I 116TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION H. R. 8716 To strengthen the United States ties with Latin American and Caribbean countries through diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation, to counter efforts by the People’s Republic of China to undermine United States interests and values in the Americas, and to promote economic development and competitiveness in the Latin America and Caribbean region. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OCTOBER 30, 2020 Mr. SIRES introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned A BILL To strengthen the United States ties with Latin American and Caribbean countries through diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation, to counter efforts by the Peo- ple’s Republic of China to undermine United States in- terests and values in the Americas, and to promote eco- nomic development and competitiveness in the Latin America and Caribbean region. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 VerDate Sep 11 2014 19:47 Nov 25, 2020 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H8716.IH H8716 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 8716 IH SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 1 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 2 ‘‘Advancing Competitiveness, Transparency, and Security 3 in the Americas Act of 2020’’. 4 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 5 this Act is as follows: 6 Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Findings. Sec. 3. Sense of Congress. Sec. 4. Statement of policy. Sec. 5. Definitions. Sec. 6. Assessing the intentions of the People’s Republic of China in the West- ern Hemisphere. TITLE I—INCREASING COMPETITIVENESS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Sec. 101. Developing and implementing a strategy to increase economic com- petitiveness and promote the rule of law. Sec. 102. Strengthening United States International Development Finance Cor- poration engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean. Sec. 103. Advancing regulation of foreign investment in infrastructure projects to protect host countries’ national interests. Sec. 104. Strengthening infrastructure project selection and procurement proc- esses. Sec. 105. Promoting the rule of law in digital governance. Sec. 106. Investing in projects that strengthen the region’s digital infrastruc- ture. Sec. 107. Countering foreign corrupt practices in the Americas. Sec. 108. Countering malign business practices. Sec. 109. Promoting greater energy security. TITLE II—PROMOTING REGIONAL SECURITY AND DIGITAL SECURITY, AND PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS Sec. 201. Ensuring the integrity of telecom and data networks and critical in- frastructure. Sec. 202. Addressing the risks that pervasive surveillance and monitoring tech- nologies pose to human rights. Sec. 203. Revitalizing bilateral and multilateral military education programs. TITLE III—ADVANCING THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Sec. 301. Counteracting growing Chinese educational and cultural influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Sec. 302. Advancing the role of civil society and the media to promote account- ability. TITLE IV—RESOURCING FOR SUCCESS VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:46 Nov 21, 2020 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6211 E:\BILLS\H8716.IH H8716 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 8716 IH Sec. 401. Appointment of China Engagement Officers at United States embas- sies in the Western Hemisphere. Sec. 402. Assessing staffing needs at United States embassies in Latin America and the Caribbean. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 1 Congress makes the following findings: 2 (1) The People’s Republic of China has dra- 3 matically increased engagement with Latin America 4 and the Caribbean since 2004. Latin America is the 5 second largest destination for Chinese foreign direct 6 investment. China has become the top trading part- 7 ner of Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. China’s 8 trade with Latin America has grown from 9 $17,000,000,000 in 2002 to $306,000,000,000 in 10 2018. 11 (2) Between 2005 and 2018, the People’s Re- 12 public of China provided Latin America with an esti- 13 mated $141,000,000,000 in development loans and 14 other assistance. The annual amount of such loans 15 and assistance consistently surpasses the annual sov- 16 ereign lending to Latin America and the Caribbean 17 from either the World Bank or the Inter-American 18 Development Bank. 19 (3) The People’s Republic of China— 20 (A) is investing extensively across the re- 21 gion’s extractive sector and agricultural supply 22 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:46 Nov 21, 2020 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H8716.IH H8716 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 8716 IH chains to more effectively control raw materials 1 supply and pricing; 2 (B) has acquired and built new port facili- 3 ties and other transport and energy infrastruc- 4 ture in Brazil, Panama, Costa Rica, El Sal- 5 vador, and elsewhere in the region to expand its 6 footprint in Latin America; and 7 (C) has developed strong partnerships and 8 engaged in extensive deal-making in tele- 9 communications and other technology-intensive 10 sectors in the Latin American and Caribbean 11 region. 12 (4) In 2015, the People’s Republic of China 13 and countries of the Community of Latin American 14 and Caribbean States (CELAC) held the first meet- 15 ing of the China-CELAC Ministerial Forum, at 16 which they agreed to a 5-year cooperation plan re- 17 garding politics, security, trade, investment, finance, 18 infrastructure, energy, resources, industry, agri- 19 culture, science, and people-to-people exchanges. 20 China is also active in other regional institutions, in- 21 cluding multilateral development banks. 22 (5) The United States Southern Command has 23 warned that China’s space and telecommunications 24 ventures in Latin America and the Caribbean have 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:46 Nov 21, 2020 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H8716.IH H8716 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 8716 IH created United States commercial and security 1 vulnerabilities. 2 (6) China has spent more than 3 $244,000,000,000 on energy projects worldwide 4 since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in Latin 5 America and the Caribbean. Although the majority 6 of this spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has 7 also been the largest investor in clean energy glob- 8 ally for almost a decade. 9 (7) China promotes the repressive use of tech- 10 nology— 11 (A) by selling crowd control weapons and 12 riot gear used against demonstrators; and 13 (B) by developing tracking systems that 14 can be used by governments to surveil and mon- 15 itor their citizens. 16 (8) Although China did not originally include 17 the Latin America and Caribbean region in its Belt 18 and Road Initiative— 19 (A) at a meeting with the Community of 20 Latin American and Caribbean States in Janu- 21 ary 2018, China invited Latin America and the 22 Caribbean to participate in the Belt and Road 23 Initiative, referring to the region as a natural 24 fit for a program that aims to improve 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:46 Nov 21, 2020 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H8716.IH H8716 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 8716 IH connectivity between land and sea through 1 jointly built logistic, electricity and information 2 pathways; and 3 (B) Nineteen Latin American and Carib- 4 bean countries have signed bilateral Belt and 5 Road Cooperation Agreements since 2017. 6 (9) The People’s Republic of China offers to fi- 7 nance projects in Latin America and the Caribbean 8 on deceptively easy terms that frequently lead recipi- 9 ent countries to become dependent on, and deeply 10 indebted to, China. Chinese companies frequently 11 engage in exploitative practices, including predatory 12 lending, and project requirements that— 13 (A) provide little or no benefit to the host 14 country; and 15 (B) facilitate corrupt practices. 16 (10) The Government of China expects that 17 Chinese companies will invest the equivalent of 18 $250,000,000,000 in Latin America and the Carib- 19 bean by 2025. 20 (11) Since 2017, China has used its increasing 21 economic influence in Latin America and the Carib- 22 bean to encourage countries, including El Salvador, 23 Panama, and the Dominican Republic, to sever dip- 24 lomatic relations with Taiwan. Of the 15 countries 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:59 Nov 23, 2020 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H8716.IH H8716 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 7 •HR 8716 IH that still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, 1 9 are in Latin America and the Caribbean, namely: 2 Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, 3 Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. 4 Vincent and the Grenadines. 5 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 6 It is the sense of Congress that— 7 (1) the United States shares extensive economic 8 and commercial relations, democratic values, cultural 9 ties, and geographic proximity with the nations of 10 the Western Hemisphere; 11 (2) increased United States engagement with 12 countries in the Western Hemisphere is essential to 13 addressing initiatives by rival powers, such as China, 14 to increase their presence and influence over govern- 15 ments in Latin American and the Caribbean at the 16 expense of strategic economic and security interests 17 of the United States; 18 (3) the United States is uniquely positioned to 19 promote the rule of law and support the strength- 20 ening of democratic institutions and individual free- 21 doms in Latin America and the Caribbean, while im- 22 proving the quality of life of citizens throughout the 23 Western Hemisphere; 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:46 Nov 21, 2020 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H8716.IH H8716 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 8 •HR 8716 IH (4) China’s growing presence in the Western 1 Hemisphere— 2 (A) has contributed to the survival of auto- 3 cratic and anti-democratic regimes, such as the 4 Maduro regime and the Government of Cuba, 5 by acting as a lender of last resort and pro- 6 viding other forms of economic support; 7 (B) has assisted such regimes in under- 8 mining democratic norms through weapons 9 sales and the proliferation of surveillance tech- 10 nology; and 11 (C) has provided governments with the re- 12 sources to implement irresponsible economic 13 policies to the detriment of its citizens; and 14 (5) the United States Government should con- 15 tinue to assert a positive presence in the Western 16 Hemisphere based upon— 17 (A) supporting the rule of law, combating 18 corruption, and advancing digital security as a 19 means to improve prospects for regional growth 20 and development and mitigate the unfair advan- 21 tage accrued to those that engage in unfair and 22 illegal practices; 23 (B) facilitating technical assistance and 24 knowledge-sharing programs that strengthen re- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:46 Nov 21, 2020 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H8716.IH H8716 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 9 •HR 8716 IH gional governments’ and businesses’ capacity 1 for engaging in sound negotiations and con- 2 tracts, protect their economic interests, and 3 protect the economic interests of their citizens; 4 (C) engaging in development investments 5 that strengthen United States public and pri- 6 vate sector ties to Western Hemisphere govern- 7 ments and businesses, promote shared convic- 8 tion that open markets and fair competition are 9 critical to sustained economic growth, enhance 10 regional businesses’ ability to move up the value 11 chain, and are environmentally sustainable; 12 (D) raising awareness regarding how the 13 proliferation of Chinese economic largesse and 14 the increased adoption of Chinese surveillance 15 technology can harm Western Hemisphere 16 economies and undermine democratic institu- 17 tions; 18 (E) empowering local and international 19 media and civil society to carefully monitor in- 20 vestment activity in Latin America and the 21 Caribbean to ensure accountability and uncover 22 the malign effects of greater Chinese engage- 23 ment, including a lack of transparency, facilita- 24 tion of corruption, unsustainable debt, environ- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:46 Nov 21, 2020 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H8716.IH H8716 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 10 •HR 8716 IH mental damage, opaque labor and business 1 practices of Chinese firms, and the increased 2 likelihood of projects that leave host countries 3 in unsustainable debt; and 4 (F) promoting greater economic engage- 5 ment between the United States and other 6 countries of the Western Hemisphere to spur 7 economic development in the region and in- 8 crease economic opportunities for the United 9 States private sector. 10 SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 11 It is the policy of the United States— 12 (1) to expand United States engagement in the 13 Western Hemisphere through economic and public 14 diplomacy that strengthens political and economic 15 relations, reinforces shared democratic values, and 16 facilitates economic development in the Western 17 Hemisphere; and 18 (2) to promote United States economic pros- 19 perity through increased engagement with Latin 20 America and the Caribbean. 21 SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS. 22 In this Act: 23 (1) CARIBBEAN.—The term ‘‘Caribbean’’ does 24 not include Cuba, unless it is specifically named. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:46 Nov 21, 2020 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H8716.IH H8716 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS 11 •HR 8716 IH (2) LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.— 1 The term ‘‘Latin America and the Caribbean’’ does 2 not include Cuba, unless Cuba is specifically named. 3 (3) RULE OF LAW.—The term ‘‘rule of law’’ re- 4 fers to a durable system of institutions and proc- 5 esses founded on the universal principles of— 6 (A) accountability; 7 (B) just laws that protect fundamental 8 freedoms; 9 (C) open and transparent government 10 processes; and 11 (D) accessible and impartial dispute reso- 12 lution. 13 SEC. 6. ASSESSING THE INTENTIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S RE- 14 PUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE WESTERN HEMI- 15 SPHERE. 16 (a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term ‘‘ap- 17 propriate congressional committees’’ means— 18 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 19 Senate; 20 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 21 Senate; 22 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]