Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019

I 116TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 2913 To promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean, and for other purposes. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY 22, 2019 Mr. DEUTCH (for himself, Mr. BILIRAKIS, and Mr. CICILLINE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, Oversight and Reform, Ways and Means, and the Judiciary, for a period to be subse- quently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned A BILL To promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Eastern Mediterranean 4 Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019’’. 5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6 Congress makes the following findings: 7 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:15 Jun 06, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2913.IH H2913 khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 2913 IH (1) The security of partners and allies in the 1 Eastern Mediterranean region is critical to the secu- 2 rity of the United States and Europe. 3 (2) Greece is a valuable member of the North 4 Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a key pil- 5 lar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. 6 (3) Israel is a steadfast ally of the United 7 States and has been designated a ‘‘major non-NATO 8 ally’’ and ‘‘major strategic partner’’. 9 (4) Cyprus is an important partner in the East- 10 ern Mediterranean and signed a Statement of Intent 11 with the United States on July 10, 2018, to enhance 12 bilateral security cooperation. 13 (5) The countries of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus 14 participate in a critical trilateral dialogue to improve 15 cooperation on energy and security issues. 16 (6) Secretary of State Mike Pompeo partici- 17 pated in the trilateral dialogue among the three 18 countries on March 20, 2019. 19 (7) All three countries oppose any action in the 20 Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea that 21 could challenge stability, violate international law, or 22 undermine good neighborly relations. 23 (8) The recent discovery of a large natural gas 24 field off the Egyptian coast and the newest discov- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:15 Jun 06, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2913.IH H2913 khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 2913 IH eries of natural gas off of the Cypriot coast could 1 represent a significant positive development for the 2 Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and 3 may offer new economic opportunities in the region 4 provided ecologically sound extraction methods pro- 5 tect the regional environment. 6 (9) The Government of Turkey has expressed 7 an intent to purchase the S–400 missile defense sys- 8 tem from the Russian Federation, which could trig- 9 ger the imposition of mandatory sanctions under the 10 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanc- 11 tions Act (Public Law 115–114). 12 (10) It is in the national security interests of 13 the United States to promote, achieve, and maintain 14 energy security among, and through cooperation 15 with, allies. 16 (11) Natural gas developments in the Eastern 17 Mediterranean have the potential to provide eco- 18 nomic gains and contribute to energy security in the 19 region and Europe, as well as support European ef- 20 forts to diversify away from natural gas supplied by 21 the Russian Federation. 22 (12) The soon to be completed Trans Adriatic 23 pipeline is a critical component of the Southern Gas 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:15 Jun 06, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2913.IH H2913 khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 2913 IH Corridor and the European Union’s efforts to diver- 1 sify energy resources. 2 (13) The proposed Eastern Mediterranean pipe- 3 line if commercially viable would provide for energy 4 diversification in accordance with the European 5 Union’s third energy package of reforms. 6 (14) Cooperation between the United States, 7 Cyprus, and Greece for the purpose of research and 8 development of energy sources would be in the na- 9 tional interests of not only the United States, but 10 also Israel, and other countries in the Eastern Medi- 11 terranean and North Africa with similar natural gas 12 finds. 13 (15) The United States acknowledges the 14 achievements and importance of the Binational In- 15 dustrial Research and Development Foundation 16 (BIRD) and the United States-Israel Binational 17 Science Foundation (BSF) and supports continued 18 multiyear funding to ensure the continuity of the 19 programs of the Foundations. 20 (16) The United States has welcomed Greece’s 21 allocation of two percent of its gross domestic prod- 22 uct (GDP) to defense in accordance with commit- 23 ments made at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:15 Jun 06, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2913.IH H2913 khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 2913 IH (17) Energy exploration efforts in the Eastern 1 Mediterranean region must be safeguarded against 2 threats posed by terrorist and extremist groups, in- 3 cluding Hezbollah and others. 4 (18) The energy exploration in the Republic of 5 Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone and territorial 6 waters— 7 (A) furthers United States interests by 8 providing a potential alternative to Russian gas 9 for United States allies and partners; and 10 (B) should not be impeded by other sov- 11 ereign states. 12 (19) The United States Government cooperates 13 closely with the Government of Cyprus through nu- 14 merous bilateral agreements. 15 (20) United States officials have assisted the 16 Government of Cyprus with crafting that country’s 17 national security strategy. 18 (21) The United States Government provides 19 training to Cypriot officials in areas such as cyberse- 20 curity, counterterrorism, and explosive ordnance dis- 21 posal and stockpile management. 22 (22) Cyprus is a valued member of the Pro- 23 liferation Security Initiative to combat the traf- 24 ficking of weapons of mass destruction. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:15 Jun 06, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2913.IH H2913 khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 2913 IH (23) Cyprus continues to work closely with the 1 United Nations and regional partners in Europe to 2 combat terrorism and violent extremism. 3 (24) Cyprus has been used as an offshore bank- 4 ing hub. While Cyprus is working to upgrade its 5 anti-money laundering legal framework, the Depart- 6 ment of State’s 2019 International Narcotics Con- 7 trol Strategy Report (INCSR) noted that, ‘‘the Cyp- 8 riot financial system is vulnerable to money laun- 9 dering by domestic and foreign criminal enterprises 10 and individuals’’ and that ‘‘organized criminal 11 groups and others have reportedly used Cypriot 12 banks to launder proceeds, particularly from Rus- 13 sian and Ukrainian illicit activity.’’ 14 (25) As of February 2019, Cyprus has taken 15 steps to address legitimate criticism of its use of in- 16 vestor citizenship schemes (known as ‘‘golden pass- 17 ports’’), which have in the past allowed Russian 18 oligarchs under United States sanctions to obtain 19 Cypriot passports and gain full access to the Euro- 20 pean Union. 21 (26) United Nations Security Council Resolu- 22 tion 1251 (1999) noted ‘‘grave concern at the con- 23 tinuing excessive levels of military forces and arma- 24 ments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:15 Jun 06, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2913.IH H2913 khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS 7 •HR 2913 IH which they are being expanded, upgraded and mod- 1 ernized’’ and called upon ‘‘all concerned to commit 2 themselves to . . . limiting and then substantially 3 reducing the level of all troops and armaments in 4 the Republic of Cyprus.’’. 5 (27) A 1987 United States arms prohibition 6 was designed to restrict United States arms sales 7 and transfer to Cyprus and the occupied part of Cy- 8 prus to avoid hindering reunification efforts. 9 (28) At least 40,000 Turkish troops are sta- 10 tioned in the occupied part of Cyprus. 11 (29) While the United States has, as a matter 12 of policy, avoided the provision of defense articles 13 and services to Cyprus, the Government of Cyprus 14 has, in the past, sought to obtain defense articles 15 from other countries, such as Russia, that pose chal- 16 lenges to United States interests around the world. 17 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 18 It is the policy of the United States— 19 (1) to continue to actively participate in the tri- 20 lateral dialogue on energy, maritime security, cyber 21 security and protection of critical infrastructure con- 22 ducted among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus; 23 (2) to support diplomatic efforts with partners 24 and allies to deepen energy security cooperation 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:15 Jun 06, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2913.IH H2913 khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS 8 •HR 2913 IH among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus and encourage the 1 private sector to make investments in energy infra- 2 structure in the Eastern Mediterranean; 3 (3) to strongly support the completion of the 4 Trans Adriatic pipeline and the Eastern Mediterra- 5 nean pipeline and the establishment of liquified nat- 6 ural gas (LNG) terminals across the Eastern Medi- 7 terranean as a means of diversifying regional energy 8 needs away from the Russian Federation; 9 (4) to maintain a robust United States naval 10 presence and investments in the naval facility at 11 Souda Bay, Greece, and develop deeper security co- 12 operation with Greece; 13 (5) to welcome Greece’s commitment to move 14 forward with the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria 15 (IGB pipeline) and additional LNG terminals that 16 will help facilitate delivery of non-Russian gas to the 17 Balkans and central Europe; 18 (6) to continue to support efforts to reach a 19 comprehensive settlement to reunify Cyprus as a bi- 20 zonal, bicommunal federation and urge all parties to 21 intensify their work on behalf of peace; 22 (7) to deepen security cooperation with Cyprus, 23 potentially including lifting current restrictions on 24 the export of defense articles and services to Cyprus; 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:15 Jun 06, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2913.IH H2913 khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS 9 •HR 2913 IH (8) to support robust International Military 1 Education and Training (IMET) programing with 2 Greece and Cyprus; 3 (9) to leverage relationships within NATO and 4 the European Union to encourage investments in 5 Cypriot border and maritime security; 6 (10) to support efforts to counter Russian in- 7 terference and influence in the Eastern Mediterra- 8 nean through increased security cooperation with 9 Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, to include intelligence 10 sharing, cyber cooperation, and maritime domain 11 awareness; 12 (11) to support Cyprus’s efforts to better regu- 13 late its banking industry to ensure that it is not 14 used as a source of international money laundering 15 and encourage additional measures toward that end; 16 (12) to encourage Cyprus and other relevant 17 countries to ensure that investor citizenship schemes 18 do not create security, money laundering, or tax eva- 19 sion vulnerabilities; 20 (13) to strongly oppose any actions that would 21 trigger mandatory sanctions pursuant to section 231 22 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 23 Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44), to include the 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:15 Jun 06, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2913.IH H2913 khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS 10 •HR 2913 IH purchase by Turkey of an S–400 missile defense sys- 1 tem from the Russian Federation; 2 (14) to continue robust official strategic dia- 3 logues with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus; 4 (15) to urge countries in the region to deny 5 port services to Russian vessels deployed to support 6 the government of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria and 7 terminate existing agreements granting Russian 8 naval vessels access to ports; 9 (16) to support joint military exercises among 10 Israel, Greece, and Cyprus; 11 (17) to fully implement relevant provisions of 12 the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 13 Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44) to prevent inter- 14 ference by the Government of the Russian Federa- 15 tion in the region; 16 (18) to support efforts by countries in the re- 17 gion to demobilize military equipment supplied by 18 the Government of the Russian Federation in favor 19 of equipment provided by NATO and NATO-allied 20 member countries; and 21 (19) to strongly support the active and robust 22 participation of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus in the 23 Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:15 Jun 06, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2913.IH H2913 khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS 11 •HR 2913 IH SEC. 4. UNITED STATES-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EN- 1 ERGY COOPERATION. 2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in con- 3 sultation with the Secretary of Energy, may, subject to 4 the availability of appropriations, enter into cooperative 5 agreements supporting and enhancing dialogue and plan- 6 ning involving international partnerships between the 7 United States and Israel, Greece, and Cyprus. 8 (b) ANNUAL REPORTS.—If the Secretary of State, in 9 consultation with the Secretary of Energy, enters into 10 agreements authorized under subsection (a), the Secretary 11 shall submit an annual report to the appropriate congres- 12 sional committees that describes— 13 (1) actions taken to implement such agree- 14 ments; and 15 (2) any projects undertaken pursuant to such 16 agreements. 17 (c) UNITED STATES-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EN- 18 ERGY CENTER.—The Secretary of Energy, in consultation 19 with the Secretary of State, may establish a joint United 20 States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center in the 21 United States leveraging the experience, knowledge, and 22 expertise of institutions of higher education and entities 23 in the private sector, among others, in offshore energy de- 24 velopment to further dialogue and collaboration to develop 25 more robust academic cooperation in energy innovation 26 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:15 Jun 06, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2913.IH H2913 khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS 12 •HR 2913 IH technology and engineeri [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]