AB1595 - Criminal procedure: writs of habeas corpus and motions to vacate.

Enrolled August 30, 2026 Passed IN Senate August 26, 2026 Passed IN Assembly August 26, 2026 Amended IN Senate August 19, 2026 Amended IN Assembly May 18, 2026 Amended IN Assembly February 23, 2026 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE— 2025–2026 REGULAR SESSION Assembly Bill No. 1595 Introduced by Assembly Member Schultz January 16, 2026 An act to amend Sections 1376, 1473, 1473.6, 1473.7, and 1484 of the Penal Code, relating to criminal procedure. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST AB 1595, Schultz. Criminal procedure: writs of habeas corpus and motions to vacate. Existing law allows a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of their imprisonment or restraint. Existing law allows a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on several bases, including on the basis of false evidence that is material on the issue of guilt or punishment, as specified, or the discovery of new evidence that exists that is presented without substantial delay, is admissible, and that has not been previously presented and heard at trial and has been discovered after trial. Existing law creates a presumption in favor of granting relief through habeas when the district attorney in the county of the conviction or the Attorney General concedes or stipulates to a legal or factual basis for habeas relief. This bill would revise the above-described standards to no longer require false evidence to be material and would instead require that the evidence create any reasonable likelihood it could have affected the outcome of the case. The bill would also change the new evidence standard to instead require that there be a reasonable probability it would have produced a different result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the case. The bill would revise the presumption in favor of granting relief to instead make a stipulation binding on the parties, if certain conditions are met, unless the moving party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the other party violated the terms or the state withheld evidence, as specified. The bill would also revise the process for a concession and instead prohibit a party from withdrawing a concession if the concession is contained in a return or other written filing signed by counsel for respondent, as specified. Existing law allows a person who is no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained to prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence of fraud by a government official that completely undermines the prosecution’s case, is conclusive, and points unerringly to their innocence, newly discovered evidence that a government official testified falsely at trial that resulted in the conviction and that the testimony was substantially probative on the issue of guilt or punishment, or newly discovered evidence of misconduct by a government official committed in the underlying case that resulted in fabrication of evidence that was substantially material and probative on the issue of guilt or punishment. The bill would revise the above-described standards to instead require a demonstration that there is a reasonable probability the evidence would have produced a different result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the case, as specified. The bill would make other conforming changes. The bill would make related findings and declarations. Digest Key Vote: MAJORITY Appropriation: NO Fiscal Committee: YES Local Program: NO Bill Text The people of the State of California do enact as follows: SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following: (a) According to the 2024 Annual Report from the Committee on Revision of the Penal Code, the Penal Code contains inconsistent and unclear standards for obtaining relief for habeas corpus claims and motions to vacate based on new evidence. The committee also recognized that courts rarely exercise their broad authority to dismiss a criminal action in the furtherance of justice when ruling on a habeas petition, and that often leads to years of unnecessary legal limbo and litigation while the district attorney reviews the case and determines whether to retry the case. The court ruling on the habeas petition typically has enough evidence before it to make a determination about whether the action should be dismissed with prejudice. (b) It is the intent of the Legislature that courts assessing statutory habeas corpus claims and motions to vacate based on new evidence determine whether the new evidence shows there is a reasonable probability of a different result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the case. That standard is the same as the one articulated in Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031 to evaluate violations of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. (c) Courts considering habeas corpus claims across California do not provide discovery after an order to show cause issues in a consistent manner. (d) Harmonizing the standard for evaluating these claims, clarifying when courts should allow discovery, and establishing a clear standard to overcome rigid procedural bars that can prevent courts from adjudicating meritorious claims will help correct wrongful convictions and sentences and be a more efficient use of court and other resources. This act reaffirms the Legislature’s intolerance for wrongful convictions and rejection of prior case law’s requirement that innocent people produce evidence that points unerringly to innocence and undermines the prosecution’s entire case. (e) Harmonizing the standard for evaluating these claims and clarifying when courts should allow discovery will help correct wrongful convictions and sentences and promote more efficient use of court and other resources. SEC. 2. Section 1376 of the Penal Code is amended to read: 1376. (a) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply: (1) “Intellectual disability” means the condition of significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested before the end of the developmental period, as defined by clinical standards. (2) “Manifested before the end of the developmental period” means that the deficits were present during the developmental period. It does not require a formal diagnosis of intellectual disability, or tests of intellectual functioning in the intellectual disability range, before the end of the developmental period. (3) “Prima facie showing of intellectual disability” means that the defendant’s allegation of intellectual disability is based on the type of evidence typically relied on by a qualified expert in diagnosing intellectual disability, as defined in current clinical standards, or when a qualified expert provides a declaration diagnosing the defendant as a person with intellectual disability. (4) “The prosecution” refers to the prosecuting agency at trial and to the respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding. (b) A person with an intellectual disability is ineligible for the death penalty. (c) (1) When the prosecution seeks the death penalty, the defendant may, at a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial, apply for an order directing that a hearing to determine intellectual disability be conducted. Upon a prima facie showing that the defendant is a person with an intellectual disability, the court shall order a hearing to determine whether the defendant is a person with an intellectual disability. At the request of the defendant, the court shall conduct the hearing without a jury prior to the commencement of the trial. The defendant’s request for a court hearing prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of a jury hearing on the issue of intellectual disability. If the defendant does not request a court hearing, the court shall order a jury hearing to determine if the defendant is a person with an intellectual disability. The jury hearing on intellectual disability shall occur at the conclusion of the phase of the trial in which the jury has found the defendant guilty with a finding that one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in Section 190.2 are true. Except as provided in paragraph (3), the same jury shall make a finding that the defendant is a person with an intellectual disability or that the defendant does not have an intellectual disability. (2) For the purposes of the procedures set forth in this section, the court or jury shall decide only the question of the defendant’s intellectual disability. The defendant shall present evidence in support of the claim that they are a person with an intellectual disability. The prosecution shall present its case regarding the issue of whether the defendant is a person with an intellectual disability. Each party may offer rebuttal evidence. The court, for good cause in furtherance of justice, may permit either party to reopen its case to present evidence in support of or opposition to the claim of intellectual disability. A statement made by the defendant during an examination ordered by the court shall not be admissible in the trial on the defendant’s guilt. (3) At the close of evidence, the prosecution shall make its final argument, and the defendant shall conclude with their final argument. The burden of proof shall be on the defense to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is a person with an intellectual disability. The jury shall return a verdict that either the defendant is a person with an intellectual disability or the defendant does not have an intellectual disability. The verdict of the jury shall be unanimous. When the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict that the defendant is a person with an intellectual disability, and does not reach a unanimous verdict that the defendant does not have an intellectual disability, the court shall dismiss the jury and enter a finding that the defendant is ineligible for the death penalty pursuant to this section. (d) When the hearing is conducted before the court prior to the commencement of the trial, the following shall apply: (1) If the court finds that the defendant is a person with an intellectual disability, the court shall preclude the death penalty and the criminal trial thereafter shall proceed as in any other case in which a sentence of death is not sought by the prosecution. If the defendant is found guilty of murder in the first degree, with a finding that one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in Section 190.2 are true, the court shall sentence the defendant to confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole. The jury shall not be informed of the prior proceedings or the findings concerning the defendant’s claim of intellectual disability unless the defendant elects to present that information at trial. (2) If the court finds that the defendant does not have an intellectual disability, the trial court shall proceed as in any other case in which a sentence of death is sought by the prosecution. The jury shall not be informed of the prior proceedings or the findings concerning the defendant’s claim of intellectual disability. (e) When the hearing is conducted before the jury after the defendant is found guilty with a finding that one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in Section 190.2 are true, the following shall apply: (1) If the jury finds that the defendant is a person with an intellectual disability, the court shall preclude the death penalty and shall sentence the defendant to confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole. (2) If the jury finds that the defendant does not have an intellectual disability, the trial shall proceed as in any other case in which a sentence of death is sought by the prosecution. (f) When the defendant has not requested a court hearing as provided in subdivision (c), and has entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity under Sections 190.4 and 1026, the hearing on intellectual disability shall occur at the conclusion of the sanity trial if the defendant is found sane. (g) A person in custody pursuant to a judgment of death may apply for an order directing that a hearing to determine intellectual disability be conducted as part of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. When the claim of intellectual disability is raised in a petition for habeas corpus and a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of intellectual disability, the reviewing court shall issue an order to show cause if the petitioner has met the prima facie standard. The petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is a person with an intellectual disability. The prosecution may present its case regarding the issue of whether the petitioner is a person with an intellectual disability. Each party may offer rebuttal evidence. During an evidentiary hearing under this subdivision, an expert may testify about the contents of out-of-court statements, including documentary evidence and statements from witnesses when those types of statements are accepted by the medical community as relevant to a diagnosis of intellectual disability if the expert relied upon these statements as the basis for their opinion. (h) The results of a test measuring intellectual functioning shall not be changed or adjusted based on race, ethnicity, national origin, or socioeconomic status. (i) (1) When a court has concluded a hearing under this section is necessary, that court may order a defendant or petitioner to submit to testing by a qualified prosecution expert only if the prosecution presents a reasonable factual basis that the intellectual functioning testing presented by the defendant or petitioner is unreliable. Any order requiring the defendant or petitioner to submit to testing by a qualified prosecution expert shall be limited to tests directly related to the determination of the defendant or petitioner’s intellectual functioning. Any such order shall also prohibit the expert from questioning the defendant or petitioner about the facts of the case, shall permit the defendant or petitioner to have their attorney nearby during the examination and to consult with their attorney during the examination if they choose, and shall, upon request by the defendant or petitioner’s counsel, require that the prosecution expert’s examination be recorded in a manner agreed upon by the parties and the court. (2) The prosecution shall submit a proposed list of the tests its expert wishes to administer so that the defendant or petitioner may raise any objections before testing is ordered. The Legislature finds and declares that this paragraph is declaratory of existing law. (j) Intellectual disability is a question of fact. The parties to a trial or habeas proceeding may stipulate that a defendan [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]