Taiwan Defense Act

II 116TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION S. 3936 To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, and for other purposes. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES JUNE 10, 2020 Mr. HAWLEY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services A BILL To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Defense Act’’. 4 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 5 In this Act: 6 (1) DENY.—The term ‘‘deny’’ means to use 7 combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ul- 8 timately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic 9 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:35 Jun 25, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3936.IS S3936 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 2 •S 3936 IS of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, 1 resulting in— 2 (A) the termination of hostilities or, at a 3 minimum, the termination of the attempted fait 4 accompli; or 5 (B) the neutralization of the ability of the 6 People’s Republic of China to execute a fait 7 accompli against Taiwan. 8 (2) FAIT ACCOMPLI.—The term ‘‘fait accompli’’ 9 means the strategy of the People’s Republic of 10 China designed to allow the People’s Republic of 11 China to use military force to seize control of Tai- 12 wan before the United States Armed Forces are able 13 to respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring 14 an effective combined joint response by the United 15 States Armed Forces by convincing the United 16 States that mounting such a response would be pro- 17 hibitively difficult or costly. 18 SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 19 Congress makes the following findings: 20 (1) Taiwan is— 21 (A) a beacon of democracy in Asia; and 22 (B) a steadfast partner of the United 23 States in the common pursuit of a free and 24 open Indo-Pacific region in which— 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:35 Jun 25, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3936.IS S3936 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 3 •S 3936 IS (i) all societies enjoy sovereign auton- 1 omy; 2 (ii) people live securely, prosperously, 3 and with dignity; and 4 (iii) the societies of the region rise 5 and fall not by coercion but on the basis 6 of peaceful competition. 7 (2) If the Government of the People’s Republic 8 of China were to use military force to compel the 9 unification of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of 10 China— 11 (A) the world would lose one of the great 12 champions of freedom and democracy; 13 (B) the United States and allies and part- 14 ners of the United States would face severe dif- 15 ficulty in maintaining favorable balances of 16 power relative to the People’s Republic of China 17 in Northeast and Southeast Asia; and 18 (C) as the balance of power in the Indo- 19 Pacific region shifted in favor of the People’s 20 Republic of China, the Government of the Peo- 21 ple’s Republic of China would possess an in- 22 creasing ability— 23 (i) to impose its will throughout the 24 Indo-Pacific region; and 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:35 Jun 25, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3936.IS S3936 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 4 •S 3936 IS (ii) to prevent United States access to 1 key trade routes and markets in the Indo- 2 Pacific region, thereby imposing severe 3 economic hardship on middle-class and 4 working-class people of the United States 5 and undermining the American way of life. 6 (3) In January 2019, the Defense Intelligence 7 Agency assessed that the ‘‘longstanding’’ intent of 8 the Government of the People’s Republic of China to 9 compel the unification of Taiwan with the People’s 10 Republic of China, and deter any attempt by Taiwan 11 to declare independence, was the ‘‘primary driver for 12 China’s military modernization’’. 13 (4) The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific 14 Strategy Report released in June 2019, states that 15 the Government of the People’s Republic of China is 16 ‘‘preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with 17 the mainland by force, while simultaneously deter- 18 ring, delaying, or denying any third-party interven- 19 tion on Taiwan’s behalf’’. 20 (5) Department of Defense statements and pub- 21 lications indicate that the Government of the Peo- 22 ple’s Republic of China is developing the plans and 23 capabilities required to employ the fait accompli 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:35 Jun 25, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3936.IS S3936 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 5 •S 3936 IS strategy to compel the unification of Taiwan with 1 the People’s Republic of China, including— 2 (A) the assessment by the Defense Science 3 Board in 2017 that the Government of the Peo- 4 ple’s Republic of China had adopted a theory of 5 victory whereby once conflict with the United 6 States appeared inevitable, as might be the case 7 if the Government of the People’s Republic of 8 China attempted to use military force to compel 9 the unification of Taiwan with the People’s Re- 10 public of China, then the Government of the 11 People’s Republic of China ‘‘will attempt to 12 achieve a decisive outcome very quickly, pre- 13 senting the United States and its allies with a 14 fait accompli’’ and ‘‘then seek to demonstrate 15 that the United States and its allies will incur 16 significant costs in seeking to reverse that out- 17 come’’; 18 (B) the assessment in the Indo-Pacific 19 Strategy Report that, if the Government of the 20 People’s Republic of China or another compet- 21 itor in the Indo-Pacific region decides ‘‘to ad- 22 vance their interests through force, they are 23 likely to enjoy a local military advantage at the 24 onset of conflict. In a fait accompli scenario, 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:35 Jun 25, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3936.IS S3936 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 6 •S 3936 IS competitors would seek to employ their capabili- 1 ties quickly to achieve limited objectives and 2 forestall a response from the United States and 3 its allies and partners’’; 4 (C) testimony by then Acting Secretary of 5 Defense Patrick Shanahan in March 2019 6 that— 7 (i) the Government of the People’s 8 Republic of China ‘‘has made investments 9 specifically intended to offset U.S. advan- 10 tages’’; and 11 (ii) if deployed in the initial stages of 12 a conflict, ‘‘these capabilities could seek to 13 achieve a ‘fait accompli’ that would make 14 reversing Chinese gains more difficult, 15 militarily and politically’’; and 16 (D) testimony by then Commanding Gen- 17 eral of Marine Corps Combat Development 18 Command Lieutenant General David Berger in 19 April 2019 that peer adversaries of the United 20 States seek ‘‘to create strategic dilemmas 21 through fait accompli scenarios’’. 22 (6) In March 2019, then Acting Secretary of 23 Defense Patrick Shanahan testified that the imple- 24 mentation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:35 Jun 25, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3936.IS S3936 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 7 •S 3936 IS would ensure the United States has ‘‘the capabili- 1 ties, posture, and employment of forces’’ required to 2 prevent a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of 3 China. 4 (7) According to the Indo-Pacific Strategy Re- 5 port, ‘‘[t]he National Defense Strategy implicitly ac- 6 knowledges the most stressing potential scenarios 7 will occur along our competitors’ peripheries’’. An 8 attempted fait accompli by the People’s Republic of 9 China against Taiwan should therefore be expected 10 to constitute a ‘‘most stressing’’ potential scenario 11 for the United States Armed Forces. 12 (8) The National Defense Strategy Commission 13 found that the United States Armed Forces must be 14 postured ‘‘to deter and prevent a fait accompli by an 15 agile opportunistic adversary’’ in order to compete 16 effectively in the Indo-Pacific region and stated that 17 ‘‘the United States must develop new operational 18 concepts to achieve strategic advantage, including by 19 addressing the ability of aggressive regimes to 20 achieve a fait accompli against states on their pe- 21 riphery,’’ in recognition of— 22 (A) the unique challenges to the United 23 States Armed Forces posed by the employment 24 of the fait accompli strategy by the Government 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:35 Jun 25, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3936.IS S3936 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 8 •S 3936 IS of the People’s Republic of China or another 1 strategic competitor; and 2 (B) the consequent urgent need for new 3 thinking and steady focus by the Department of 4 Defense on ensuring the ability of the United 5 States Armed Forces to prevent an adversary 6 from using the fait accompli strategy to ad- 7 vance its interests at the expense of those of the 8 United States. 9 (9) Department of Defense strategic guidance 10 and official statements underscore the essential role 11 that denial operations will play in preventing a fait 12 accompli by the People’s Republic of China against 13 Taiwan, including— 14 (A) the incorporation in the National De- 15 fense Strategy of the Global Operating Model 16 that includes a ‘‘blunt layer’’ of combat-credible 17 forward forces postured and employed to 18 ‘‘delay, degrade, or deny adversary aggression’’; 19 (B) the conclusion by the National Defense 20 Strategy Commission that the Department of 21 Defense must position ‘‘substantial capability 22 forward’’ in the form of the ‘‘blunt layer’’ in- 23 cluded in the Global Operating Model to ‘‘deter 24 and prevent a fait accompli’’; 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:35 Jun 25, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3936.IS S3936 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 9 •S 3936 IS (C) the statement for the record by the 1 Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific 2 Command, Admiral Phil Davidson, in April 3 2018 in which he concludes, ‘‘[d]ue to the dis- 4 tances involved in the Indo-Pacific, we cannot 5 rely solely on surge forces from the continental 6 United States to deter Chinese aggression or 7 prevent a fait accompli. PACOM must maintain 8 a robust blunt layer that effectively deters Chi- 9 nese aggression in the Indo-Pacific’’; 10 (D) the Joint Operating Concept for De- 11 terrence Operations, which states that forward- 12 deployed forces, such as those included in the 13 blunt layer of the Global Operating Model and 14 referenced by the National Defense Strategy 15 Commission and the Commander of the United 16 States Indo-Pacific Command, contribute to 17 ‘‘denying benefits’’ and thereby reduce ‘‘the 18 likelihood of an adversary achieving strategic or 19 tactical surprise, thus helping to prevent adver- 20 sary decisionmakers from concluding they 21 might achieve a military fait accompli that 22 could be extremely costly for the [United 23 States] to reverse by force’’; 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:35 Jun 25, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3936.IS S3936 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 10 •S 3936 IS (E) the United States Army Multi-Domain 1 Operations concept document, which states that 2 the Armed Forces must demonstrate the capa- 3 bility ‘‘to immediately deny a fait accompli at- 4 tack’’ in order to deter a near-peer adversary; 5 and 6 (F) the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 7 report, which states that forward-deployed 8 forces ‘‘that can continue to operate inside an 9 adversary’s long-range precision-fire weapons 10 engagement zone (WEZ) are more operationally 11 relevant than forces which must rapidly maneu- 12 ver to positions outside the WEZ in order to re- 13 main survivable,’’ and that such ‘‘stand-in’’ 14 forces possess the capability to ‘‘attrite adver- 15 sary forces, enable joint force access require- 16 ments, complicate targeting and consume adver- 17 sary [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- 18 sance] resources, and prevent fait accompli sce- 19 narios’’. 20 SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 21 It is the sense of Congress that— 22 (1) the ability of the United States to uphold 23 a free and open Indo-Pacific region would be se- 24 verely compromised if the Government of the Peo- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:35 Jun 25, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3936.IS S3936 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 11 •S 3936 IS ple’s Republic of China were able to compel the uni- 1 fication of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of 2 China, particularly if the People’s Republic of China 3 were able to do so by military force; 4 (2) the loss by the United States of the ability 5 to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region 6 would result in the significantly increased vulner- 7 ability of the middle-class and working-class people 8 of the United States and the allies and partners of 9 the United States to economic coercion by the Gov- 10 ernment of the People’s Republic of China; 11 (3) the fate of Taiwan is therefore crucially 12 linked to the fates of all countries in the Indo-Pa- 13 cific region, including to the fate of the United 14 States; 15 (4) under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 16 3301 et seq.), it is the policy of the United States 17 to consider any effort to determine the future of 18 Taiwan by other than peaceful means to be of grave 19 concern to the United States; 20 (5) since 1979, the United States Government 21 has consistently upheld the commitments of the 22 United States under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 23 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.); 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:35 Jun 25, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3936.IS S3936 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 12 •S 3936 IS (6) the National Defense Authorization Act for 1 Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) reaffirms 2 that the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et 3 seq.) and the ‘‘Six Assurances’’ are the cornerstones 4 of United States relations with Taiwan; 5 (7) the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 6 et seq.) further establishes the policy of the United 7 States ‘‘to maintain the capacity of the United 8 States to resist any resort to force or other forms 9 of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the 10 social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan’’; 11 (8) the Government of the People’s Republic of 12 China appears to be developing the plans and capa- 13 bilities required to use the fait accompli strategy to 14 compel the unification of Taiwan with the People’s 15 Republic of China, [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]