Plain English summary not yet available
The full original text is available below. Check back soon as we process this bill.
I
116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H. R. 5982
To direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to study American
dependence on Chinese pharmaceuticals and to empower the Food and
Drug Administration to issue boxed warnings in the case of critical
contamination.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FEBRUARY 26, 2020
Mr. POSEY (for himself and Mr. RYAN) introduced the following bill; which
was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce
A BILL
To direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
study American dependence on Chinese pharmaceuticals
and to empower the Food and Drug Administration to
issue boxed warnings in the case of critical contamina-
tion.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
1
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
3
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Safe Medicine Act’’.
4
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
5
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
6
VerDate Sep 11 2014
23:31 Feb 26, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00001
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H5982.IH
H5982
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2
•HR 5982 IH
(1) Following the enactment of the Drug Price
1
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
2
1984 (Public Law 98–417), the People’s Republic of
3
China was able to corner the market on generic
4
drugs, pharmaceutical ingredients, and related mate-
5
rials through its steady supply of readily exploitable
6
labor and threadbare safety regulations. Ninety per-
7
cent of the medications taken by individuals in the
8
United States are generic, rendering them especially
9
dependent on supplies originating in the People’s
10
Republic of China.
11
(2) The number of drugs produced outside of
12
the United States doubled between 2001 and 2008.
13
At present, 80 percent of the active pharmaceutical
14
ingredients used in drugs taken by individuals in the
15
United States come from overseas, mainly the Peo-
16
ple’s Republic of China and the Republic of India.
17
The United States no longer produces penicillin,
18
with the last fermentation plant phasing out of pro-
19
duction in 2004.
20
(3) In 2008, the counterfeiting of Heparin pre-
21
cursor chemicals by a Chinese-based pharmaceutical
22
plant led to the deaths of 81 individuals in the
23
United States, with 785 more being severely injured.
24
The counterfeit product cost one-hundredth of the
25
VerDate Sep 11 2014
23:31 Feb 26, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H5982.IH
H5982
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
3
•HR 5982 IH
price of the real product, indicating a clear economic
1
motive for distributing contaminated materials.
2
(4) In 2018, the Secretary of Health and
3
Human Services, acting through the Commissioner
4
of Food and Drugs, issued recalls of valsartan,
5
losartan, and irbesartan, common blood pressure
6
drugs. The Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
7
ices, acting through the Commissioner of Food and
8
Drugs, determined that versions of such drugs have
9
been contaminated, as a result of Chinese and In-
10
dian manufacturing practices and that one Chinese
11
company, Zhejaiang Huahai Pharmaceuticals had
12
‘‘systemic problems of supervision’’, with the potent
13
carcinogens N-Nitroso-N-methyl-4-aminobutyric acid
14
(NMBA), N-Nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), and N-
15
Nitrosodiethylamine (NDEA), for a period of 4
16
years before being detected.
17
(5) Domestic pharmaceutical facilities are in-
18
spected every 2 years, whereas foreign pharma-
19
ceutical facilities are inspected only every 9 years.
20
Further, inspections of foreign facilities by the Food
21
and Drug Administration have declined in the past
22
2 years. In the People’s Republic of China, these in-
23
spections have fallen by more than 10 percent.
24
VerDate Sep 11 2014
23:31 Feb 26, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H5982.IH
H5982
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
4
•HR 5982 IH
(6) In 2010, the People’s Republic of China
1
embargoed the shipment of rare earth metals to
2
Japan as political leverage in its negotiations over a
3
boating incident that took place between the two
4
countries in the East China Sea. National security
5
experts warn that if such an incident were to take
6
place between the United States and China, and
7
China were to embargo medicine and pharmaceutical
8
ingredients, the United States would be helpless.
9
United States dependence on Chinese medicine and
10
pharmaceutical ingredients poses a national security
11
risk.
12
(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are—
13
(1) to direct the Secretary of Health and
14
Human Services to study the dependence of the
15
United States on Chinese drugs; and
16
(2) to authorize the Food and Drug Adminis-
17
tration to order a temporary boxed warning on po-
18
tentially contaminated drugs.
19
SEC. 3. STUDY OF DEPENDENCE OF UNITED STATES ON
20
CHINESE DRUGS.
21
Not later than one year after the date of the enact-
22
ment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human
23
Services, in consultation with the heads of other appro-
24
priate Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to
25
VerDate Sep 11 2014
23:31 Feb 26, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H5982.IH
H5982
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
5
•HR 5982 IH
Congress a report on vulnerabilities to the United States
1
medicine supply chain. Such report shall include—
2
(1) an identification of any finished drugs and
3
their essential components including raw materials,
4
chemical components, and active ingredients nec-
5
essary for the manufacture of medicines whose sup-
6
ply is at risk of disruption due to dependence on a
7
single or limited number of providing countries;
8
(2) an identification of the defense and geo-
9
political contingencies that are sufficiently likely to
10
arise that may disrupt, strain, compromise, or elimi-
11
nate supply chains of medicines and their essential
12
components and recommendations for reasonable
13
preparation for the occurrence of such contingencies;
14
(3) an assessment of the resilience and capacity
15
of the current supply chain and industrial base to
16
support the population of the United States upon
17
the occurrence of the contingencies identified pursu-
18
ant to paragraph (2), including with respect to—
19
(A) the manufacturing capacity of the
20
United States;
21
(B) gaps in domestic manufacturing capa-
22
bilities including non-existent, extinct, threat-
23
ened, and single-point-of-failure capabilities;
24
and
25
VerDate Sep 11 2014
23:31 Feb 26, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H5982.IH
H5982
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
6
•HR 5982 IH
(C) supply chains with single points of fail-
1
ure and limited resiliency;
2
(4) legislative, regulatory, and policy changes
3
necessary to avoid, or prepare for, contingencies
4
identified pursuant to paragraph (2);
5
(5) recommendations to diversify supply away
6
from predominant dependency on sources of supply
7
in competitor countries and politically unstable coun-
8
tries that may cut off United States supply, and ad-
9
dress critical bottlenecks and mitigate single points
10
of failure and limited resilience; and
11
(6) an assessment of the potential impact on
12
domestic drug prices if the People’s Republic of
13
China were to embargo the export of drugs and
14
pharmaceutical ingredients to the United States.
15
SEC. 4. AUTHORIZING TEMPORARY BOXED WARNINGS ON
16
POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED DRUGS.
17
The Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting
18
through the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, may issue
19
a temporary order deeming certain drugs to be mis-
20
branded within the meaning of section 502 of the Federal
21
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 352), if—
22
(1) such drugs, or the active pharmaceutical in-
23
gredients thereof, are manufactured in a country
24
that the Secretary determines may be producing
25
VerDate Sep 11 2014
23:31 Feb 26, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H5982.IH
H5982
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
7
•HR 5982 IH
contaminated drugs (or active pharmaceutical ingre-
1
dients) because of systemic problems of supervision
2
in the manufacture of such drugs or active pharma-
3
ceutical ingredients; and
4
(2) the labeling of such drugs does not bear a
5
boxed warning of the potential for contamination.
6
Æ
VerDate Sep 11 2014
23:31 Feb 26, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6301
E:\BILLS\H5982.IH
H5982
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS