to the 18 World Trade Organization; 19 (C) providing development finance and 20 technical assistance; 21 (D) promoting research collaboration; 22 (E) educating the PRC’s top students; 23 (F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge 24 technologies and scientific knowledge; and 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:25 May 10, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6401 E:\BILLS\S1169.RS S1169 pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS 7 •S 1169 RS (G) providing intelligence and military as- 1 sistance. 2 (4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to 3 pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an 4 increasingly authoritarian governance model at home 5 through increased restrictions on personal freedoms, 6 and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These 7 policies frequently and deliberately undermine 8 United States interests and are contrary to core 9 United States values and the values of other nations, 10 both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to 11 this strategic decision of the CCP, the United States 12 has been compelled to reexamine and revise its strat- 13 egy towards the PRC. 14 (5) The General Secretary of the Chinese Com- 15 munist Party and the President of the People’s Re- 16 public of China, Xi Jinping, has elevated the ‘‘Great 17 Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’’ as central to 18 the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC. His pro- 19 gram demands— 20 (A) strong, centralized CCP leadership; 21 (B) concentration of military power; 22 (C) a strong role for the CCP in the state 23 and the economy; 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:25 May 10, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6401 E:\BILLS\S1169.RS S1169 pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS 8 •S 1169 RS (D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking 1 control over broadly asserted territorial claims; 2 and 3 (E) the denial of any universal values and 4 individual rights that are deemed to threaten 5 the CCP. 6 (6) The PRC views its Leninist model of gov- 7 ernance, ‘‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’’, as 8 superior to, and at odds with, the constitutional 9 models of the United States and other democracies. 10 This approach to governance is lauded by the CCP 11 as essential to securing the PRC’s status as a global 12 leader, and to shaping the future of the world. In a 13 2013 speech, President Xi said, ‘‘We firmly believe 14 that as socialism with Chinese characteristics devel- 15 ops further . . . it is . . . inevitable that the superi- 16 ority of our socialist system will be increasingly ap- 17 parent . . . [and] our country’s road of development 18 will have increasingly greater influence on the 19 world.’’. 20 (7) The PRC’s objectives are to first establish 21 regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to 22 use that dominant position to propel the PRC to be- 23 come the ‘‘leading world power,’’ shaping an inter- 24 national order that is conducive to the CCP’s inter- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:25 May 10, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6401 E:\BILLS\S1169.RS S1169 pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS 9 •S 1169 RS ests. Achieving these objectives requires turning the 1 PRC into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by 2 using a strong military and advanced technological 3 capability to pursue the PRC’s objectives, regardless 4 of other countries’ interests. 5 (8) The PRC is reshaping the current inter- 6 national order, which is built upon the rule of law 7 and free and open ideals and principles, by con- 8 ducting global information and influence oper [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]