Countering the Chinese Government and Communist Party's Political Influence Operations Act

II 116TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION S. 480 To require an unclassified interagency report on the political influence oper- ations of the Government of China and the Communist Party of China with respect to the United States, and for other purposes. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES FEBRUARY 13, 2019 Mr. RUBIO (for himself, Ms. CORTEZ MASTO, Mr. GARDNER, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. CORNYN, and Mr. COTTON) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To require an unclassified interagency report on the political influence operations of the Government of China and the Communist Party of China with respect to the United States, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Countering the Chinese 4 Government and Communist Party’s Political Influence 5 Operations Act’’. 6 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 7 In this Act: 8 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:51 Feb 25, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S480.IS S480 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 2 •S 480 IS (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT- 1 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com- 2 mittees’’ means— 3 (A) the Committee on Appropriations of 4 the Senate; 5 (B) the Committee on Armed Services of 6 the Senate; 7 (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 8 the Senate; 9 (D) the Committee on Health, Education, 10 Labor, and Pensions of the Senate; 11 (E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 12 Senate; 13 (F) the Select Committee on Intelligence of 14 the Senate; 15 (G) the Committee on Banking, Housing, 16 and Urban Affairs of the Senate; 17 (H) the Committee on Appropriations of 18 the House of Representatives; 19 (I) the Committee on Armed Services of 20 the House of Representatives; 21 (J) the Committee on Education and 22 Labor of the House of Representatives; 23 (K) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 24 the House of Representatives; 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:51 Feb 25, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S480.IS S480 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 3 •S 480 IS (L) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1 House of Representatives; 2 (M) the Permanent Select Committee on 3 Intelligence of the House of Representatives; 4 and 5 (N) the Committee on Financial Services 6 of the House of Representatives. 7 (2) POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.—The 8 term ‘‘political influence operations’’ means the co- 9 ordinated and often concealed application of disin- 10 formation, press manipulation, economic coercion, 11 targeted investments, corruption, or academic cen- 12 sorship. Such efforts are often intended— 13 (A) to coerce and corrupt United States in- 14 terests, values, institutions, or individuals; and 15 (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, 16 or outcomes in the United States that support 17 the interests of the Government of the People’s 18 Republic of China or the Communist Party of 19 China. 20 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 22 (1) The Government of China and the Com- 23 munist Party of China employ a wide range of polit- 24 ical, informational, and economic measures to influ- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:51 Feb 25, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S480.IS S480 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 4 •S 480 IS ence, coerce, intimidate, or undermine the United 1 States interests or the interests of United States 2 partners and allies. 3 (2) The December 2017 National Security 4 Strategy of the United States of America states, 5 ‘‘Although the United States seeks to continue to co- 6 operate with China, China is using economic induce- 7 ments and penalties, influence operations, and im- 8 plied military threats to persuade other states to 9 heed its political and security agenda.’’. 10 (3) The political influence operations efforts of 11 the Government of China and the Communist Party 12 of China have received less scrutiny than similar ef- 13 forts of the Government of the Russian Federation, 14 but given China’s economic strength and the grow- 15 ing apparatus being used to spread its influence 16 globally, efforts to promote its authoritarian ideal 17 pose significant and consequential long-term chal- 18 lenges to United States interests and values. 19 (4) The Government of China and the Com- 20 munist Party of China use overt and covert means 21 to target the political and economic elite, the media 22 and public opinion, civil society and academia, and 23 members of the Chinese diaspora. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:51 Feb 25, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S480.IS S480 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 5 •S 480 IS (5) The Government of China and the Com- 1 munist Party of China employ an array of govern- 2 ment entities, friendship and exchange organiza- 3 tions, private entities and businesspeople, and gov- 4 ernment-funded foundations, think tanks, edu- 5 cational and other projects to carry out political in- 6 fluence operations, which is often referred to as 7 united front work. 8 (6) These political influence operations violate 9 national sovereignty, and as such, are fundamentally 10 different from traditional efforts by states to shape 11 international policy debates and improve their public 12 image through public diplomacy and strategic com- 13 munications campaigns. 14 (7) The aims of the political influence oper- 15 ations of the Government of China and the Com- 16 munist Party of China are— 17 (A) to protect the political security of the 18 Chinese Communist Party, both within China 19 and globally; 20 (B) to domestically and globally promote 21 the idea that the Chinese Communist Party’s 22 political and economic model is superior to the 23 governments of Western democracies; 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:51 Feb 25, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S480.IS S480 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 6 •S 480 IS (C) to promote the interests of the regime 1 globally; and 2 (D) to weaken Western alliances and part- 3 nerships. 4 (8) The political influence operations of the 5 Government of China and the Communist Party of 6 China take advantage of the open and democratic 7 nature of the United States, including— 8 (A) constitutional protections for free 9 speech and a free press; and 10 (B) the desire of some individuals or insti- 11 tutions to attract Chinese investment, gain ac- 12 cess to Chinese markets, or attain greater glob- 13 al influence. 14 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con- 15 gress that— 16 (1) the political influence operations of the Gov- 17 ernment of China and the Communist Party of 18 China are not ‘‘soft power’’ intended to persuade, 19 but ‘‘sharp power’’ intended— 20 (A) to penetrate or corrupt democratic 21 countries and undermine democratic institu- 22 tions and freedoms; 23 (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, laws, and 24 policies favorable to the Government of China’s 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:51 Feb 25, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S480.IS S480 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 7 •S 480 IS interest through disinformation, coercion, cor- 1 ruption, and other means; 2 (C) to widen the scope of Chinese authori- 3 tarian influence around the world, including— 4 (i) to suppress political opposition to 5 the Chinese Communist Party; and 6 (ii) to violate the internationally rec- 7 ognized human and civil rights of Chinese 8 citizens living in nations around the world; 9 and 10 (D) to undermine the strength of American 11 alliances around the world; and 12 (2) the American people need reliable and cur- 13 rent information— 14 (A) to identify the key institutions, individ- 15 uals, entities, and ministries that carry out such 16 operations; and 17 (B) to distinguish between malign political 18 influence operations intended to undermine core 19 American freedoms, democratic institutions, 20 and cultural, educational, business, and people- 21 to-people exchanges that may benefit the 22 United States and China. 23 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 24 United States— 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:51 Feb 25, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S480.IS S480 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 8 •S 480 IS (1) to clearly differentiate between the Chinese 1 people and culture and the Government of China 2 and the Communist Party of China in official state- 3 ments, media, and messaging; 4 (2) to clearly differentiate between legal, inter- 5 nationally accepted public diplomacy and strategic 6 communications campaigns and illicit activities to 7 undermine democratic institutions or freedoms; 8 (3) to protect United States citizens and legal 9 residents from malign or coercive political influence 10 operations; 11 (4) to enhance cooperation and coordination 12 with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Taiwan 13 (officially known as the ‘‘Republic of China’’), whose 14 governments and institutions have faced acute pres- 15 sure from the political influence operations of the 16 Government of China and the Communist Party of 17 China, and with other allies throughout the world; 18 (5) to create strategies to ensure that countries 19 in Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast Asia, 20 and elsewhere are aware of China’s ‘‘sharp power’’ 21 and provide needed capacity to counter them effec- 22 tively; 23 (6) to implement more advanced transparency 24 requirements concerning collaboration with Chinese 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:51 Feb 25, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S480.IS S480 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 9 •S 480 IS actors for media agencies, universities, think tanks, 1 and government officials; 2 (7) to use various forums to raise awareness 3 about— 4 (A) the goals and methods of the political 5 influence operations of the Government of 6 China and the Communist Party of China; and 7 (B) common patterns and approaches used 8 by Chinese intelligence agencies or related ac- 9 tors; 10 (8) to require greater transparency for Confu- 11 cius Institutes, think tanks, academic programs, and 12 nongovernmental organizations funded primarily by 13 the Government of China, the Communist Party of 14 China, or by individuals or public or private organi- 15 zations with a demonstrable affiliation with the Gov- 16 ernment of China or the Communist Party of China 17 that are operating in the United States to register 18 through the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 19 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.) or a comparable mech- 20 anism; 21 (9) to seek ways to increase Chinese language 22 proficiency among mid-career professionals that do 23 not rely on funding linked to the Government of 24 China; 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:51 Feb 25, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S480.IS S480 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 10 •S 480 IS (10) to ensure that existing tools are suffi- 1 ciently screening for the risk of Chinese influence 2 operations; and 3 (11) to create more flexible tools, as needed, 4 with the goals of— 5 (A) screening investments from the Gov- 6 ernment of China or sources backed by the 7 Government of China to protect against the 8 takeover of United States companies by Chinese 9 state-owned or state-driven entities; and 10 (B) protecting institutions or business sec- 11 tors critically important to United States na- 12 tional security and the viability of democratic 13 institutions. 14 SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO COUNTER ‘‘SHARP POWER’’ POLIT- 15 ICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND TO PRO- 16 TECT UNITED STATES CITIZENS. 17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and the 18 Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with all 19 relevant Federal agencies shall develop a long-term strat- 20 egy— 21 (1) to carry out the policy statements set forth 22 in section 3(c); 23 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:51 Feb 25, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S480.IS S480 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 11 •S 480 IS (2) to effectively counter the ‘‘sharp power’’ po- 1 litical influence operations of the Chinese Com- 2 munist Party globally and in the United States; 3 (3) to ensure that United States citizens, par- 4 ticularly Chinese Americans and members of the 5 Chinese, Uyghur, and Tibetan diaspora who are 6 often the victims and primary targets of malign po- 7 litical influence operations, are protected; 8 (4) to ensure that— 9 (A) the United States Government strategy 10 to protect the communities described in para- 11 graph (3) is clearly communicated by relevant 12 Federal officials; and 13 (B) secure outlets are created for reporting 14 on intimidation and surveillance; 15 (5) to ensure that Chinese nationals who are le- 16 gally studying, living, or working temporarily in the 17 United States know that intimidation or surveillance 18 by the Government of China and the Communist 19 Party of China is an unacceptable invasion of their 20 rights while they reside in the United States; and 21 (6) to provide secure outlets for reporting on in- 22 timidation and surveillance. 23 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:51 Feb 25, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S480.IS S480 jbell on DSK30RV082PROD with BILLS 12 •S 480 IS (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 1 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, or 2 an appropriate high-ranking official, shall— 3 (1) submit an unclassified report containing the 4 strategy required under subsection (a) to the appro- 5 priate congressional committees; or 6 (2) describe the strategy required under sub- 7 section (a) through unclassified testimony before the 8 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or 9 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 10 Representatives. 11 SEC. 5. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPER- 12 ATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA AND 13 THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA. 14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Because it is important for Amer- 15 ican policymakers and the American people to be informed 16 about the influence operations described in section 3, not 17 later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of 18 this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 19 Director of National Intelligence, and in consultation with 20 the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, 21 shall submit an unclassified report to the appropriate con- 22 gressional committees that describes the political influence 23 operations of the Government of China and the Com- 24 munist Party of China affecting the United States and 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 22:51 Feb 25, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 62 [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]