HALT Act of 2023

I 118TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 3154 To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United States, and for other purposes. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY 9, 2023 Mr. MCGOVERN (for himself, Mr. BEYER, Mr. BLUMENAUER, and Mr. GARAMENDI) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on For- eign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the juris- diction of the committee concerned A BILL To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United States, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Hastening Arms Limi- 4 tations Talks Act of 2023’’ or the ‘‘HALT Act of 2023’’. 5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6 Congress makes the following findings: 7 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:08 May 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3154.IH H3154 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 3154 IH (1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an exis- 1 tential threat to humanity, a fact that led President 2 Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorba- 3 chev to declare in a joint statement in 1987 that a 4 ‘‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 5 fought’’, a sentiment affirmed by the People’s Re- 6 public of China, the French Republic, the Russian 7 Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 8 and Northern Ireland, and the United States of 9 America in January 2022. 10 (2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 11 people attended the largest peace rally in United 12 States history, in support of a movement to freeze 13 and reverse the nuclear arms race, a movement that 14 helped to create the political will necessary for the 15 negotiation of several bilateral arms control treaties 16 between the United States and former Soviet Union, 17 and then the Russian Federation. Those treaties 18 contributed to strategic stability through mutual and 19 verifiable reciprocal nuclear weapons reductions. 20 (3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 21 1945, millions of people around the world have stood 22 up to demand meaningful, immediate international 23 action to halt, reduce, and eliminate the threats 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:08 May 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3154.IH H3154 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 3154 IH posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing, 1 and nuclear war, to humankind and the planet. 2 (4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera- 3 tion of Nuclear Weapons done at Washington, Lon- 4 don, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483) (com- 5 monly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation 6 Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’), entered into force, which 7 includes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weap- 8 on states (commonly referred to as the ‘‘P5’’), 9 among other things, ‘‘to pursue negotiations in good 10 faith on effective measures relating to the cessation 11 of the nuclear arms race . . . and to nuclear disar- 12 mament’’. 13 (5) Bipartisan United States global leadership 14 has curbed the growth in the number of countries 15 possessing nuclear weapons and has slowed overall 16 vertical proliferation among countries already pos- 17 sessing nuclear weapons, as is highlighted by a more 18 than 90-percent reduction in the United States nu- 19 clear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of 20 31,255 in 1967. 21 (6) The United States testing of nuclear weap- 22 ons is no longer necessary as a result of the fol- 23 lowing major technical developments since the Sen- 24 ate’s consideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:08 May 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3154.IH H3154 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 3154 IH Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to as the 1 ‘‘CTBT’’) in 1999: 2 (A) The verification architecture of the 3 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Orga- 4 nization (commonly referred to as the 5 ‘‘CTBTO’’)— 6 (i) has made significant advance- 7 ments, as seen through its network of 300 8 International Monitoring Stations and its 9 International Data Centre, which together 10 provide for the near instantaneous detec- 11 tion of nuclear explosives tests, including 12 all 6 such tests conducted by North Korea 13 between 2006 and 2017; and 14 (ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 15 days a week. 16 (B) Since the United States signed the 17 CTBT, confidence has grown in the science- 18 based Stockpile Stewardship and Management 19 Plan of the Department of Energy, which forms 20 the basis of annual certifications to the Presi- 21 dent regarding the continual safety, security, 22 and effectiveness of the United States nuclear 23 deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, 24 leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:08 May 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3154.IH H3154 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 3154 IH Moniz to remark in 2015 that ‘‘lab directors 1 today now state that they certainly understand 2 much more about how nuclear weapons work 3 than during the period of nuclear testing’’. 4 (7) Despite the progress made to reduce the 5 number and role of, and risks posed by, nuclear 6 weapons, and to halt the Cold War-era nuclear arms 7 race, tensions between countries that possess nuclear 8 weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk reduction 9 treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles of 10 weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a quali- 11 tative global nuclear arms race is now underway 12 with each of the countries that possess nuclear 13 weapons spending tens of billions of dollars each 14 year to maintain and improve their arsenals. 15 (8) The Russian Federation is pursuing the de- 16 velopment of destabilizing types of nuclear weapons 17 that are not presently covered under any existing 18 arms control treaty or agreement and the People’s 19 Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and North 20 Korea have each taken concerning steps to diversify 21 their more modest sized, but nonetheless very dead- 22 ly, nuclear arsenals. 23 (9) President Joseph R. Biden’s 2022 Nuclear 24 Posture Review was right to label the nuclear-armed 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:08 May 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3154.IH H3154 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 3154 IH Sea-Launched Cruise Missile ‘‘no longer necessary’’, 1 as this weapon, if deployed, would have the effect of 2 lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use. 3 (10) On February 3, 2021, President Joseph R. 4 Biden preserved binding and verifiable limits on the 5 deployed and non-deployed strategic forces of the 6 largest two nuclear weapons powers through the 7 five-year extension of the Treaty between the United 8 States of America and the Russian Federation on 9 Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 10 of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, 11 and entered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly 12 referred to as the ‘‘New START Treaty’’). 13 (11) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons 14 employment strategy of the United States submitted 15 under section 492 of title 10, United States Code, 16 determined that it is possible to ensure the security 17 of the United States and allies and partners of the 18 United States and maintain a strong and credible 19 strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a 1⁄3 20 reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level 21 established in the New START Treaty. 22 (12) On January 12, 2017, then-Vice President 23 Biden stated, ‘‘[G]iven our non-nuclear capabilities 24 and the nature of today’s threats—it’s hard to envi- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:08 May 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3154.IH H3154 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 7 •HR 3154 IH sion a plausible scenario in which the first use of nu- 1 clear weapons by the United States would be nec- 2 essary. Or make sense.’’. 3 (13) In light of moves by the United States and 4 other countries to increase their reliance on nuclear 5 weapons, a global nuclear freeze would seek to halt 6 the new nuclear arms race by seeking conclusion of 7 a comprehensive and verifiable freeze on the testing, 8 deployment, and production of nuclear weapons and 9 delivery vehicles for such weapons. 10 (14) The reckless and repeated nuclear threats 11 by Russian President Vladimir Putin since his Feb- 12 ruary 2022 invasion of Ukraine underscore the need 13 for a global nuclear freeze. 14 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 15 The following is the policy of the United States: 16 (1) The United States should build upon its 17 decades long, bipartisan efforts to reduce the num- 18 ber and salience of nuclear weapons by leading inter- 19 national negotiations on specific arms-reduction 20 measures as part of a 21st century global nuclear 21 freeze movement. 22 (2) Building on the 2021 extension of the New 23 START Treaty, the United States should engage 24 with all other countries that possess nuclear weapons 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:08 May 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3154.IH H3154 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 8 •HR 3154 IH to seek to negotiate and conclude future multilateral 1 arms control, disarmament, and risk reduction 2 agreements, which should contain some or all of the 3 following provisions: 4 (A) An agreement by the United States 5 and the Russian Federation on a resumption of 6 on-site inspections and verification measures 7 per the New START Treaty and a follow-on 8 treaty or agreement to the New START Treaty 9 that may lower the central limits of the Treaty 10 and cover new kinds of strategic delivery vehi- 11 cles or non-strategic nuclear weapons. 12 (B) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on 13 the testing, production, and further deployment 14 of all nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for 15 such weapons. 16 (C) An agreement that establishes a 17 verifiable numerical ceiling on the deployed 18 shorter-range and intermediate-range and stra- 19 tegic delivery systems (as defined by the Inter- 20 mediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 21 New START Treaty, respectively) and the nu- 22 clear warheads associated with such systems be- 23 longing to the P5, and to the extent possible, 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:08 May 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3154.IH H3154 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 9 •HR 3154 IH all countries that possess nuclear weapons, at 1 August 2, 2019, levels. 2 (D) An agreement by each country to 3 adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weap- 4 ons or provide transparency into its nuclear de- 5 claratory policy. 6 (E) An agreement on a proactive United 7 Nations Security Council resolution that ex- 8 pands access by the International Atomic En- 9 ergy Agency to any country found by the Board 10 of Governors of that Agency to be noncompliant 11 with its obligations under the NPT. 12 (F) An agreement to refrain from config- 13 uring nuclear forces in a ‘‘launch on warning’’ 14 or ‘‘launch under warning’’ nuclear posture, 15 which may prompt a nuclear armed country to 16 launch a ballistic missile attack in response to 17 detection by an early-warning satellite or sensor 18 of a suspected incoming ballistic missile. 19 (G) An agreement not to target or inter- 20 fere in the nuclear command, control, and com- 21 munications (commonly referred to as ‘‘NC3’’) 22 infrastructure of another country through a ki- 23 netic attack or a cyberattack. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:08 May 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3154.IH H3154 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 10 •HR 3154 IH (H) An agreement on transparency meas- 1 ures or verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic 2 cruise missiles and glide vehicles that are fired 3 from sea-based, ground, and air platforms. 4 (I) An agreement to provide a baseline and 5 continuous exchanges detailing the aggregate 6 number of active nuclear weapons and associ- 7 ated systems possessed by each country. 8 (3) The United States should rejuvenate efforts 9 in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament 10 toward the negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Mate- 11 rial Treaty or Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, or 12 move negotiations to another international body or 13 fora, such as a meeting of the P5. Successful conclu- 14 sion of such a treaty would verifiably prevent any 15 country’s production of highly enriched uranium and 16 plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. 17 (4) The United States should convene a series 18 of head-of-state level summits on nuclear disar- 19 mament modeled on the Nuclear Security Summits 20 process, which saw the elimination of the equivalent 21 of 3,000 nuclear weapons. 22 (5) The President should seek ratification by 23 the Senate of the CTBT and mobilize all countries 24 covered by Annex 2 of the CTBT to pursue similar 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:08 May 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3154.IH H3154 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 11 •HR 3154 IH action to hasten entry into force of the CTBT. The 1 entry into force of the CTBT, for which ratification 2 by the United States will provide critical momentum, 3 will activate the CTBT’s onsite inspection provision 4 to investigate allegations that any country that is a 5 party to the CTBT has conducted a nuclear test of 6 any yield. 7 (6) The President should make the accession of 8 North Korea to the CTBT a component of any final 9 agreement in fulfilling the pledges the Government 10 of North Korea made in Singapore, as North Korea 11 is reportedly the only country to have conducted a 12 nuclear explosive test since 1998. 13 (7) The United States should— 14 (A) refrain from developing any new de- 15 signs for nuclear warheads or bombs, but espe- 16 cially designs that could add a level of technical 17 uncertainty into the United States stockpile and 18 thus renew calls to resume nuclear explosive 19 testing in order to test that new design; and 20 (B) seek reciprocal commitments from 21 other countries that possess nuclear weapons. 22 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:08 May 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3154.IH H3154 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 12 •HR 3154 IH SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR 1 TEST EXPLOSIONS. 2 (a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds authorized to 3 be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 4 2024 [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]