Libya Stabilization Act

II 117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION S. 379 To advance a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Libya and support the people of Libya. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES FEBRUARY 23, 2021 Mr. COONS (for himself, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. MURPHY, and Mr. RUBIO) intro- duced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations A BILL To advance a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Libya and support the people of Libya. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 3 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 4 ‘‘Libya Stabilization Act’’. 5 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 6 this Act is as follows: 7 Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Findings; statement of policy. TITLE I—IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES TO STABILITY IN LIBYA Sec. 101. Codification of Executive Order 13726. VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:45 Mar 05, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6211 E:\BILLS\S379.IS S379 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 2 •S 379 IS Sec. 102. Report on activities of certain foreign governments and actors in Libya. Sec. 103. Strategy to counter Russian influence in Libya. TITLE II—ACTIONS TO ADDRESS FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN LIBYA Sec. 201. Definitions. Sec. 202. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons supporting Russian military intervention in Libya. Sec. 203. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons threatening the peace or stability of Libya. Sec. 204. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain persons who are re- sponsible for or complicit in human rights abuses committed in Libya. Sec. 205. Sanctions described. Sec. 206. Waiver; exceptions. Sec. 207. Implementation; regulations; penalties. Sec. 208. Termination. TITLE III—ASSISTANCE FOR LIBYA Sec. 301. Humanitarian relief for the people of Libya and international refu- gees and migrants in Libya. Sec. 302. Support for democratic governance, elections, and democratic civil so- ciety. Sec. 303. Engaging international financial institutions to advance Libyan eco- nomic recovery and improve public sector financial manage- ment. Sec. 304. Recovering assets stolen from the Libyan people. SEC. 2. FINDINGS; STATEMENT OF POLICY. 1 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find- 2 ings: 3 (1) The stability and territorial unity of Libya 4 is critical to the security of the United States, Eu- 5 rope, North Africa, and the Sahel, as well as mari- 6 time routes in the southern Mediterranean Sea. 7 (2) AFRICOM has identified containing insta- 8 bility in Libya as one of its six main lines of effort 9 in Africa and works to support diplomatic efforts to 10 reconstitute the Libyan state and to disrupt terrorist 11 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:45 Mar 05, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S379.IS S379 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 3 •S 379 IS organizations that impede that process or threaten 1 United States interests. 2 (3) On April 4, 2019, Khalifa Haftar, the com- 3 mander of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces/Libyan 4 National Army (LAAF/LNA) movement, ordered 5 forces loyal to him to begin a unilateral military op- 6 eration to take control of Tripoli, the capital of 7 Libya and seat of the Government of National Ac- 8 cord (GNA), an interim body that emerged from 9 previous United Nations-backed negotiations which 10 the United States Government and United Nations 11 Security Council have recognized since 2015. 12 (4) Although the LAAF/LNA movement initi- 13 ated the offensive, all parties to the conflict and 14 their associated forces have since April 2019 failed 15 to observe their obligations under international hu- 16 manitarian law and increased the geographic scope 17 of the conflict, including by using heavy weapons, 18 aircraft, and armed drones provided by foreign pow- 19 ers in violation of the United Nations arms embargo. 20 Foreign mercenaries have reportedly also partici- 21 pated in the conflict. 22 (5) In November 2019, the GNA and the Gov- 23 ernment of Turkey signed a Memorandum of Under- 24 standing on maritime boundaries in the Mediterra- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:45 Mar 05, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S379.IS S379 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 4 •S 379 IS nean Sea, which was opposed by European Union 1 member states and other countries in the region. 2 (6) On January 19, 2020, at a peace conference 3 in Berlin, representatives of the Governments of Al- 4 geria, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Rus- 5 sia, Turkey, the Republic of Congo, the United Arab 6 Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United 7 States, as well as regional and multilateral organiza- 8 tions, agreed to refrain from interference in Libya’s 9 internal affairs, abide by the United Nations arms 10 embargo, and advance a 55-point communique to re- 11 solve the conflict in Libya. 12 (7) On January 30, 2020, then-United Nations 13 Special Representative of the Secretary General 14 (SRSG) Ghassan Salame´ asserted that ‘‘the warring 15 parties have continued to receive a sizable amount of 16 advanced equipment, fighters, and advisors from for- 17 eign sponsors, in brazen violation of the UN arms 18 embargo as well as of the pledges made by rep- 19 resentatives of these countries in Berlin’’. 20 (8) On February 12, 2020, the United States 21 Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Af- 22 fairs testified before the Committee on Foreign Re- 23 lations of the Senate, ‘‘The task of bringing the 24 Libyans back to the negotiating table has been com- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:45 Mar 05, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S379.IS S379 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 5 •S 379 IS plicated by the involvement of external actors. Libya 1 is not the place for Russian mercenaries, or fighters 2 from Syria, Chad, and Sudan. It is not the place for 3 the Emiratis, Russians, or Turks to be fighting bat- 4 tles on the ground through intermediaries they spon- 5 sor or support with sophisticated and deadly equip- 6 ment in pursuit of their own agendas.’’. 7 (9) On September 2, 2020, Acting SRSG 8 Stephanie Williams described to the United Nations 9 Security Council cargo shipments and dozens of 10 military resupply flights to the LAAF/LNA and the 11 GNA as ‘‘an alarming breach of Libya’s sovereignty, 12 a blatant violation of the UN arms embargo, not to 13 mention the commitments undertaken by the Berlin 14 conference participants’’. 15 (10) On October 23, 2020, conflict parties in 16 Libya agreed to a United Nations-facilitated 17 ceasefire which called for all military units and 18 armed groups on the front lines to return to their 19 camps, all mercenaries and foreign fighters to depart 20 from Libyan territory, and all military agreements 21 on training be suspended within three months of the 22 ceasefire’s signing. Ceasefire enforcement is histori- 23 cally difficult in Libya, and as of February 2021, 24 mercenaries, foreign fighters, and foreign militaries 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:45 Mar 05, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S379.IS S379 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 6 •S 379 IS remained active there. On February 4, 2021, the 1 United Nations Security Council requested an ad- 2 vance team be sent to Libya as a first step to send- 3 ing monitors to observe the ceasefire. 4 (11) On November 13, 2020, UNSMIL an- 5 nounced that national elections in Libya are sched- 6 uled to take place on December 24, 2021. On Janu- 7 ary 20, 2021, Libyan leaders agreed to hold a con- 8 stitutional referendum prior to the December 2021 9 election. On February 5, 2021, the 74-member 10 United Nations-led Libyan Political Dialogue Forum 11 reached an agreement on a unified interim Libyan 12 executive to lead the country to national elections on 13 December 24, 2021. 14 (12) According to the United Nations, since the 15 LNA movement offensive began in April 2019, the 16 conflict in Libya has led to the deaths of more than 17 400 civilians and the displacement of more than 18 200,000 people. 19 (13) Parties to the conflict in Libya have killed 20 civilians, committed torture and abuse, committed 21 mass extrajudicial killings, requisitioned the houses 22 of civilians, targeted medical facilities, and blocked 23 humanitarian access to food, health, and other life- 24 saving services, worsening humanitarian conditions. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:45 Mar 05, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S379.IS S379 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 7 •S 379 IS (14) According to the United Nations Office for 1 the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as of De- 2 cember 2020, more than 574,000 migrants and refu- 3 gees remained in Libya and ‘‘continue to be at risk 4 of killing, torture, arbitrary detention, rape and 5 other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, 6 forced labor, extortion and exploitation’’. Among 7 these, between 1,000 and 3,000 migrants and refu- 8 gees are held in official detention centers and ‘‘many 9 other migrants and refugees are believed to be held 10 at other sites run by militias and trafficking 11 groups’’. 12 (15) On January 19, 2021, at least 43 mi- 13 grants died in a shipwreck off of Libya’s coast, high- 14 lighting the vulnerable position of non-Libyan mi- 15 grants who are either subject to detention and 16 abuses in Libya or are forced to undertake unsafe 17 attempts to reach Europe. More than 100 migrants 18 drowned in 2020 and nearly 100 have drowned since 19 January 2021 in the Mediterranean. 20 (16) On January 21, 2021, the United States 21 joined the Governments of France, Germany, Italy, 22 and the United Kingdom to remind all Berlin Con- 23 ference participants of the need to ‘‘continue to sup- 24 port a ceasefire, restore full respect for the UN arms 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:45 Mar 05, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S379.IS S379 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 8 •S 379 IS embargo, and end the toxic foreign interference that 1 undermines the aspirations of all Libyans to reestab- 2 lish their sovereignty and choose their future peace- 3 fully through national elections’’. 4 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 5 United States— 6 (1) to engage regularly at the senior-most levels 7 and assert there is no military solution to the con- 8 flict in Libya and that only a political process can 9 secure United States interests, ensure a stable and 10 unified Libya, reduce the threat of terrorism, and 11 provide peace and opportunity to the people of 12 Libya; 13 (2) to support the implementation of United 14 Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 (2011) 15 and 1973 (2011), which established an arms embar- 16 go on Libya, and subsequent resolutions modifying 17 and extending the embargo; 18 (3) to support the implementation of United 19 Nations Security Council Resolutions 2146 (2014) 20 and 2362 (2017), which condemn attempts to illic- 21 itly export petroleum and refined petroleum products 22 from Libya, including by parallel institutions which 23 are not acting under the authority of the Govern- 24 ment of National Accord; 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:45 Mar 05, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S379.IS S379 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 9 •S 379 IS (4) to promote unified and effective Libyan 1 oversight over the Libyan National Oil Corporation, 2 the Central Bank of Libya, and the Libyan Invest- 3 ment Authority; 4 (5) to enforce Executive Order 13726 (81 Fed. 5 Reg. 23559; relating to blocking property and sus- 6 pending entry into the United States of persons con- 7 tributing to the situation in Libya (April 19, 2016)), 8 designed to target individuals or entities who 9 ‘‘threaten the peace, security, and stability of 10 Libya’’; 11 (6) to employ sanctions and support war-crimes 12 prosecution, against any and all parties engaging in 13 attacks on civilians, medical workers, and critical in- 14 frastructure, including water supplies, in Libya; 15 (7) to contribute to the peace and stability of 16 Libya, prevent destabilizing arms shipments, and 17 support efforts to safeguard Libya’s oil resources in 18 accordance with United Nations Security Council 19 Resolutions 2259 (2015), 2278 (2016), 2362 20 (2017), and 2473 (2019); 21 (8) to leverage diplomatic relations to convince 22 the parties to the conflict in Libya to de-escalate 23 and persuade foreign powers to stop providing weap- 24 ons and financing that exacerbate the conflict; 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:45 Mar 05, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S379.IS S379 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 10 •S 379 IS (9) to encourage the parties to continue to en- 1 gage in the political process led by UNSMIL; 2 (10) to support the United Nations-mediated 3 political process, which seeks a negotiated and 4 peaceful solution to the Libyan crisis; 5 (11) that a negotiated and peaceful political so- 6 lution should include a transitional, civilian-led gov- 7 ernment representing all Libyans, preparations for 8 credible elections, a fair and transparent allocation 9 of resources, interim security arrangements, and a 10 process to reunify security and economic institu- 11 tions; 12 (12) to support constant, unimpeded, and reli- 13 able humanitarian access to those in need and to 14 hold accountable those who impede or threaten the 15 delivery of humanitarian assistance; 16 (13) to advocate for the immediate release and 17 safe evacuations of detained refugees and migrants 18 threatened by conflict in Libya; 19 (14) to assist implementation of UNSMIL’s 20 plan for the organized and gradual closure of mi- 21 grant detention centers in Libya and ensure robust 22 protection assistance for refugees and migrants; and 23 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:45 Mar 05, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S379.IS S379 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 11 •S 379 IS (15) to support future democratic development 1 and the economic recovery of Libya both during and 2 after a negotiated and peaceful political solution. 3 TITLE I—IDENTIFYING CHAL- 4 LENGES TO STABILITY IN 5 LIBYA 6 SEC. 101. CODIFICATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13726. 7 Notwithstanding any other provision of law or Execu- 8 tive order, Executive Order 13726 (81 Fed. Reg. 23559), 9 signed on April 19, 2016, and entitled ‘‘Blocking Property 10 and Suspending Entry into the United States of Persons 11 Contributing to the Situation in Libya’’ shall have the 12 force and effect of law. 13 SEC. 102. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN 14 GOVERNMENTS AND ACTORS IN LIBYA. 15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days afte [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]