Taiwan Peace and Stability Act

I 117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 3972 To support the diplomatic, economic, and physical space of Taiwan, and for other purposes. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUNE 17, 2021 Mr. BERA (for himself, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. KAHELE, Mr. BACON, Mr. CASE, and Mr. WOMACK) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned A BILL To support the diplomatic, economic, and physical space of Taiwan, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 3 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 4 ‘‘Taiwan Peace and Stability Act’’. 5 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 6 this Act is as follows: 7 Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Findings and statement of policy. VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:58 Jul 08, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6211 E:\BILLS\H3972.IH H3972 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 3972 IH TITLE I—SUPPORTING TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY Sec. 101. Findings. Sec. 102. Sense of Congress on Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the inter- national community. Sec. 103. Strategy to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in inter- national organizations. Sec. 104. Expanding United States-Taiwan development cooperation. Sec. 105. Appropriate congressional committees. TITLE II—ADVANCING TAIWAN’S ECONOMIC SPACE Sec. 201. Sense of Congress on expanding U.S. economic relations with Tai- wan. Sec. 202. Legal framework for expanding economic relations with Taiwan. Sec. 203. Appropriate congressional committees. TITLE III—ENHANCING DETERRENCE OVER TAIWAN Sec. 301. Sense of Congress on peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Sec. 302. Strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict. Sec. 303. Supporting Taiwan’s investment in asymmetric capabilities. Sec. 304. Advancing Taiwan’s territorial defense force concept. Sec. 305. Strengthening Taiwan’s civilian defense professionals. Sec. 306. Appropriate congressional committees. SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY. 1 (a) Congress makes the following findings: 2 (1) The United States has consistently sought 3 to advance peace and stability in East Asia as a cen- 4 tral element of U.S. foreign policy toward the region. 5 (2) Peace and stability in East Asia has pro- 6 vided the necessary environment for the tremendous 7 economic growth experienced by the region and re- 8 mains critical to the continued development and 9 prosperity of all people in the Indo-Pacific. 10 (3) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public 11 Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the ‘‘Six As- 12 surances’’, provided by the United States to Taiwan 13 in July 1982, are the cornerstones of U.S.-Taiwan 14 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:58 Jul 08, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3972.IH H3972 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 3972 IH relations and continue to guide U.S. policy toward 1 Taiwan. 2 (4) The Taiwan Relations Act states that it is 3 the policy of the United States to— 4 ‘‘(A) preserve and promote extensive, close, 5 and friendly commercial, cultural, and other re- 6 lations between the people of the United States 7 and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people 8 on the China mainland and all other peoples of 9 the Western Pacific area; 10 ‘‘(B) declare that peace and stability in the 11 area are in the political, security, and economic 12 interests of the United States, and are matters 13 of international concern; 14 ‘‘(C) make clear that the United States de- 15 cision to establish diplomatic relations with the 16 People’s Republic of China rests upon the ex- 17 pectation that the future of Taiwan will be de- 18 termined by peaceful means; 19 ‘‘(D) consider any effort to determine the 20 future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, 21 including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to 22 the peace and security of the Western Pacific 23 area and of grave concern to the United States; 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:58 Jul 08, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3972.IH H3972 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 3972 IH ‘‘(E) provide Taiwan with arms of a defen- 1 sive character; and 2 ‘‘(F) maintain the capacity of the United 3 States to resist any resort to force or other 4 forms of coercion that would jeopardize the se- 5 curity, or the social or economic system, of the 6 people on Taiwan.’’. 7 (5) The Government of the People’s Republic of 8 China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai 9 Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated cam- 10 paign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economi- 11 cally, and militarily in a manner that threatens to 12 erode U.S. policy and create a fait accompli on ques- 13 tions surrounding Taiwan’s future. 14 (6) In order to ensure the longevity of U.S. pol- 15 icy and preserve the ability of the people of Taiwan 16 to determine their future independently, it is nec- 17 essary to reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic, 18 and physical space. 19 (b) It is the policy of the United States to— 20 (1) maintain the position that peace and sta- 21 bility in the Western Pacific are in the political, se- 22 curity, and economic interests of the United States, 23 and are matters of international concern; and 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:58 Jul 08, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3972.IH H3972 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 3972 IH (2) work with allies and partners to promote 1 peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter 2 military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that 3 would undermine regional stability. 4 TITLE I—SUPPORTING TAIWAN’S 5 MEANINGFUL PARTICIPA- 6 TION IN THE INTERNATIONAL 7 COMMUNITY 8 SEC. 101. FINDINGS. 9 Congress makes the following findings: 10 (1) Taiwan has provided monetary, humani- 11 tarian, and medical assistance to combat diseases 12 such as AIDS, tuberculosis, Ebola, and dengue fever 13 in countries around the world. During the COVID– 14 19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of 15 personal protective equipment and COVID–19 tests 16 to countries in need. 17 (2) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and 18 Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina 19 Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and 20 Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Tai- 21 wan in favor of diplomatic relations with China. 22 (3) Taiwan was invited to participate in the 23 World Health Assembly, the decision-making body of 24 the World Health Organization (WHO), as an ob- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:58 Jul 08, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3972.IH H3972 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 3972 IH server annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the 1 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has in- 2 creasingly resisted Taiwan’s participation in the 3 WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA 4 in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021. 5 (4) The Taipei Flight Information Region re- 6 portedly served 1.75 million flights and 68.9 million 7 passengers in 2018 and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan 8 International airport, the eleventh busiest airport in 9 the world. Taiwan has been excluded from partici- 10 pating at the International Civil Aviation Organiza- 11 tion (ICAO) since 2013. 12 (5) United Nations (UN) General Assembly 13 Resolution 2758 does not address the issue of rep- 14 resentation of Taiwan and its people at the United 15 Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to rep- 16 resent the people of Taiwan. 17 SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL 18 PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL 19 COMMUNITY. 20 It is the sense of Congress that— 21 (1) Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous, 22 and is home to 23.5 million people. It is an impor- 23 tant contributor to the global community, as a model 24 for democracy, and by providing expertise in global 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:58 Jul 08, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3972.IH H3972 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 7 •HR 3972 IH health, international aviation security, emerging 1 technology development, and with forward looking 2 environmental policies; 3 (2) multiple United States Government admin- 4 istrations of both political parties have taken impor- 5 tant steps to advance Taiwan’s meaningful partici- 6 pation in international organizations; 7 (3) existing efforts to enhance U.S. cooperation 8 with Taiwan to provide global public goods, includ- 9 ing through development assistance, humanitarian 10 assistance, and disaster relief in trilateral and multi- 11 lateral fora is laudable and should continue; 12 (4) nonetheless, significant structural, policy, 13 and legal barriers remain to advancing Taiwan’s 14 meaningful participation in the international com- 15 munity; and 16 (5) efforts to share Taiwan’s expertise with 17 other parts of the global community could be further 18 enhanced through a systematic approach, along with 19 greater attention from Congress and the American 20 public to such efforts. 21 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:58 Jul 08, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3972.IH H3972 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 8 •HR 3972 IH SEC. 103. STRATEGY TO SUPPORT TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL 1 PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANI- 2 ZATIONS. 3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 5 in consultation with other Federal departments and agen- 6 cies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate con- 7 gressional committees a strategy— 8 (1) to advance Taiwan’s meaningful participa- 9 tion in a prioritized set of international organiza- 10 tions (IOs); and 11 (2) that responds to growing pressure from the 12 PRC on foreign governments, IOs, commercial ac- 13 tors, and civil society organizations to comply with 14 its ‘‘One-China Principle’’, with respect to Taiwan. 15 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.— 16 (1) IN GENERAL.—The strategy required in 17 paragraph (a) shall include: 18 (A) An assessment of the methods the 19 PRC uses to coerce actors to into adhering to 20 its ‘‘One-China Principle.’’ The methods shall 21 include those employed against governments, 22 IOs, and civil society organizations. The assess- 23 ment shall also include pressure on commercial 24 actors, to the extent it is relevant in the context 25 of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in IOs. 26 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:58 Jul 08, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3972.IH H3972 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 9 •HR 3972 IH (B) An assessment of the policies of for- 1 eign governments toward the PRC and Taiwan, 2 to identify likeminded allies and partners who 3 might become public or private partners in the 4 strategy. 5 (C) A systematic analysis of all IOs, as 6 practicable, to identify IOs that best lend them- 7 selves to advancing Taiwan’s participation. The 8 analysis shall include, but is not limited to the 9 IOs’— 10 (i) policy on the requirements to ob- 11 tain membership and observer status, as 12 well as the foundational documents defin- 13 ing membership requirements and observer 14 status within the IO; 15 (ii) participation rules; 16 (iii) processes for developing member- 17 ship requirements and participation rules; 18 (iv) policies of current members re- 19 garding Taiwan’s political status; and 20 (v) relative reliance on contributions 21 from the PRC and how it may affect inter- 22 nal decision making. 23 (D) An evaluation of the feasibility and ad- 24 visability of expanding economic, security, and 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:58 Jul 08, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3972.IH H3972 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 10 •HR 3972 IH diplomatic engagement with nations that have 1 demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or up- 2 graded relations with Taiwan, where it aligns 3 with U.S. interests. 4 (E) A survey of IOs that have allowed Tai- 5 wan’s meaningful participation, including an as- 6 sessment of whether any erosion in Taiwan’s 7 engagement has occurred within those organiza- 8 tions and how Taiwan’s participation has posi- 9 tively strengthened the capacity and activity of 10 these organizations, thereby providing positive 11 models for Taiwan’s inclusion in other similar 12 forums. 13 (F) A list of no more than 20 IOs at which 14 the U.S. Government will prioritize for using its 15 voice, vote, and influence to advance Taiwan’s 16 meaningful participation over the three-year pe- 17 riod following the date of enactment of this Act. 18 The list shall be derived from the IOs identified 19 in paragraph (1)(C). 20 (G) A description of the diplomatic strate- 21 gies and the coalitions the U.S. Government 22 plans to develop to implement paragraph 23 (b)(1)(F). 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:58 Jul 08, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3972.IH H3972 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 11 •HR 3972 IH (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The strategy required in 1 subsection (a) shall be classified, but it may include an 2 unclassified summary, if the Secretary of State determines 3 it appropriate. 4 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 5 (1) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.—The term 6 ‘‘international organization’’ shall include, but is not 7 limited to, UN funds, programs, specialized agen- 8 cies, entities, and bodies. It shall also include other 9 organizations outside of the UN system, as the Sec- 10 retary of State or his or her designee deems appro- 11 priate, and in consultation with other Federal de- 12 partments and agencies. 13 (2) ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE.—The term ‘‘One- 14 China Principle’’ shall solely and exclusively refer to 15 the PRC’s policy toward Taiwan. 16 (3) CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS.—The term 17 ‘‘civil society organizations’’ means international 18 civil society organizations that are critical to main- 19 taining Taiwan’s international space and enabling 20 Taiwan to play a positive and constructive role in 21 the global community. 22 (e) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State or his 23 or her designee, shall consult with the appropriate con- 24 gressional committees— 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:58 Jul 08, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3972.IH H3972 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 12 •HR 3972 IH (1) no later than 90 days after the date of en- 1 actment of this Act, on the list of IOs identified in 2 [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]