No START Treaty Act

II 118TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION S. 1674 To provide for better security and accountability with respect to the strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MAY 18, 2023 Mr. COTTON (for himself, Mr. RISCH, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. CRAMER, Mr. SCOTT of Florida, Mr. BARRASSO, Mr. BUDD, Mr. RICKETTS, Mr. HAGERTY, Mr. ROUNDS, and Mr. CRUZ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To provide for better security and accountability with respect to the strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘No START Treaty 4 Act’’. 5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6 Congress makes the following findings: 7 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:35 Jun 02, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1674.IS S1674 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 2 •S 1674 IS (1) The United States and the Russian Federa- 1 tion signed the New START Treaty in April 2010, 2 and the treaty entered into force in February 2011. 3 (2) The central limits of the New START Trea- 4 ty prohibit the United States and the Russian Fed- 5 eration from possessing any more than 700 deployed 6 strategic nuclear launchers, 800 deployed and non- 7 deployed strategic nuclear launchers, and 1,550 nu- 8 clear warheads attributed to those deployed launch- 9 ers. 10 (3) The New START Treaty includes an in- 11 spection and verification regime that includes 18 on- 12 site inspections per year, data exchanges and notifi- 13 cations, and a Bilateral Consultative Commission as 14 a compliance and implementation convening body. 15 (4) The New START Treaty allows each party 16 the right to withdraw if it decides that extraordinary 17 events related to the subject matter of the treaty 18 jeopardize its supreme interests. 19 (5) The New START Treaty placed no con- 20 straints on Russia’s estimated 2,000 non-strategic 21 nuclear weapons, which can be delivered by a variety 22 of ground-based, air-based, and sea-based platforms. 23 In contrast, the United States possesses only a small 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:35 Jun 02, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1674.IS S1674 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 3 •S 1674 IS inventory of aircraft-deliverable non-strategic nuclear 1 gravity bombs. 2 (6) The New START Treaty did not constrain 3 the arsenal of the People’s Republic of China, which 4 is now engaged in a strategic breakout of its nuclear 5 forces. The Department of Defense estimates that 6 China will have about 1,000 operational nuclear 7 warheads by 2030 and about 1,500 warheads by 8 2035 if it continues at its current pace. 9 (7) The Department of Defense acknowledged 10 in its 2022 Report on Military and Security Devel- 11 opments Involving the People’s Republic of China 12 that China took only two years to double its nuclear 13 arsenal, far sooner than the Department’s 2020 esti- 14 mate that it would take China until 2030 to double 15 its nuclear arsenal. 16 (8) Even when the Russian Federation was 17 found compliant with the New START Treaty, it de- 18 veloped multiple strategic nuclear-armed systems 19 that circumvented the spirit and intent of the treaty, 20 such as a nuclear-powered cruise missile and nu- 21 clear-powered torpedo. 22 (9) In March 2020, the United States and the 23 Russian Federation mutually agreed to suspend New 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:35 Jun 02, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1674.IS S1674 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 4 •S 1674 IS START Treaty inspections due to the COVID–19 1 pandemic. 2 (10) On February 3, 2021, Secretary of State 3 Antony Blinken announced the unconditional exten- 4 sion of the New START Treaty for an additional 5 five years, until February 5, 2026, the maximum ex- 6 tension allowed by the treaty. 7 (11) The Russian Federation refused United 8 States requests in August 2022 to resume New 9 START inspections and refused to engage in the Bi- 10 lateral Consultative Commission with the United 11 States in November 2022 to work towards resuming 12 inspections. 13 (12) Given Russia’s refusal to resume manda- 14 tory inspections and refusal to participate in the Bi- 15 lateral Consultative Commission as required by the 16 treaty, the Department of State declared in January 17 2023 that Russia was noncompliant with the New 18 START Treaty. 19 (13) In February 2023, President of the Rus- 20 sian Federation Vladimir Putin announced that Rus- 21 sia would ‘‘suspend’’ its participation in the New 22 START Treaty. The New START Treaty has no 23 provision for suspension. Russia shortly thereafter 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:35 Jun 02, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1674.IS S1674 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 5 •S 1674 IS ceased providing to the United States the data on its 1 nuclear arsenal that is required under the treaty. 2 (14) The United States remains in compliance 3 with the central limits of the New START Treaty 4 and attempted in good faith to resume mutual in- 5 spections under the treaty. 6 (15) The United States has not deployed a new 7 nuclear-capable delivery system in over 30 years, 8 while the Russian Federation has in that same time 9 deployed over a dozen new nuclear-capable delivery 10 systems. Russia also has active nuclear production 11 facilities that enable it to produce large numbers of 12 new warheads. 13 (16) The United States nuclear modernization 14 program of record does not expand the United 15 States nuclear arsenal from current levels, while the 16 People’s Republic of China is growing its nuclear ar- 17 senal as part of what former Commander of the 18 United States Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, 19 has labeled ‘‘breathtaking’’. China’s deployed forces 20 will achieve effective parity with the United States 21 arsenal deployed under the New START Treaty by 22 2035, if not sooner. 23 (17) In its resolution of advice and consent to 24 ratification of the New START Treaty in 2010, the 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:35 Jun 02, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1674.IS S1674 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 6 •S 1674 IS Senate stated that ‘‘if, during the time the New 1 START Treaty remains in force, the President de- 2 termines that there has been an expansion of the 3 strategic arsenal of any country not party to the 4 New START Treaty so as to jeopardize the supreme 5 interests of the United States, then the President 6 should consult on an urgent basis with the Senate 7 to determine whether adherence to the New START 8 Treaty remains in the national interest of the 9 United States’’. To date, the President has taken no 10 action to consult with the Senate on this issue, even 11 though China’s actions clearly meet this standard. 12 (18) For deterrence to be effective, United 13 States Strategic Command needs to be confident it 14 can hold at risk what an adversary values most, in- 15 cluding its nuclear forces. Therefore, the expansion 16 of the nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation 17 and the People’s Republic of China directly impact 18 United States deterrence requirements. 19 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 20 It is the sense of Congress that— 21 (1) arms control is not an end in and of itself, 22 and is only useful if it strengthens the security of 23 the United States and its allies; 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:35 Jun 02, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1674.IS S1674 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 7 •S 1674 IS (2) the extension of the New START Treaty in 1 2021 with no conditions attached and no attempts 2 to resolve the numerous shortcomings of the original 3 treaty harmed United States national security and 4 emboldened America’s adversaries; 5 (3) the Russian Federation is in material 6 breach of its commitments under the New START 7 Treaty, and Russia’s ‘‘suspension’’ of the treaty rep- 8 resents a de facto withdrawal from the treaty; 9 (4) Russia’s de facto withdrawal from the New 10 START Treaty removes the treaty’s value to the na- 11 tional security interest of the United States and its 12 allies of limiting strategic nuclear weapons, as the 13 United States is now unable to confirm Russia is ad- 14 hering to the central limits of the treaty; 15 (5) China’s nuclear buildup meets the Senate 16 criterion of an expansion of the strategic arsenal of 17 a country not party to the New START Treaty that 18 jeopardizes the supreme interests of the United 19 States; 20 (6) Due to Russia’s de facto withdrawal from 21 the New START Treaty and China’s nuclear expan- 22 sion, the New START Treaty is no longer in the 23 United States national interest and the United 24 States should withdraw; 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:35 Jun 02, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1674.IS S1674 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 8 •S 1674 IS (7) after the New START Treaty expires or be- 1 comes defunct, any new arms control agreement or 2 treaty that sets numerical limits on nuclear arsenals 3 should limit the Russian Federation’s nuclear arse- 4 nal—strategic and non-strategic—and should also 5 restrict the nuclear arsenal of the People’s Republic 6 of China without allowing China to increase its arse- 7 nal to reach treaty limits; 8 (8) the United States should not divest itself of, 9 or slow or halt the development or procurement of, 10 any nuclear-capable strategic or non-strategic deliv- 11 ery systems unless a new nuclear arms control treaty 12 is ratified that similarly constrains the nuclear arse- 13 nals of both the Russian Federation and the Peo- 14 ple’s Republic of China; and 15 (9) the United States should strengthen its nu- 16 clear forces, to include growing the size of its nu- 17 clear arsenal, strengthening its force posture, and 18 acquiring additional capabilities, to account for the 19 growth in deterrence requirements caused by the ex- 20 pansion of the nuclear arsenals of the People’s Re- 21 public of China and the Russian Federation since 22 the New START Treaty was signed, as well as to 23 hedge against a Russian breakout from New START 24 Treaty limits. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:35 Jun 02, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1674.IS S1674 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 9 •S 1674 IS SEC. 4. ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR NU- 1 CLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS 2 REQUIRED. 3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De- 5 fense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall 6 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re- 7 port on United States nuclear deterrence. 8 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub- 9 section (a) shall include the following elements: 10 (1) An assessment of the adequacy of the cur- 11 rent and planned nuclear arsenal of the United 12 States for purposes of facing its adversaries, with a 13 focus on the new dynamics associated with facing 14 two major nuclear powers simultaneously in both 15 peacetime and in conflict. The assessment shall de- 16 scribe— 17 (A) the sufficiency of the size and struc- 18 ture of the current and planned arsenal to 19 maintain deterrence with respect to two nu- 20 clear-peers without reduced levels of risk or re- 21 dundancy; 22 (B) the sufficiency of the size and struc- 23 ture of the current and planned arsenal to 24 maintain deterrence of two nuclear-peers with- 25 out reduced levels of risk or redundancy should 26 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:35 Jun 02, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1674.IS S1674 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 10 •S 1674 IS the Russian Federation grow its nuclear forces 1 beyond the levels allowed under the central lim- 2 its of the New START Treaty and should the 3 People’s Republic of China continue to grow its 4 nuclear forces after reaching parity with the 5 currently deployed United States nuclear arse- 6 nal under the New START Treaty; 7 (C) the impact of emerging technology, 8 such as nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons and 9 fractional orbital bombardment systems, on 10 United States nuclear posture and planning; 11 and 12 (D) the current and planned sufficiency of 13 nuclear command, control, and communications 14 capabilities in crisis or conflict scenarios. 15 (2) A proposed implementation plan to address 16 any deficiencies found in the assessment described in 17 paragraph (1). The plan shall include— 18 (A) needed changes to the planned nuclear 19 force structure and force posture based on any 20 gaps in deterrence and assurance capabilities; 21 (B) a proposal and timeline to improve the 22 survivability of the strategic bomber force; 23 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:35 Jun 02, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1674.IS S1674 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 11 •S 1674 IS (C) a proposal and timeline detailing the 1 steps necessary to return a portion of the stra- 2 tegic bomber force to heightened alert status; 3 (D) a proposal and timeline detailing the 4 steps necessary to reduce the time necessary to 5 upload nuclear weapons to the bomber force; 6 (E) a proposal and timeline detailing the 7 steps necessary— 8 (i) to upload additional warheads to 9 the Minuteman III ICBM fleet to its full 10 capacity; and 11 (ii) to deploy Sentinel missiles as they 12 come online with the maximum number of 13 warheads that can be deployed on each 14 missile; and 15 (F) a proposal and timeline detailing the 16 steps necessary to restore submarine-launched 17 ballistic missile tubes on Ohio-class submarines 18 that were rendered inoperable to comply with 19 the terms of the New START Treaty. 20 (3) The national security implications of— 21 (A) any unilateral reductions of the United 22 States nuclear arsenal without corresponding 23 reductions in Russia and China’s nuclear arse- 24 nal; and 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:35 Jun 02, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1674.IS S1674 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 12 •S 1674 IS (B) any unilateral reductions in the United 1 States’ national and theater missile defense 2 without corresponding reductions in Russia and 3 China’s missile defense. 4 SEC. 5. REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE NUCLEAR ARMS 5 AGREEMENTS. 6 (a) REQUIREMENTS.—The President and any rep- 7 resentative of the President shall not negotiate, sign, or [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]