What This Bill Does
This bill prohibits brand name drug companies from paying generic drug makers to delay selling cheaper generic versions of their drugs. It also prohibits makers of brand name biological products (drugs made from living organisms) from paying companies that make biosimilar products (cheaper copies of biological drugs) to delay their entry into the market.
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Who It Affects
- Brand name drug companies
- Generic drug manufacturers
- Biological product manufacturers
- Biosimilar product manufacturers
- The Federal Trade Commission (the government agency that enforces competition laws)
- Consumers who buy prescription drugs
- Healthcare payers (insurance companies and government programs)
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Key Provisions
- Brand name drug companies cannot pay generic drug makers anything of value if the generic maker agrees to delay researching, developing, making, marketing or selling their drug (Sec. 3)
- The same prohibition applies to biological product makers paying biosimilar makers to delay their products (Sec. 3)
- Companies must file and certify all settlement agreements involving patent disputes within 30 days, and the Chief Executive Officer must confirm the agreement is complete and accurate (Sec. 4)
- Companies that violate these rules must pay a penalty up to 3 times the value they received from breaking the law (Sec. 3)
- The Federal Trade Commission has 6 years from the date companies file their agreement to take legal action against violators (Sec. 9)
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What Changes
If this bill becomes law, brand name drug and biological product companies can no longer use "reverse payment" settlement agreements. These are deals where brand name companies pay generic or biosimilar makers to delay entering the market. The law makes such payments illegal and subject to penalties. Companies must now publicly file all patent settlement agreements and have executives certify they are telling the truth about what was agreed to.
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Important Definitions
- **Generic drug**: A drug that copies a brand name drug after its patent expires
- **Biosimilar**: A biological product that is very similar to an approved brand name biological product
- **Patent infringement claim**: Any allegation that a generic or biosimilar drug violates a patent held by the brand name company
- **Statutory exclusivity**: Time periods when the government prevents approval of generic or biosimilar drugs due to patent or data protection laws
- **ANDA filer**: A company that owns or controls an application to make a generic drug
- **NDA holder**: A company that holds approval for a brand name drug
##
Effective Date
This law applies to all settlement agreements entered into on or after the date this bill becomes law. (Sec. 3(b))
II
Calendar No. 20
118TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
S. 142
To prohibit brand name drug companies from compensating generic drug
companies to delay the entry of a generic drug into the market, and
to prohibit biological product manufacturers from compensating bio-
similar and interchangeable companies to delay the entry of biosimilar
biological products and interchangeable biological products.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 30, 2023
Ms. KLOBUCHAR (for herself, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. CRAMER, Mr.
BLUMENTHAL, Mr. KELLY, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Mr. BOOKER, Mr.
OSSOFF, Ms. ERNST, and Mr. WELCH) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
MARCH 1, 2023
Reported by Mr. DURBIN, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]
A BILL
To prohibit brand name drug companies from compensating
generic drug companies to delay the entry of a generic
drug into the market, and to prohibit biological product
manufacturers from compensating biosimilar and inter-
changeable companies to delay the entry of biosimilar
biological products and interchangeable biological prod-
ucts.
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•S 142 RS
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
1
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
3
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Preserve Access to Af-
4
fordable Generics and Biosimilars Act’’.
5
SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF
6
PURPOSES.
7
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
8
(1) In 1984, the Drug Price Competition and
9
Patent Term Restoration Act (Public Law 98–417)
10
(referred to in this Act as the ‘‘1984 Act’’), was en-
11
acted with the intent of facilitating the early entry
12
of generic drugs while preserving incentives for inno-
13
vation.
14
(2) Prescription drugs make up approximately
15
10 percent of the national health care spending.
16
(3) Initially, the 1984 Act was successful in fa-
17
cilitating generic competition to the benefit of con-
18
sumers and health care payers, although 88 percent
19
of all prescriptions dispensed in the United States
20
are generic drugs, they account for only 28 percent
21
of all expenditures.
22
(4) Generic drugs cost substantially less than
23
brand name drugs, with discounts off the brand
24
price averaging 80 to 85 percent.
25
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•S 142 RS
(5) Federal dollars currently account for over
1
40 percent of the $325,000,000,000 spent on retail
2
prescription drugs, and this share is expected to rise
3
to 47 percent by 2025.
4
(6)(A) In recent years, the intent of the 1984
5
Act has been subverted by certain settlement agree-
6
ments in which brand name companies transfer
7
value to their potential generic competitors to settle
8
claims that the generic company is infringing the
9
branded company’s patents.
10
(B) These ‘‘reverse payment’’ settlement agree-
11
ments—
12
(i) allow a branded company to share its
13
monopoly profits with the generic company as a
14
way to protect the branded company’s monop-
15
oly; and
16
(ii) have unduly delayed the marketing of
17
low-cost generic drugs contrary to free competi-
18
tion, the interests of consumers, and the prin-
19
ciples underlying antitrust law.
20
(C) Because of the price disparity between
21
brand name and generic drugs, such agreements are
22
more profitable for both the brand and generic man-
23
ufacturers than competition and will become increas-
24
ingly common unless prohibited.
25
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•S 142 RS
(D) These agreements result in consumers los-
1
ing the benefits that the 1984 Act was intended to
2
provide.
3
(7) In 2010, the Biologics Price Competition
4
and Innovation Act (Public Law 111–148) (referred
5
to in this Act as the ‘‘BPCIA’’), was enacted with
6
the intent of facilitating the early entry of biosimilar
7
and interchangeable follow-on versions of branded
8
biological products while preserving incentives for in-
9
novation.
10
(8) Biological drugs play an important role in
11
treating many serious illnesses, from cancers to ge-
12
netic
disorders.
They
are
also
expensive,
rep-
13
resenting more than 40 percent of all prescription
14
drug spending.
15
(9)
Competition
from
biosimilar
and
inter-
16
changeable biological products promises to lower
17
drug costs and increase patient access to biological
18
medicines. But ‘‘reverse payment’’ settlement agree-
19
ments also threaten to delay the entry of biosimilar
20
and interchangeable biological products, which would
21
undermine the goals of BPCIA.
22
(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are—
23
(1) to enhance competition in the pharma-
24
ceutical market by stopping anticompetitive agree-
25
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•S 142 RS
ments between brand name and generic drug and
1
biosimilar
biological
product
manufacturers
that
2
limit, delay, or otherwise prevent competition from
3
generic drugs and biosimilar biological products; and
4
(2) to support the purpose and intent of anti-
5
trust law by prohibiting anticompetitive practices in
6
the pharmaceutical industry that harm consumers.
7
SEC. 3. UNLAWFUL COMPENSATION FOR DELAY.
8
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Federal Trade Commission
9
Act (15 U.S.C. 44 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
10
section 26 (15 U.S.C. 57c–2) the following:
11
‘‘SEC. 27. PRESERVING ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE GENERICS
12
AND BIOSIMILARS.
13
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—
14
‘‘(1) ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING.—The Com-
15
mission may initiate a proceeding to enforce the pro-
16
visions of this section against the parties to any
17
agreement resolving or settling, on a final or interim
18
basis, a patent claim, in connection with the sale of
19
a drug product or biological product.
20
‘‘(2) PRESUMPTION AND VIOLATION.—
21
‘‘(A) IN
GENERAL.—Subject to subpara-
22
graph (B), in such a proceeding, an agreement
23
shall be presumed to have anticompetitive ef-
24
fects and shall be a violation of this section if—
25
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•S 142 RS
‘‘(i) an ANDA filer or a biosimilar bi-
1
ological product application filer receives
2
anything of value, including an exclusive li-
3
cense; and
4
‘‘(ii) the ANDA filer or biosimilar bio-
5
logical product application filer agrees to
6
limit or forgo research, development, man-
7
ufacturing,
marketing,
or
sales
of
the
8
ANDA
product
or
biosimilar
biological
9
product, as applicable, for any period of
10
time.
11
‘‘(B)
EXCEPTION.—Subparagraph
(A)
12
shall not apply if the parties to such agreement
13
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
14
that—
15
‘‘(i) the value described in subpara-
16
graph (A)(i) is compensation solely for
17
other goods or services that the ANDA
18
filer or biosimilar biological product appli-
19
cation filer has promised to provide; or
20
‘‘(ii) the procompetitive benefits of the
21
agreement outweigh the anticompetitive ef-
22
fects of the agreement.
23
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•S 142 RS
‘‘(b) LIMITATIONS.—In determining whether the set-
1
tling parties have met their burden under subsection
2
(a)(2)(B), the fact finder shall not presume—
3
‘‘(1) that entry would not have occurred until
4
the expiration of the relevant patent or statutory ex-
5
clusivity; or
6
‘‘(2) that the agreement’s provision for entry of
7
the ANDA product or biosimilar biological product
8
prior to the expiration of the relevant patent or stat-
9
utory exclusivity means that the agreement is pro-
10
competitive.
11
‘‘(c) EXCLUSIONS.—Nothing in this section shall pro-
12
hibit a resolution or settlement of a patent infringement
13
claim in which the consideration that the ANDA filer or
14
biosimilar biological product application filer, respectively,
15
receives as part of the resolution or settlement includes
16
only one or more of the following:
17
‘‘(1) The right to market and secure final ap-
18
proval in the United States for the ANDA product
19
or biosimilar biological product at a date, whether
20
certain or contingent, prior to the expiration of—
21
‘‘(A) any patent that is the basis for the
22
patent infringement claim; or
23
‘‘(B) any patent right or other statutory
24
exclusivity that would prevent the marketing of
25
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•S 142 RS
such ANDA product or biosimilar biological
1
product.
2
‘‘(2) A payment for reasonable litigation ex-
3
penses not to exceed—
4
‘‘(A) for calendar year 2023, $7,500,000;
5
or
6
‘‘(B) for calendar year 2024 and each sub-
7
sequent calendar year, the amount determined
8
for the preceding calendar year adjusted to re-
9
flect the percentage increase (if any) in the
10
Producer Price Index for Legal Services pub-
11
lished by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the
12
Department of Labor for the most recent cal-
13
endar year.
14
‘‘(3) A covenant not to sue on any claim that
15
the ANDA product or biosimilar biological product
16
infringes a United States patent.
17
‘‘(d) ENFORCEMENT.—
18
‘‘(1) ENFORCEMENT.—A violation of this sec-
19
tion shall be treated as an unfair method of competi-
20
tion under section 5(a)(1).
21
‘‘(2) JUDICIAL REVIEW.—
22
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Any party that is sub-
23
ject to a final order of the Commission, issued
24
in an administrative adjudicative proceeding
25
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•S 142 RS
under the authority of subsection (a)(1), may,
1
within 30 days of the issuance of such order,
2
petition for review of such order in—
3
‘‘(i) the United States Court of Ap-
4
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit;
5
‘‘(ii) the United States Court of Ap-
6
peals for the circuit in which the ultimate
7
parent
entity,
as
defined
in
section
8
801.1(a)(3) of title 16, Code of Federal
9
Regulations, or any successor thereto, of
10
the NDA holder or biological product li-
11
cense holder is incorporated as of the date
12
that the NDA or biological product license
13
application, as applicable, is filed with the
14
Commissioner of Food and Drugs; or
15
‘‘(iii) the United States Court of Ap-
16
peals for the circuit in which the ultimate
17
parent entity of the ANDA filer or bio-
18
similar biological product application filer
19
is incorporated as of the date that the
20
ANDA or biosimilar biological product ap-
21
plication is filed with the Commissioner of
22
Food and Drugs.
23
‘‘(B) TREATMENT
OF
FINDINGS.—In a
24
proceeding for judicial review of a final order of
25
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•S 142 RS
the Commission, the findings of the Commis-
1
sion as to the facts, if supported by evidence,
2
shall be conclusive.
3
‘‘(e) ANTITRUST LAWS.—Nothing in this section
4
shall modify, impair, limit, or supersede the applicability
5
of the antitrust laws as defined in subsection (a) of the
6
first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), and
7
of section 5 of this Act to the extent that section 5 applies
8
to unfair methods of competition. Nothing in this section
9
shall modify, impair, limit, or supersede the right of an
10
ANDA filer or biosimilar biological product application
11
filer to assert claims or counterclaims against any person,
12
under the antitrust laws or other laws relating to unfair
13
competition.
14
‘‘(f) PENALTIES.—
15
‘‘(1) FORFEITURE.—Each party that violates or
16
assists in the violation of this section shall forfeit
17
and pay to the United States a civil penalty suffi-
18
cient to deter violations of this section, but in no
19
event greater than 3 times the value received by the
20
party that is reasonably attributable to the violation
21
of this section. If no such value has been received by
22
the NDA holder, the biological product license hold-
23
er, the ANDA filer, or the biosimilar biological prod-
24
uct application filer, the penalty to the NDA holder,
25
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•S 142 RS
the biological product license holder, the ANDA
1
filer, or the biosimilar biological product application
2
filer shall be sufficient to deter violations, but in no
3
event shall be greater than 3 times the value given
4
to an ANDA filer or biosimilar biological product
5
application filer reasonably attributable to the viola-
6
tion of this section. Such penalty shall accrue to the
7
United States and may be recovered in a civil action
8
brought by the Commission, in its own name by any
9
of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose, in
10
a district court of the United States against any
11
party that violates this section. In such actions, the
12
United States district courts are empowered to grant
13
mandatory injunctions and such other and further
14
equitable relief as they deem appropriate.
15
‘‘(2) CEASE AND DESIST.—
16
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—If the Commission has
17
issued a cease and desist order with respect to
18
a party in an administrative adjudicative pro-
19
ceeding
under
the
authority
of
subsection
20
(a)(1), an action brought pursuant to para-
21
graph (1) may be commenced against such
22
party at any time before the expiration of 1
23
year after such order becomes final pursuant to
24
section 5(g).
25
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•S 142 RS
‘‘(B)
EXCEPTION.—In
an
action
under
1
subparagraph (A), the findings of the Commis-
2
sion as to the material facts in the administra-
3
tive adjudicative proceeding with respect to the
4
violation of this section by a party shall be con-
5
clusive unless—
6
‘‘(i) the terms of such cease and de-
7
sist order expressly provide that the Com-
8
mission’s findings shall not be conclusive;
9
or
10
[Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]