Protect Our Universities Act of 2021

I 117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 1091 To create a task force within the Department of Education to address the threat of foreign government influence and threats to academic research integrity on college campuses, and for other purposes. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FEBRUARY 18, 2021 Mr. BANKS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor, and in addition to the Committees on Intel- ligence (Permanent Select), Armed Services, and Science, Space, and Technology, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the juris- diction of the committee concerned A BILL To create a task force within the Department of Education to address the threat of foreign government influence and threats to academic research integrity on college campuses, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protect Our Univer- 4 sities Act of 2021’’. 5 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:59 Mar 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1091.IH H1091 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 1091 IH SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 1 Congress finds the following: 2 (1) Adversaries of the United States take ad- 3 vantage of a largely vulnerable academic system. 4 Academia is a place of uniquely free thought; how- 5 ever, adversaries take advantage of access to feder- 6 ally funded sensitive research that takes place on the 7 campuses of institutions of higher education. 8 (2) As stated in a 2018 report by the White 9 House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, 10 ‘‘More than 300,000 Chinese nationals annually at- 11 tend U.S. universities or find employment at U.S. 12 national laboratories, innovation centers, incubators, 13 and think tanks. Chinese nationals now account for 14 approximately one third of foreign university and 15 college students in the United States and about 25 16 percent of graduate students specializing in science, 17 technology, engineering, or math (STEM).’’. 18 (3) International students from nations that are 19 adversarial to the United States could face undue 20 pressure or incentives to divulge technology to their 21 home nation or to use sensitive information to nega- 22 tively impact the United States. According to the 23 same 2018 White House Report, ‘‘The national and 24 economic security risks are that the Chinese State 25 may seek to manipulate or pressure even unwitting 26 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:59 Mar 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1091.IH H1091 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 1091 IH or unwilling Chinese nationals into becoming non- 1 traditional information collectors that serve Beijing’s 2 military and strategic ambitions.’’. 3 (4) Technology and information that could be 4 deemed sensitive to the national security interests of 5 the United States should be given increased scrutiny 6 to determine if access should be restricted in a re- 7 search environment. 8 (5) An open federally funded research environ- 9 ment exposes the United States to the possibility of 10 exchanging research affiliated with current or future 11 critical military technological systems. 12 (6) In Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 13 Director Wray’s view, Chinese non-traditional intel- 14 ligence collectors ‘‘are exploiting the very open re- 15 search and development environment that we have, 16 which we all revere. But they’re taking advantage of 17 it, so one of the things we’re trying to do is view the 18 China threat as not just the whole-of-government 19 threat, but a whole-of-society threat on their end, 20 and I think it’s going to take a whole-of-society re- 21 sponse by us.’’. 22 (7) As stated in the January 2018 China’s 23 Technology Transfer Strategy report by the Defense 24 Innovation Unit, ‘‘Academia is an opportune envi- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:59 Mar 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1091.IH H1091 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 1091 IH ronment for learning about science and technology 1 since the cultural values of U.S. educational institu- 2 tions reflect an open and free exchange of ideas. As 3 a result, Chinese science and engineering students 4 frequently master technologies that later become 5 critical to key military systems, amounting over time 6 to unintentional violations of U.S. export control 7 laws.’’. 8 (8) In 2020, Bill Evanina, the senior counter- 9 intelligence official in the Office of the Director of 10 National Intelligence, stated ‘‘. . . our ideas, tech- 11 nology, research, innovation is incubated on those 12 university campuses. That’s where the science and 13 technology originates—and that’s why it’s the most 14 prime place to steal.’’. 15 (9) David Bowdich, Deputy Director of the 16 Federal Bureau of Investigation, stated at the 17 March 2020 Academic Security and Counter Exploi- 18 tation Annual Seminar that [China] is ‘‘taking ad- 19 vantage of non-traditional collectors to work on their 20 behalf, like ostensibly private companies or some 21 graduate students and researchers. . . . And they 22 are targeting cutting-edge research at our univer- 23 sities.’’. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:59 Mar 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1091.IH H1091 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 1091 IH (10) The 2020 House of Representatives China 1 Task Force Report states, ‘‘Research programs at 2 U.S. colleges and universities are increasingly tar- 3 geted by students and researchers acting as ‘non- 4 traditional collectors’. These students, ranging from 5 undergraduates to postdoctoral researchers, are gen- 6 erally untrained in espionage techniques but are 7 asked to actively target sensitive dual-use tech- 8 nologies and other emerging research during their 9 time in the U.S. The stated goal for these operations 10 is to exfiltrate research data from the U.S. to the 11 PRC.’’. 12 SEC. 3. TASK FORCE. 13 (a) TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED.—Not later than one 14 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary 15 of Education, in consultation with the Secretary of De- 16 fense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall es- 17 tablish the National Security Technology Task Force 18 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘Task Force’’) within the 19 Department of Education to address the threat of espio- 20 nage at institutions of higher education. 21 (b) MEMBERSHIP.— 22 (1) DESIGNATION.—The Task Force shall in- 23 clude not more than 30 members, of which— 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:59 Mar 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1091.IH H1091 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 1091 IH (A) at least 1 representative shall be from 1 the Department of Defense, designated by the 2 Secretary of Defense; 3 (B) at least 1 representative shall be from 4 the intelligence community, designated by the 5 Director of National Intelligence; 6 (C) at least 1 representative shall be from 7 the Department of Justice, designated by the 8 United States Attorney General; 9 (D) at least 1 representative shall be from 10 the Department of Energy, designated by the 11 Secretary of Energy; and 12 (E) at least 1 representative shall be from 13 each of the following offices of the Department 14 of Education, as appointed and named by the 15 Secretary of Education: 16 (i) Office of Postsecondary Education. 17 (ii) Office of Planning, Evaluation, 18 and Policy Development. 19 (iii) Office of the General Counsel. 20 (iv) Any other office the Secretary of 21 Education determines to be appropriate. 22 (2) MEMBERSHIP LIST.—Not later than 10 23 days after the first meeting of the Task Force, the 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:59 Mar 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1091.IH H1091 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 7 •HR 1091 IH Task Force shall submit to Congress a list identi- 1 fying each member of the Task Force. 2 (c) SENSITIVE RESEARCH PROJECT LIST.—The 3 Task Force shall, in consultation with the Office of the 4 Director of National Intelligence, actively maintain a list 5 of sensitive research projects. Such list shall— 6 (1) be referred to as the Sensitive Research 7 Projects List; and 8 (2) for each project included on the list, indi- 9 cate— 10 (A) the qualified funding agency that is 11 funding the project; 12 (B) whether the project is open to student 13 participation; and 14 (C) whether the project is related to— 15 (i) an item listed on the Commerce 16 Control List (CCL) maintained by the De- 17 partment of Commerce; 18 (ii) an item listed on the United 19 States Munitions List maintained by the 20 Department of State; or 21 (iii) technology designated by the Sec- 22 retary of Defense as having a technology 23 readiness level of 1, 2, or 3. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:59 Mar 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1091.IH H1091 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 8 •HR 1091 IH (d) CONSULTATION WITH OIG.—The Task Force 1 shall periodically, but no less than annually, consult with 2 the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of 3 Education, which shall include annual reports to the Of- 4 fice of the Inspector General on the activities of the Task 5 Force, with an opportunity for the Office of the Inspector 6 General to provide active feedback related to such activi- 7 ties. 8 (e) INSTRUCTION TO INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER 9 EDUCATION.—Not less than once every six months, the 10 Task Force shall provide relevant instruction to institu- 11 tions of higher education at which research projects on 12 the Sensitive Research Project List are being carried out. 13 Such instruction shall provide the institutions of higher 14 education with information related to the threat posed by 15 espionage, best practices identified by the Task Force, 16 and, to the extent possible, any specific risks that the in- 17 telligence community, the qualified funding agency, or law 18 enforcement entities determine appropriate to share with 19 the institutions. 20 (f) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than one year 21 after the date of enactment of this Act, and every six 22 months thereafter, the Task Force shall provide a report 23 to the Committee on Education and Labor, the Committee 24 on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:59 Mar 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1091.IH H1091 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 9 •HR 1091 IH on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and to 1 the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pen- 2 sions, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select 3 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, regarding the 4 threat of espionage at institutions of higher education. In 5 each such briefing, the Task Force shall identify actions 6 that may be taken to reduce espionage carried out through 7 student participation in sensitive research projects. The 8 Task Force shall also include in this report an assessment 9 of whether the current licensing regulations relating to the 10 International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Export 11 Administration Regulations are sufficient to protect the 12 security of the projects listed on the Sensitive Research 13 Project List. 14 SEC. 4. FOREIGN STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN SENSITIVE 15 RESEARCH PROJECTS. 16 (a) APPROVAL OF FOREIGN STUDENT PARTICIPA- 17 TION REQUIRED.—Beginning on the date that is one year 18 after the date of enactment of this Act, for each project 19 on the Sensitive Research Project List that is open to stu- 20 dent participation, the head of such project at the institu- 21 tion of higher education at which the project is being car- 22 ried out shall ensure that each student participating in 23 such project shall be required to provide proof of citizen- 24 ship before the student is permitted to participate in such 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:59 Mar 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1091.IH H1091 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 10 •HR 1091 IH project. A student who is a citizen of a country identified 1 in subsection (b) shall be permitted to participate in such 2 a project only if— 3 (1) the student applies for, and receives ap- 4 proval from, the Director of National Intelligence to 5 participate in such project, based on a background 6 check and any other information the Director deter- 7 mines to be appropriate; and 8 (2) in the case of such a project that is related 9 to an item or technology described in subparagraph 10 (C) of section 3(c)(2), the student applies for, and 11 receives approval from, the head of the qualified 12 funding agency, to participate in such project. 13 (b) LIST OF CITIZENSHIP REQUIRING APPROVAL.— 14 Approval under subsection (a) shall be required for any 15 student who is a citizen of a country that is one of the 16 following: 17 (1) The People’s Republic of China. 18 (2) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 19 (3) The Russian Federation. 20 (4) The Islamic Republic of Iran. 21 (5) Any country identified by the head of the 22 qualified funding agency as requiring approval for 23 the purposes of this section. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:59 Mar 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1091.IH H1091 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 11 •HR 1091 IH SEC. 5. FOREIGN ENTITIES. 1 (a) LIST OF FOREIGN ENTITIES THAT POSE AN IN- 2 TELLIGENCE THREAT.—Not later than one year after the 3 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 4 Intelligence shall identify foreign entities, including gov- 5 ernments, corporations, non-profit and for-profit organiza- 6 tions, and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity, 7 that the Director determines pose a threat of espionage 8 with respect to sensitive research projects, and shall de- 9 velop and maintain a list of such entities. The Director 10 may add or remove entities from such list at any time. 11 The initial list developed by the Director shall include the 12 following entities (including any subsidiary or affiliate): 13 (1) Huawei Technologies Company. 14 (2) ZTE Corporation. 15 (3) Hytera Communications Corporation. 16 (4) Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology 17 Company. 18 (5) Dahua Technology Company. 19 (6) Kaspersky Lab. 20 (7) Any entity that is owned or controlled by, 21 or otherwise has demonstrated financial ties to, the 22 government of a country identified under section 23 4(b). 24 (b) NOTICE TO INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDU- 25 CATION.—The Director of National Intelligence shall 26 VerDate Sep 11 2 [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]