Democracy Technology Partnership Act

II 117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION S. 604 To authorize the establishment of a Technology Partnership among democratic countries, and for other purposes. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MARCH 4, 2021 Mr. WARNER (for himself, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. YOUNG, Mr. CORNYN, Mr. SASSE, Mr. RUBIO, and Mr. BENNET) introduced the fol- lowing bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on For- eign Relations A BILL To authorize the establishment of a Technology Partnership among democratic countries, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Democracy Technology 4 Partnership Act’’. 5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6 Congress finds the following: 7 (1) The 21st century will increasingly be de- 8 fined by economic competition rooted in techno- 9 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 2 •S 604 IS logical advances. Leaders in adopting emerging tech- 1 nologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum 2 computing, biotechnology, and next-generation tele- 3 communications, and those who shape the use of 4 such technologies, will garner economic, military, 5 and political strength for decades. 6 (2) These technologies offer opportunities for 7 the empowerment of citizens, but also and challenges 8 to basic norms of democratic governance and inter- 9 nationally recognized human rights. The collection 10 and analysis of data from individuals allows govern- 11 ments to know more about their residents’ behaviors, 12 preferences, interests, and activities than was pos- 13 sible years ago. The concentration of this data in 14 key technologies, such as smart phones, search data- 15 bases, and facial recognition databases, along with 16 the sharing of data among governments, creates 17 pressing concerns about individuals’ scope to exer- 18 cise their fundamental political and social rights. 19 (3) This challenge arises as the integrity and 20 efficacy of post-World War II international institu- 21 tions are increasingly challenged. New approaches to 22 multilateral cooperation and arrangements are need- 23 ed to tackle the challenges ahead to ensure that the 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 3 •S 604 IS United States continues to lead in critical tech- 1 nologies. 2 (4) As information and communications tech- 3 nologies have matured and increasingly mediate 4 large swathes of social, political and economic activ- 5 ity, it is incumbent on democratic governments to 6 address the ways in which these technologies have 7 undermined democratic values, consumer protec- 8 tions, and social cohesion. Moreover, as authori- 9 tarian regimes increasingly shape and deploy tech- 10 nologies to bolster repression, stifle free expression, 11 and interfere with free and fair elections in other 12 countries, the world’s advanced democracies will 13 need to shape technology standards so that emerging 14 and critical technologies reflect democratic values, 15 including freedom of expression and privacy. 16 (5) Technological leadership by the world’s 17 major liberal-democratic nations collectively will be 18 essential to safeguarding democratic institutions, 19 norms, and values, and contributing to global peace 20 and prosperity, especially as authoritarian govern- 21 ments seek to promote closed information systems 22 and technology that is not interoperable, often 23 through trade and investment practices that are in- 24 compatible with global norms. A unified approach by 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 4 •S 604 IS like-minded nations is needed to counteract growing 1 investments in, and deployments of, emerging tech- 2 nologies by authoritarian powers. 3 (6) In addition to the development of emerging 4 technologies, democratic nations must lead in shap- 5 ing expectations for the responsible use of such tech- 6 nologies and push back against laissez faire ap- 7 proaches and authoritarian interests on internet gov- 8 ernance advanced in multilateral forums by— 9 (A) advocating against efforts to crim- 10 inalize or limit political dissent and freedom of 11 speech online, such as those spearheaded by the 12 Russian Federation, which seek to undermine 13 the Council of Europe’s Convention on 14 Cybercrime, done at Budapest November 23, 15 2001, in favor of a statist alternative; and 16 (B) prioritizing protections for elections, 17 and other processes essential for healthy democ- 18 racies, from cyber-attack. 19 (7) The world’s leading democracies must also 20 confront new challenges to their market-driven eco- 21 nomic systems to ensure their continued leadership 22 in technology and innovation. The People’s Republic 23 of China (referred to in this Act as the ‘‘PRC’’) is 24 pursuing an industrial policy to achieve dominance 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 5 •S 604 IS in key technologies, including 5G, artificial intel- 1 ligence (referred to in this section as ‘‘AI’’), quan- 2 tum computing, hypersonics, biotechnology, space 3 capabilities, and autonomous vehicles. 4 (8) The PRC seeks to use technological superi- 5 ority for national security, military-civil fusion, and 6 economic gains, according to its strategic plans, in- 7 cluding— 8 (A) the Made in China 2025 strategy; 9 (B) the Five-Year Plan for Standardiza- 10 tion and China Standards 2035; 11 (C) the 2006 Medium-to-Long Term S&T 12 Plan; 13 (D) the 2010 State Council Decision on 14 Accelerating the Development of Strategic 15 Emerging Industries; and 16 (E) the 13th Five-Year Plan for the Devel- 17 opment of Strategic Emerging Industries. 18 (9) The PRC seeks to advance in areas in 19 which democratic countries currently have a techno- 20 logical advantage and move ahead in emerging tech- 21 nologies where China seeks a unique opportunity to 22 overtake such countries. 23 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 6 •S 604 IS (10) For many years, the PRC has pursued in- 1 dustrial policies and discriminatory trade practices 2 that include— 3 (A) heavily subsidizing Chinese companies, 4 restricting foreign competition, conducting 5 forced technology transfers, and using both licit 6 and illicit means to access research and devel- 7 opment around technologies in order to advan- 8 tage Chinese companies in specific technology 9 fields; 10 (B) providing significant government fund- 11 ing for research and development in the PRC in 12 specific technologies to build future competitive- 13 ness; 14 (C) seeking to ensure global adoption of 15 Chinese technologies, and the success of Chi- 16 nese firms, especially in emerging and strategic 17 markets, through significant foreign direct in- 18 vestment, low-cost financing and comprehensive 19 services for foreign development projects, 20 through initiatives such as the Belt and Road 21 Initiative, which includes the Digital Silk Road 22 and the Health Silk Road, as well as the Smart 23 City Initiative, efforts centered on promoting 24 the use of Chinese exports by offering far 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 7 •S 604 IS cheaper rates and bundling these deals into 1 larger development and aid packages; 2 (D) aiding the adoption of Chinese-led 3 standards for digital technologies and products 4 through compensating Chinese firms that sub- 5 mit standards and flooding forums with tech- 6 nical experts; and 7 (E) leveraging the international standard 8 setting bodies to advance the vision of the PRC 9 regarding standards and technologies. 10 (11) As a result of these practices in support of 11 Chinese companies, the PRC is increasing its influ- 12 ence in AI, 5G, and a wide range of other science 13 and technology disciplines that constitute long-term 14 economic and security threats to the United States, 15 its allies, and like-minded partners. According to 16 market research firm Dell’Oro Group, Huawei’s 17 share of worldwide telecommunications revenue 18 equipment grew from 20 percent in 2014 to 31 per- 19 cent in 2020. 20 (12) While the United States semiconductor in- 21 dustry is the worldwide industry leader with approxi- 22 mately 50 percent of global market share and sales 23 of $193,000,000,000 in 2019, the situation may be 24 changing. In 2019, all 6 of the new semiconductor 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 8 •S 604 IS fabrication plants that opened worldwide were lo- 1 cated outside of the United States, with 4 of these 2 plants built in China. The Government of the PRC 3 plans to spend $150,000,000,000 on its computer 4 chip industry during the next 10 years. 5 (13) The PRC uses technologies, such as AI, 6 facial recognition, and biometrics, to increase control 7 over its population, facilitating mass surveillance, 8 scalable censorship, and technology-enabled social 9 control, including against ethnic and religious mi- 10 norities including Tibetans, Uyghurs, ethnic 11 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim mi- 12 nority groups. 13 (14) The PRC uses its economic power to co- 14 erce and censor companies, individuals, and coun- 15 tries. 16 (15) In the past decade, the Government of the 17 PRC— 18 (A) blocked exports of rare earth elements 19 to Japan; 20 (B) threatened to curtail domestic sales of 21 German cars; 22 (C) cut off tourism to South Korea; 23 (D) restricted banana imports from the 24 Philippines; and 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 9 •S 604 IS (E) imposed large tariffs on Australian 1 barley exports. 2 (16) The Government of the PRC— 3 (A) has banned United States technology 4 companies, including Facebook, Google, and 5 Twitter; 6 (B) has pressured movie studios based in 7 the United States to alter content in movies 8 that it deemed objectionable; and 9 (C) has retaliated against a range of 10 American companies for actual or perceived 11 support for a range of political positions, in- 12 cluding recognizing territorial claims of coun- 13 tries in border disputes with China, recognizing 14 Tibet, and more. 15 (17) Third countries have become particular 16 targets of Chinese investments in technology. These 17 third-country investments provide access to innova- 18 tion, data that allows Chinese companies to refine 19 their own systems, and influence over the policies of 20 these governments. The terms on which Chinese in- 21 vestments are made often are attractive in the short- 22 term but create conditions for Chinese ownership of, 23 or influence over, major industries in those coun- 24 tries. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 10 •S 604 IS (18) After decades of being the world leader in 1 key technologies, the United States is at risk of fall- 2 ing behind the PRC in key technologies of the fu- 3 ture. While private-sector research and development 4 investments have steadily increased in the United 5 States, Federal Government spending has declined 6 as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product from ap- 7 proximately 1.2 percent in 1976 to approximately 8 0.7 percent in 2018. The decline has been even 9 steeper in the physical sciences. The Federal Gov- 10 ernment plays a unique and critical role in Amer- 11 ica’s innovation ecosystem. Government research and 12 development spending spurs private-sector invest- 13 ments, and the United States Government remains 14 the largest source of basic research funding, which 15 is foundational to game-changing technological 16 achievements. 17 (19) During the past several years, the PRC 18 has quadrupled its research and development spend- 19 ing and is on the brink of surpassing the United 20 States in total investments in key technologies, with 21 its growth in research and development spending 22 doubling the United States Government’s spending 23 increase in this area. Chinese patent publications 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 11 •S 604 IS have surged in the fields of artificial intelligence, 1 machine learning, and deep learning. 2 (20) The United States is highly dependent on 3 China for key components of critical technologies in 4 its supply chains, such as rare earths. 5 (21) The United States remains a leader in the 6 science and technology areas of engineering and biol- 7 ogy as well as key components, including tele- 8 communications equipment and semiconductors. The 9 United States does not have a domestic manufac- 10 turer of radio access network equipment for 5G net- 11 works, but is well-positioned to lead in 6G tele- 12 communications, which depend on software and 13 semiconductors, areas of United States strength. 14 (22) Other countries have unique knowledge, 15 expertise, and capabilities in numerous cutting edge 16 technologies, including semiconductor manufacturing 17 equipment, such as extreme ultraviolet lithography 18 machines for semiconductor fabrication and machine 19 tools for fabrication of custom components. In order 20 to successfully compete against the PRC, the United 21 States must partner with such countries. 22 (23) The private sector in the United States 23 and partner countries, including Japan, Korea, Aus- 24 tralia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:43 Apr 02, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S604.IS S604 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 12 •S 604 IS European Union has considerable expertise in both 1 technology and in standard setting, given the role of 2 the private sector in international standard setting 3 bodies, but this expertise can be better leveraged in 4 shaping United States technology policy. 5 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 6 It is the sense of Congress that— 7 (1) emerging technology governance regimes 8 driven by undemocratic governm [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]