Prevention of Arms Race Act of 2019

I 116TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 1231 To prevent a nuclear arms race resulting from weakened international restric- tions on the proliferation of intermediate- and short-range missiles, and for other purposes. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FEBRUARY 14, 2019 Ms. FRANKEL (for herself, Mr. TED LIEU of California, Mr. KHANNA, and Mr. POCAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Com- mittee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdic- tion of the committee concerned A BILL To prevent a nuclear arms race resulting from weakened international restrictions on the proliferation of intermediate- and short-range missiles, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Prevention of Arms 4 Race Act of 2019’’. 5 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:22 Mar 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1231.IH H1231 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 1231 IH SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 1 Congress makes the following findings: 2 (1) On February 1, 2019, Secretary of State 3 Mike Pompeo announced the United States would 4 immediately suspend its obligations and would with- 5 draw, in six months, from the Treaty between the 6 United States of America and the Union of Soviet 7 Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their In- 8 termediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, to- 9 gether with the Memorandum of Understanding and 10 Two Protocols (commonly known as the ‘‘INF Trea- 11 ty’’), signed at Washington, December 8, 1987, and 12 entered into force June 1, 1988. 13 (2) The United States Senate provided its ad- 14 vice and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty 15 on May 27, 1988, by a vote of 93 to 5. 16 (3) The INF Treaty permanently bans the 17 United States and twelve former Soviet republics, in- 18 cluding Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, 19 from testing or possessing ground-launched cruise or 20 ballistic missiles of intermediate range (500 to 5,500 21 kilometers, or roughly 300 to 3,400 miles). 22 (4) The INF Treaty, signed by President Ron- 23 ald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail 24 Gorbachev, led to the elimination of entire classes of 25 United States and Russian nuclear and conventional 26 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:22 Mar 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1231.IH H1231 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 1231 IH ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles—2,692 1 in total—supported by on-site inspections that al- 2 lowed both sides to ‘‘trust but verify’’ compliance 3 with the Treaty. 4 (5) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 5 (NATO) allies were deeply involved in the pursuit of 6 negotiation on the INF Treaty and have significant 7 national security interests in the Treaty’s preserva- 8 tion. The communique from the July 11, 2018, 9 NATO Summit in Brussels stated that the INF 10 Treaty ‘‘has been crucial to Euro-Atlantic security’’. 11 (6) Less than one month prior to the announce- 12 ment of the United States intent to withdraw from 13 the INF Treaty, then-Secretary of Defense Jim 14 Mattis met with his NATO counterparts to discuss 15 the full-range of diplomatic, economic, and INF- 16 compliant military options to pressure the Russian 17 Federation to return to compliance with the Treaty 18 as outlined in the ‘‘Trump Administration INF 19 Treaty Integrated Strategy’’ published December 8, 20 2017. 21 (7) Since the United States publicly declared in 22 July 2014 that the Russian Federation was in viola- 23 tion of the INF Treaty’s prohibition on possessing, 24 producing, or flight-testing a ground-launched cruise 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:22 Mar 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1231.IH H1231 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 1231 IH missile (GLCM), which is the equivalent of the Rus- 1 sian SSC–8 missile system, the United States has 2 worked with its NATO allies to identify a unified ap- 3 proach on the best way forward. 4 (8) The United States did not exhaust diplo- 5 matic, economic, and military means to bring the 6 Russian Federation back into compliance with the 7 Treaty, and in 2018 alone, the United States can- 8 celled at least two strategic stability dialogues 9 planned to be conducted with the Russian Federa- 10 tion. 11 (9) On January 16, 2019, Under Secretary of 12 State for Arms Control and International Security 13 Andrea Thompson confirmed that the Russian Fed- 14 eration offered to exhibit the SSC–8 missile system 15 for the United States, which, while insufficient in 16 itself to resolve its Treaty violation, represented the 17 first such offer since the first United States finding 18 of non-compliance in 2014. 19 (10) The United States withdrawal from the 20 INF Treaty will allow the Russian Federation to es- 21 cape international criticism for its violation of the 22 Treaty and sow division among NATO allies at a 23 time when Alliance unity is critical to respond to a 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:22 Mar 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1231.IH H1231 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 1231 IH range of destabilizing actions by the Russian Fed- 1 eration. 2 (11) The United States withdrawal from the 3 INF Treaty will free the Russian Federation to ex- 4 pand deployment of the SSC–8 missile system in 5 ways that threaten NATO and Indo-Pacific allies 6 without bearing any international legal cost in doing 7 so. 8 (12) The Department of Defense has also not 9 yet identified the full estimated research, develop- 10 ment, testing, and evaluation, procurement, or per- 11 sonnel costs of producing, testing, and deploying a 12 new short- or intermediate-range ground-launched 13 cruise or ballistic missile currently prohibited by the 14 INF Treaty. 15 (13) No European or Asian ally has publicly de- 16 clared its willingness or readiness to host a future 17 United States short- or intermediate-range ground- 18 launched cruise or ballistic missile currently prohib- 19 ited by the INF Treaty should the United States 20 seek to deploy that capability. 21 (14) The Secretary General of NATO, Jens 22 Stoltenberg, stated on October 24, 2018, that ‘‘we 23 don’t want a new Cold War, we don’t want a new 24 arms race and therefore I don’t foresee that Allies 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:22 Mar 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1231.IH H1231 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 1231 IH will deploy more nuclear weapons in Europe as a re- 1 sponse to the new Russian missile,’’ which precedes 2 United States National Security Advisor John 3 Bolton’s statement of November 9, 2018, that 4 ‘‘there are no American plans to seek to deploy INF 5 non-compliant missiles in Europe for the foreseeable 6 future’’. 7 (15) Any effort by the United States Govern- 8 ment to proceed beyond research and development of 9 an intermediate-range cruise or ballistic missile that 10 is nuclear armed will be portrayed in as deeply in- 11 consistent with the United States obligation under 12 Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 13 Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, July 1, 14 1968 (commonly known as the ‘‘NPT’’), to ‘‘pursue 15 negotiations in good faith on effective measures re- 16 lating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race’’. 17 (16) Achieving the objective of expanding the 18 INF Treaty’s membership to the People’s Republic 19 of China, which has deployed intermediate-range 20 missile systems in great number, is greatly dimin- 21 ished if parties to the existing Treaty cease imple- 22 mentation. 23 (17) The Congressional Budget Office in Octo- 24 ber 2017 estimated that the costs of United States 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:22 Mar 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1231.IH H1231 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 7 •HR 1231 IH nuclear weapons spending over the next three dec- 1 ades will amount to $1,200,000,000,000, or 2 $1,700,000,000,000 when adjusted for inflation, 3 which does not include new systems proposed in the 4 2018 United States Nuclear Posture Review such as 5 a low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile 6 (SLBM), a sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), and 7 a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). 8 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 9 It is the sense of Congress that— 10 (1) Secretary of State Pompeo’s announcement 11 of the decision of the United States to withdraw 12 from the INF Treaty, without proper consultation 13 with Congress, is a serious breach of Congress’s 14 proper constitutional role as a co-equal branch of 15 government; 16 (2) United States withdrawal from the INF 17 Treaty will free the Russian Federation to deploy 18 greater quantities of the SSC–8 missile to the det- 19 riment of United States national security and that 20 of our allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific; 21 (3) withdrawal from the INF Treaty will fail to 22 limit or eliminate China’s short- and intermediate- 23 range missiles; 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:22 Mar 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1231.IH H1231 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 8 •HR 1231 IH (4) the NATO alliance makes critical contribu- 1 tions to United States national security, and the 2 failure to weigh the concerns of NATO allies risks 3 weakening the joint resolve necessary to counter 4 Russia’s aggressive behavior; and 5 (5) as opposed to withdrawing from the INF 6 Treaty, the United States should continue to ad- 7 vance other diplomatic, economic, and military meas- 8 ures outlined in the ‘‘Trump Administration INF 9 Treaty Integrated Strategy’’ to resolve the concerns 10 related to the Russian Federation’s violation of the 11 Treaty and to reach agreement on measures to en- 12 sure the Treaty’s future viability. 13 SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR PROCURE- 14 MENT, FLIGHT TESTING, OR DEPLOYMENT OF 15 SHORT- OR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE GROUND- 16 LAUNCHED BALLISTIC OR CRUISE MISSILE 17 SYSTEM. 18 (a) IN GENERAL.—No funds may be appropriated or 19 otherwise made available for the procurement, flight test- 20 ing, or deployment of a United States short- or inter- 21 mediate-range ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile 22 system with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers 23 until the Secretary of Defense, in concurrence with the 24 Secretary of State and the Director of National Intel- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:22 Mar 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1231.IH H1231 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 9 •HR 1231 IH ligence, submits a report and offers a briefing to the ap- 1 propriate committees of Congress that— 2 (1) includes a Memorandum of Understanding 3 (MOU) from a NATO or Indo-Pacific ally that com- 4 mits such ally to host deployment of any such mis- 5 sile on its own territory, and in the case of deploy- 6 ment on the European continent, has the concur- 7 rence of the North Atlantic Council; 8 (2) confirms that the United States has not re- 9 jected any diplomatic offer to exhibit the SSC–8 10 missile system, negotiations on a verifiable mutual 11 agreement prohibiting the placement of INF-range 12 missiles on NATO territory or within range of a 13 NATO Member State, or any other transparency 14 measure which may successfully move Russia closer 15 to returning to compliance with the Treaty or pre- 16 vent a proliferation of INF-range systems on the 17 continent; 18 (3) assesses the implications, in terms of the 19 military threat to the United States and its allies in 20 Europe and the Indo-Pacific, of a Russian Federa- 21 tion deployment of intermediate-range cruise and 22 ballistic missiles without restriction; 23 (4) identifies what types of technologies and 24 programs the United States would need to pursue to 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:22 Mar 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1231.IH H1231 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 10 •HR 1231 IH offset the additional Russian capabilities, and at 1 what cost; 2 (5) identifies what mission requirements with 3 respect to the Russian Federation and the People’s 4 Republic of China will be met by INF-type systems; 5 (6) identifies the degree to which INF-compli- 6 ant capabilities, such as sea and air-launched cruise 7 missiles, can meet those same mission requirements; 8 and 9 (7) identifies the ramifications of a collapse of 10 the INF Treaty on the ability to generate consensus 11 among States Parties to the NPT Treaty ahead of 12 the 2020 NPT Review Conference, and assesses the 13 degree to which the Russian Federation will use the 14 United States unilateral withdrawal to sow discord 15 within the NATO alliance. 16 (b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 17 subsection (a) shall be unclassified with a classified annex. 18 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE- 19 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit- 20 tees of Congress’’ means— 21 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 22 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and 23 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:22 Mar 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1231.IH H1231 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 11 •HR 1231 IH (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 1 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep- 2 resentatives. 3 Æ VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:22 Mar 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6301 E:\BILLS\H1231.IH H1231 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS