Federal
North Korea Policy Oversight Act of 2019
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II
116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
S. 1658
To provide for oversight of North Korea policy, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MAY 23 (legislative day, MAY 22), 2019
Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Mr. GARDNER, and Mr. COONS) introduced the
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations
A BILL
To provide for oversight of North Korea policy, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
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tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
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This Act may be cited as the ‘‘North Korea Policy
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Oversight Act of 2019’’.
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SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
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In this Act:
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(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
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TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
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mittees’’ means—
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(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
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Committee on Armed Services, and the Com-
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mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
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resentatives; and
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(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
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the Committee on Armed Services, and the
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Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
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(2)
DENUCLEARIZATION.—The
term
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‘‘denuclearization’’ refers to the complete, verified,
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and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nu-
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clear weapons programs and programs related to the
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delivery mechanisms for nuclear weapons, including
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ballistic missile programs.
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(3) GOVERNMENT
OF
NORTH
KOREA.—The
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term ‘‘Government of North Korea’’ means the Gov-
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ernment of North Korea and its agencies, instru-
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mentalities, and controlled entities.
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(4) NORTH KOREA.—The term ‘‘North Korea’’
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means the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
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(5) NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION
TREATY.—
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The term ‘‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’’ means
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the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
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Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow
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July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483).
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(6) SOUTH KOREA.—The term ‘‘South Korea’’
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means the Republic of Korea.
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(7) VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RE-
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LATIONS.—The term ‘‘Vienna Convention on Diplo-
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matic Relations’’ means the Vienna Convention on
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Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna April 18,
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1961.
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SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
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Congress makes the following findings:
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(1) The North Korean nuclear weapons pro-
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gram is the culmination of the Government of North
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Korea’s illegal efforts over six decades to acquire a
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nuclear weapons program capable of threatening
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both the United States and United States critical al-
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lies in the Indo-Pacific region.
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(2) North Korea maintains a robust ballistic
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missile arsenal that includes a diverse array of deliv-
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ery systems capable of striking targets throughout
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the Indo-Pacific region, including short- and me-
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dium-range missiles that hold regional countries, in-
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cluding some United States allies, at risk, and inter-
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continental ballistic missiles that are potentially ca-
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pable of targeting the United States mainland.
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(3) North Korea has flagrantly defied the inter-
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national community by continuing to illicitly develop
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its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation
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of United Nations Security Council Resolutions
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1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
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(2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017),
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2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017).
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(4) United States law, including the North
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Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of
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2016 (Public Law 114–122; 22 U.S.C. 9201 et seq.)
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authorizes sanctions in response to North Korea’s
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pursuit of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,
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and ballistic missiles, and its human rights abuses.
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United States law also specifies the conditions under
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which sanctions may be removed or waived, includ-
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ing that North Korea takes meaningful and
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verifiable actions toward denuclearization and ad-
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dresses human rights concerns.
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(5) International economic and diplomatic sanc-
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tions applied since the passage of the North Korea
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Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, in-
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cluding by the United States and the United Na-
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tions, when enforced, have intensified pressure on
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North Korea and degraded North Korea’s ability to
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advance it’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
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(6) The United States has applied sanctions
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against North Korean individuals and entities, in-
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cluding on Kim Jong Un, for their complicity in
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human rights abuses against the North Korean peo-
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ple and citizens of other countries, including the
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United States, South Korea, and Japan.
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(7) For decades, the Government of North
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Korea has failed to live up to its diplomatic commit-
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ments, rejecting good faith efforts by United States
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and international negotiators, and leveraging talks
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to extract concessions such as sanctions relief.
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(8) On January 1, 2018, in a New Year’s Day
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address, Kim Jong Un signaled an interest in under-
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taking diplomatic engagement, which led to direct
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bilateral talks between Kim Jong Un and the leaders
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of the South Korea, China, and the United States.
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(9) On April 22, 2018, Kim Jong Un asserted
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that North Korea had completed its quest for nu-
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clear weapons, stating that ‘‘under the proven condi-
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tion of complete nuclear weapons, we no longer need
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any nuclear tests, mid-range and intercontinental
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ballistic rocket tests, and that the nuclear test site
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in northern area has also completed its mission’’.
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(10) The Panmunjom Declaration released fol-
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lowing the Inter-Korean summit meeting on April
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27, 2018, and the joint declaration by President
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Trump and Kim Jong Un at the June 12, 2018,
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summit between the United States and North Korea
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in Singapore reaffirmed that North Korea ‘‘commits
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to working toward the complete denuclearization of
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the Korean Peninsula’’.
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(11) On June 13, 2018, Secretary of State
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Pompeo said, ‘‘President Trump has been incredibly
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clear about the sequencing of denuclearization and
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relief from the sanctions. We are going to get com-
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plete denuclearization; only then will there be relief
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from the sanctions.’’.
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(12) The Secretary of State confirmed on July
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25, 2018, in testimony before the Senate Foreign
12
Relations Committee, that North Korea does ‘‘con-
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tinue to produce fissile material’’ and, according to
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open source analysis, North Korea has enough fissile
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material for at least 30 to 60 nuclear weapons.
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(13) The North Korea Sanctions and Policy
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Enhancement Act of 2016 provides that certain
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sanctions terminate when North Korea has ‘‘made
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significant progress toward—
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(A) ‘‘completely, verifiably, and irreversibly
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dismantling all of its nuclear, chemical, biologi-
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cal, and radiological weapons programs, includ-
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ing all programs for the development of systems
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designed in whole or in part for the delivery of
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such weapons’’; and
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(B) accounting for and repatriating the
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citizens of other countries abducted or unlaw-
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fully held captive, releasing political prisoners
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including those in political prison camps, and
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accepting and abiding by internationally recog-
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nized standards for the distribution and moni-
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toring of humanitarian aid.
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(14) A robust military posture, including reg-
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ular training and exercises, by the United States,
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South Korea, and Japan, has contributed to peace
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and stability in Northeast Asia.
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(15) South Korea has contributed heavily to its
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own defense and to the defense of the United States
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military forces in South Korea, including by pro-
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viding $10 billion of the $10.8 billion toward the
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Camp Humphreys project to build and relocate
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United States military forces to a new base in South
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Korea.
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(16) United States military forces, pursuant to
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international law, are lawfully deployed on the Ko-
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rean Peninsula.
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(17) The nuclear and ballistic missile programs
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of North Korea are clear and consistent violations of
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international law.
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(18) The long-stated strategic objective of au-
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thoritarian states, such as China, Russia, and North
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Korea, has been the removal of United States mili-
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tary forces from the Korean Peninsula.
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(19) On September 18, 2018, the Pyongyang
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Declaration between President Moon of South Korea
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and Chairman Kim Jong Un of North Korea clari-
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fied that North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize
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was conditioned on unspecified United States or
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international concessions stating, ‘‘The North ex-
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pressed its willingness to continue to take additional
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measures, such as the permanent dismantlement of
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the nuclear facilities in Yeongbyeon, as the United
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States takes corresponding measures in accordance
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with the spirit of the June 12 U.S.–DPRK Joint
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Statement.’’.
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(20) On December 31, 2018, President Trump
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signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act
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of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), which states that—
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(A) it is the policy of the United States
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that the objective of negotiations with respect to
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the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the
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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea be the
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complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantle-
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ment of such programs;
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(B) it is the policy of the United States to
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continue to impose sanctions with respect to ac-
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tivities of the Government of the Democratic
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People’s Republic of Korea, persons acting for
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or on behalf of such government, or other per-
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sons in accordance with applicable United
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States law;
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(C) the Secretary of State shall submit
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regular reports to the appropriate congressional
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committees that describe actions taken by the
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United States to address the threats posed by,
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and the capabilities of, the Democratic People’s
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Republic of Korea; and
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(D) the Secretary of State, in consultation
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with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit
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justifications to the appropriate committees not
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later than 30 days after terminating any sanc-
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tion with respect to the activities of the Govern-
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ment of the Democratic People’s Republic of
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Korea, or a person acting for or on behalf of
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such government.
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(21) On December 20, 2018, North Korean
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state media reiterated North Korea’s longstanding
2
nuclear policy, stating ‘‘if we unilaterally eliminate
3
our security guarantees against a U.S. nuclear pre-
4
emptive
strike,
it
would
not
be
considered
5
denuclearization’’,
and
further
defined
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‘‘denuclearization of the Korean peninsula’’ as ‘‘re-
7
moving all nuclear threats, not only from North and
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South Korean territory, but also from the sur-
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rounding area aimed at the Korean Peninsula’’.
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(22) On January 1, 2019, in his New Year’s
11
Day address, Kim Jong Un stated, ‘‘Given that the
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North and South committed themselves to advancing
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along the road of peace and prosperity, we maintain
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that the joint military exercises with foreign forces,
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which constitute the source of aggravating the situa-
16
tion on the Korean Peninsula, should no longer be
17
permitted and the introduction of war equipment in-
18
cluding strategic assets from outside should be com-
19
pletely suspended.’’.
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(23) On January 1, 2019, in his New Year’s
21
Day address, Kim Jong Un further stated, ‘‘But if
22
the United States does not keep the promise it made
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in the eyes of the world, and of the miscalculation
24
of our people’s patience, it attempts to unilaterally
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enforce something upon us and persists in imposing
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sanctions and pressure against our Republic, we may
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be compelled to find a new way for defending the
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sovereignty of the country and the supreme interests
4
of the state and for achieving peace and stability of
5
the Korean Peninsula.’’.
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(24) On January 29, 2019, Director of Na-
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tional Intelligence Coats testified before the Select
8
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that ‘‘we
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currently assess that North Korea will seek to retain
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its WMD (weapons of mass destruction) capabilities
11
and is unlikely to completely give up its nuclear
12
weapons and production capability because its lead-
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ers ultimately view nuclear weapons as critical to re-
14
gime survival’’ and that the United States intel-
15
ligence agencies are observing ‘‘activity that is incon-
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sistent with full denuclearization’’.
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(25) On February 28, 2019, a second United
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States-North Korea summit ended without a joint
19
statement or agreement, and Secretary of State
20
Pompeo has said that ‘‘I am confident there will be’’
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a third summit between President Trump and
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Chairman Kim Jong Un, adding ‘‘We came out of
23
Hanoi with a deeper understanding of each other.
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The positions that the two sides had, the two leaders
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were able to make progress in that respect. We
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didn’t get as far as the world is demanding. These
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are global sanctions that are on North Korea today
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. . . We’re determined. I’m convinced the North Ko-
4
reans are determined as well. Chairman Kim has
5
promised me, he’s pr
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