What This Bill Does
This bill requires the Senate to approve any international agreement about pandemic prevention, preparedness and response created by the World Health Assembly. The bill states that any such agreement must be treated as a formal treaty requiring two-thirds of the Senate to vote in favor before it becomes law in the United States.
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Who It Affects
The bill affects the federal government, specifically the President and the Senate. It impacts how the United States participates in World Health Organization agreements about pandemics.
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Key Provisions
- Any international agreement on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response from the World Health Assembly must be treated as a treaty requiring Senate approval with two-thirds of Senators voting in favor (Sec. 5)
- Any such agreement cannot legally apply in the United States before the Senate ratifies it (Sec. 6)
- Before ratification, the agreement cannot be used in U.S. courts to prove someone violated American law or broke rules of international conduct (Sec. 6)
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What Changes
If this bill becomes law, the President cannot agree to any World Health Organization pandemic-related agreement without Senate approval. The Senate would need a two-thirds majority vote to ratify any such agreement before it takes effect in the United States.
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Important Definitions
The bill defines the following terms:
- **Treaty**: A contract with foreign nations that becomes the force of law
- **World Health Assembly (WHA)**: The governing body of the World Health Organization
- **International Negotiating Body (INB)**: A group established to draft pandemic-related agreements
- **Ratification**: Official approval by the Senate with two-thirds agreement
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IIB
118TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H. R. 1425
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
SEPTEMBER 17, 2024
Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
AN ACT
To require any convention, agreement, or other international
instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and
response reached by the World Health Assembly to be
subject to Senate ratification.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
1
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
1
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘No WHO Pandemic
2
Preparedness Treaty Without Senate Approval Act’’.
3
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
4
Congress makes the following findings:
5
(1) On May 18, 2020, President Donald Trump
6
sent a letter to World Health Organization (referred
7
to in this Act as ‘‘WHO’’) Director-General Tedros
8
Adhanom Ghebreyesus (referred to in this Act as the
9
‘‘Director-General’’), announcing that—
10
(A) United States contributions to WHO
11
would be halted due its mismanagement of the
12
COVID–19 outbreak and its lack of independ-
13
ence from the People’s Republic of China; and
14
(B) the United States would withdraw
15
from WHO if it did not commit to substantive
16
improvements within 30 days.
17
(2) President Trump’s May 18 letter cited nu-
18
merous instances of WHO mismanagement of the
19
COVID–19 pandemic, including—
20
(A) unjustified delays informing member
21
states about a potentially serious disease out-
22
break in Wuhan, China; and
23
(B) repeated grossly inaccurate or mis-
24
leading claims about the transmissibility of the
25
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virus and about the Government of China’s
1
handling of the outbreak.
2
(3) On June 30, 2020, Secretary of State Mike
3
Pompeo formally notified the United Nations of the
4
United States decision to withdraw from WHO,
5
which would have taken effect on July 6, 2021,
6
under the terms of a joint resolution adopted by
7
Congress on June 14, 1948 (Public Law 80–643; 62
8
Stat. 441).
9
(4) A Pew Research Center survey conducted in
10
April and May 2020 indicated that 51 percent of
11
Americans felt that WHO had done a poor or fair
12
job in managing the COVID–19 pandemic.
13
(5) On January 20, 2021, President Joseph
14
Biden sent United Nations Director-General Anto´nio
15
Guterres a letter retracting the United States notice
16
of withdrawal from WHO.
17
(6) On December 1, 2021, at the second special
18
session of the World Health Assembly (referred to in
19
this Act as the ‘‘WHA’’) decided—
20
(A) to establish an intergovernmental ne-
21
gotiating body (referred to in this section as the
22
‘‘INB’’) to draft and negotiate a WHO conven-
23
tion (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Conven-
24
tion’’), agreement, or other international instru-
25
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ment on pandemic prevention, preparedness,
1
and response, with a view to adoption under Ar-
2
ticle 19 or any other provision of the WHO
3
Constitution; and
4
(B) that the INB shall submit a progress
5
report to the Seventy-sixth WHA and a working
6
draft of the convention for consideration by the
7
Seventy-seventh WHA, which is scheduled to
8
take place beginning on March 18, 2024.
9
(7) On February 24, March 14 and 15, and
10
June 6 through 8 and 15 through 17, 2022, the
11
INB held its inaugural meeting at which the Direc-
12
tor-General proposed the following 5 themes to guide
13
the INB’s work in drafting the Convention:
14
(A) Building national, regional, and global
15
capacities based on a whole-of-government and
16
whole-of-society approach.
17
(B) Establishing global access and benefit
18
sharing for all pathogens, and determining a
19
global policy for the equitable production and
20
distribution of countermeasures.
21
(C) Establishing robust systems and tools
22
for pandemic preparedness and response.
23
(D) Establishing a long-term plan for sus-
24
tainable financing to ensure support for global
25
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health threat management and response sys-
1
tems.
2
(E) Empowering WHO to fulfill its man-
3
date as the directing and coordinating authority
4
on international health work, including for pan-
5
demic preparedness and response.
6
(8) On July 18 through 22, 2022, the INB held
7
its second meeting at which it agreed that the Con-
8
vention would be adopted under Article 19 of the
9
WHO Constitution and legally binding on the par-
10
ties.
11
(9) On December 5 through 7, 2022, the INB
12
held its third meeting at which it accepted a concep-
13
tual zero draft of the Convention and agreed to pre-
14
pare a zero draft for consideration at the INB’s next
15
meeting.
16
(10) In early January 2023, an initial draft of
17
the Convention was sent to WHO member states in
18
advance of its formal introduction at the fourth
19
meeting of the INB, which is scheduled for February
20
27 through March 3, 2023. The draft includes broad
21
and binding provisions, including rules governing
22
parties’ access to pathogen genomic sequences and
23
how the products or benefits of such access are to
24
be distributed.
25
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(11) Section 723.3 of title 11 of the Depart-
1
ment of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual states that
2
when ‘‘determining whether any international agree-
3
ment should be brought into force as a treaty or as
4
an international agreement other than a treaty, the
5
utmost care is to be exercised to avoid any invasion
6
or compromise of the constitutional powers of the
7
President, the Senate, and the Congress as a whole’’
8
and includes the following criteria to be considered
9
when determining whether an international agree-
10
ment should take the form of a treaty or an execu-
11
tive agreement:
12
(A) ‘‘The extent to which the agreement
13
involves commitments or risks affecting the na-
14
tion as a whole’’.
15
(B) ‘‘Whether the agreement is intended to
16
affect state laws’’.
17
(C) ‘‘Whether the agreement can be given
18
effect without the enactment of subsequent leg-
19
islation by the Congress’’.
20
(D) ‘‘Past U.S. practice as to similar
21
agreements’’.
22
(E) ‘‘The preference of the Congress as to
23
a particular type of agreement’’.
24
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(F) ‘‘The degree of formality desired for
1
an agreement’’.
2
(G) ‘‘The proposed duration of the agree-
3
ment, the need for prompt conclusion of an
4
agreement, and the desirability of concluding a
5
routine or short-term agreement’’.
6
(H) ‘‘The general international practice as
7
to similar agreements’’.
8
(12) Article II, Section 2 of the United States
9
Constitution provides that the President ‘‘shall have
10
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
11
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the
12
Senators present concur’’.
13
(13) Alexander Hamilton writes in Federalist
14
Paper #75 regarding the Treaty Making Powers of
15
the Executive that ‘‘Its objects are CONTRACTS
16
with foreign nations, which have the force of law,
17
but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They
18
are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the sub-
19
ject, but agreements between sovereign and sov-
20
ereign. The power in question seems therefore to
21
form a distinct department, and to belong, properly,
22
neither to the legislative nor to the Executive. The
23
qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the
24
management of foreign negotiations, point out the
25
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Executive as the most fit agent in those trans-
1
actions; while the vast importance of the trust, and
2
the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for
3
the participation of the whole or a portion of the leg-
4
islative body in the office of making them’’.
5
(14) If any provisions of a treaty are to have
6
legal bearing on United States citizens those provi-
7
sions must pass both the United States House of
8
Representatives and the Senate and be presented to
9
the President, as all Federal laws must.
10
(15) The United States Constitution establishes
11
a clear framework for making treaties by the Execu-
12
tive and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
13
This process is indispensable for the Founders’ vi-
14
sion of constitutional government.
15
(16) The United States House of Representa-
16
tives does not vote for, ratify, affirm, or consent to
17
treaties.
18
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
19
It is the policy of the United States to unequivocally
20
support Taiwan’s full participation in the World Health
21
Organization.
22
SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
23
It is the sense of Congress that—
24
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(1) a significant segment of the American pub-
1
lic is deeply skeptical of the World Health Organiza-
2
tion, its leadership, and its independence from the
3
pernicious political influence of certain member
4
states, including the People’s Republic of China;
5
(2) Congress strongly prefers that any agree-
6
ment related to pandemic prevention, preparedness,
7
and response adopted by the World Health Assembly
8
pursuant to the work of the INB be considered a
9
treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Sen-
10
ate, with two-thirds of Senators concurring;
11
(3) the scope of the agreement which the INB
12
has been tasked with drafting, as outlined by the Di-
13
rector-General, is so broad that any application of
14
the factors referred to in section 2(11) will weigh
15
strongly in favor of it being considered a treaty; and
16
(4) given the level of public distrust, any rel-
17
evant new agreement by the World Health Assembly
18
which cannot garner the two-thirds vote needed for
19
Senate ratification should not be agreed to or imple-
20
mented by the United States.
21
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SEC. 5. ANY WORLD HEALTH AGENCY CONVENTION OR
1
AGREEMENT OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL IN-
2
STRUMENT RESULTING FROM THE INTER-
3
NATIONAL NEGOTIATING BODY’S FINAL RE-
4
PORT DEEMED TO BE A TREATY SUBJECT TO
5
ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE.
6
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any con-
7
vention, agreement, or other international instrument on
8
pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response reached
9
by the World Health Assembly pursuant to the rec-
10
ommendations, report, or work of the International Nego-
11
tiating Body established by the second special session of
12
the World Health Assembly is deemed to be a treaty that
13
is subject to the requirements of article II, section 2,
14
clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States, which
15
requires the advice and consent of the Senate, with two-
16
thirds of Senators concurring.
17
SEC. 6. NO FORCE OR EFFECT TO TREATY PRIOR TO RATI-
18
FICATION.
19
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any con-
20
vention, agreement, or other international instrument on
21
pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response deemed
22
to be a treaty by section 5—
23
(1) shall have no force or effect under the laws
24
of the United States before the date on which such
25
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treaty is ratified with the advice and consent of the
1
Senate; and
2
(2) may not be used, prior to such date, to es-
3
tablish or demonstrate the existence of a violation of
4
United States law or an offense against the law of
5
nations in United States courts, including—
6
(A) to establish standing, a cause of ac-
7
tion, or damages as a matter of law; or
8
(B) to demonstrate whether an action by a
9
Federal agency is arbitrary or capricious, an
10
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
11
ance with law.
12
Passed the House of Representatives September 11,
2024.
Attest:
KEVIN F. MCCUMBER,
Clerk.
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