Taiwan Defense Act of 2021

I 117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 3934 To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUNE 16, 2021 Mr. GALLAGHER (for himself, Mr. RESCHENTHALER, Mr. WALTZ, and Mrs. HARTZLER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Com- mittee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdic- tion of the committee concerned A BILL To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Defense Act 4 of 2021’’. 5 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 6 In this Act: 7 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:07 Jul 12, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3934.IH H3934 khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 3934 IH (1) DENY.—The term ‘‘deny’’ means to use 1 combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ul- 2 timately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic 3 of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, 4 resulting in— 5 (A) the termination of hostilities or at 6 least the attempted fait accompli; or 7 (B) the neutralization of the ability of the 8 People’s Republic of China to execute a fait 9 accompli against Taiwan. 10 (2) FAIT ACCOMPLI.—The term ‘‘fait accompli’’ 11 refers to the strategy of the People’s Republic of 12 China for invading and seizing control of Taiwan be- 13 fore the United States Armed Forces can respond 14 effectively, while simultaneously deterring an effec- 15 tive combined joint response by the United States 16 Armed Forces by convincing the United States that 17 mounting such a response would be prohibitively dif- 18 ficult or costly. 19 SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 20 Congress makes the following findings: 21 (1) Taiwan is a beacon of democracy in Asia 22 and a steadfast partner of the United States in the 23 common pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific re- 24 gion in which— 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:07 Jul 12, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3934.IH H3934 khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 3934 IH (A) all societies enjoy sovereign autonomy; 1 (B) the people of the region live securely, 2 prosperously, and with dignity; and 3 (C) the societies of the region rise and fall 4 not by coercion but on the basis of peaceful 5 competition. 6 (2) If the People’s Republic of China were to 7 use military force to compel the unification of Tai- 8 wan with the People’s Republic of China— 9 (A) the world would lose one of the great 10 exemplars of freedom and democracy; 11 (B) the United States and allies and part- 12 ners of the United States would face severe dif- 13 ficulty in maintaining favorable balances of 14 power relative to the People’s Republic of China 15 in Northeast and Southeast Asia; and 16 (C) as the balance of power in the Indo- 17 Pacific region shifted in favor of the People’s 18 Republic of China, the People’s Republic of 19 China would possess an increasing ability— 20 (i) to impose its will throughout the 21 Indo-Pacific region, including by threat- 22 ening or using force against Japan, South 23 Korea, the Philippines, and other allies 24 and partners of the United States; and 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:07 Jul 12, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3934.IH H3934 khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 3934 IH (ii) restrict United States access to 1 key trade routes and markets in the Indo- 2 Pacific region, thereby imposing severe 3 economic hardship on middle-class and 4 working-class Americans and increasing 5 the ability of the People’s Republic of 6 China to intrude into political life in the 7 United States. 8 (3) There is growing concern that the Govern- 9 ment of the People’s Republic of China may con- 10 clude that the cross-Strait military balance has tilted 11 in its favor and launch an invasion of Taiwan sooner 12 than previously anticipated, including as follows: 13 (A) Former Assistant to the President for 14 National Security Affairs H.R. McMaster testi- 15 fied in March 2020 that Taiwan is ‘‘the most 16 significant flashpoint now’’ between the United 17 States and the People’s Republic of China. 18 (B) Former Commander of United States 19 Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Phil Davidson 20 testified in March 2020 that the threat of an 21 invasion by the People’s Republic of China of 22 Taiwan ‘‘is manifest during this decade, in fact 23 in the next six years’’. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:07 Jul 12, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3934.IH H3934 khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 3934 IH (C) Commander of United States Indo-Pa- 1 cific Command Admiral John Aquilino testified 2 in March 2020 that the threat of an invasion 3 by the People’s Republic of China of Taiwan is 4 ‘‘much closer to us than most think’’ and could 5 materialize well before 2035. 6 (4) Defense policymakers and analysts across 7 multiple administrations have found that, if the Peo- 8 ple’s Republic of China does invade Taiwan, the in- 9 vasion will likely take the form of a fait accompli, 10 including as follows: 11 (A) The Defense Science Board assessed in 12 June 2018 that the People’s Republic of China 13 ‘‘will attempt to achieve a decisive outcome very 14 quickly, presenting the United States and its al- 15 lies with a fait accompli,’’ in the event of con- 16 flict. 17 (B) The Department of Defense Indo-Pa- 18 cific Strategy Report released in June 2019 19 found that— 20 (i) if the People’s Republic of China 21 or another strategic competitor in the 22 Indo-Pacific region decides ‘‘to advance 23 their interests through force, they are like- 24 ly to enjoy a local military advantage at 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:07 Jul 12, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3934.IH H3934 khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 3934 IH the onset of conflict. In a fait accompli sce- 1 nario, competitors would seek to employ 2 their capabilities quickly to achieve limited 3 objectives and forestall a response from the 4 United States, and its allies and partners’’; 5 and 6 (ii) an attempted fait accompli by the 7 People’s Republic of China or another 8 strategy competitor would constitute one of 9 the ‘‘most stressing potential scenarios’’ 10 facing the United States Armed Forces. 11 (C) The Tri-Service Maritime Strategy re- 12 leased by the United States Navy, United 13 States Marine Corps, and United States Coast 14 Guard in December 2020 stated, ‘‘In the event 15 of conflict, China . . . will likely attempt to 16 seize territory before the United States and its 17 allies can mount an effective response—leading 18 to a fait accompli.’’. 19 (D) The Army Multi-Domain Trans- 20 formation strategic guidance released by Army 21 Chief of Staff General James McConville in 22 March 2021 stated that China and other adver- 23 saries of the United States will seek to ‘‘seize 24 their objectives quickly as a fait accompli,’’ if 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:07 Jul 12, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3934.IH H3934 khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with BILLS 7 •HR 3934 IH the Joint Force ‘‘cannot present credible deter- 1 rent options’’. 2 (E) Then-Acting Secretary of Defense Pat- 3 rick Shanahan testified in March 2019 that the 4 Government of the People’s Republic of China 5 is developing capabilities that could be used 6 ‘‘achieve a ‘fait accompli’ that would make re- 7 versing Chinese gains more difficult, militarily 8 and politically’’. 9 (F) Special Assistant to the Secretary of 10 Defense for China Ely Ratner assessed in Jan- 11 uary 2020 that ‘‘China has made significant in- 12 vestments in long-range ISR and strike assets’’ 13 and ‘‘China hopes the threat of these attacks 14 will deter U.S. intervention by negating a sub- 15 stantial portion of U.S. airpower early in a con- 16 flict, thereby creating time and space for a fait 17 accompli’’. 18 (G) Former Under Secretary of Defense 19 for Policy Michele Flournoy warned in June 20 2020 that the Government of the People’s Re- 21 public of China may believe the United States 22 ‘‘lack[s] the military capabilities that might be 23 effective in the face of A2/AD’’ and ‘‘conclude 24 that China should move on Taiwan sooner rath- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:07 Jul 12, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3934.IH H3934 khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with BILLS 8 •HR 3934 IH er than later, a fait accompli that a weakened 1 and distracted United States would have to ac- 2 cept’’. 3 (5) There is broad agreement that the United 4 States should maintain the ability of the United 5 States Armed Forces to defeat a fait accompli by the 6 People’s Republic of China, including as follows: 7 (A) The National Defense Strategy Com- 8 mission assessed in November 2018 that com- 9 peting successfully in ‘‘the Indo-Pacific region, 10 while also managing escalation dynamics, re- 11 quires positioning substantial capability forward 12 . . . to deter and prevent a fait accompli by an 13 agile, opportunistic adversary’’. 14 (B) Then-Acting Secretary of Defense Pat- 15 rick Shanahan testified in March 2019 that im- 16 plementation of the 2018 National Defense 17 Strategy was required to ensure the United 18 States had ‘‘the capabilities, posture, and em- 19 ployment of forces’’ necessary to prevent a fait 20 accompli by the People’s Republic of China. 21 (C) Assistant to the President for National 22 Security Affairs Jake Sullivan and Deputy As- 23 sistant to the President and Coordinator for 24 Indo-Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell warned in 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:07 Jul 12, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3934.IH H3934 khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with BILLS 9 •HR 3934 IH September 2019 that ‘‘Beijing cannot be al- 1 lowed to use the threat of force to pursue a fait 2 accompli in territorial disputes’’. 3 (D) In January 2020, Secretary of De- 4 fense Lloyd Austin upheld the assessment by 5 the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report that Depart- 6 ment of Defense ‘‘initiatives on force employ- 7 ment, crisis response, force and concept devel- 8 opment, and collaboration with allies and part- 9 ners’’ should be ‘‘aimed to help address this 10 critical challenge’’ of a potential fait accompli 11 scenario involving the People’s Republic of 12 China. 13 (E) Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen 14 Hicks testified in February 2020 that the Peo- 15 ple’s Republic of China is ‘‘less likely’’ to at- 16 tempt a fait accompli against Taiwan if it 17 knows that the United States will be able to de- 18 feat such an attempt, and that the United 19 States should therefore maintain the ability to 20 defeat a fait accompli by the People’s Republic 21 of China against Taiwan. 22 (F) Admiral Davidson and Admiral Aqui- 23 lino testified in March 2020 that they agreed 24 with Deputy Secretary Hicks’ statements, and 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:07 Jul 12, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3934.IH H3934 khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with BILLS 10 •HR 3934 IH that the United States should maintain the 1 ability to defeat a fait accompli by the People’s 2 Republic of China against Taiwan in order to 3 strengthen deterrence against such a contin- 4 gency. 5 (G) Former Under Secretary of Defense 6 for Policy James Miller wrote in October 2020 7 that ‘‘U.S. defense planners must maintain a 8 laser focus on a scenario for which U.S. forces 9 are ill-prepared today, in which China . . . 10 see[s] the opportunity for a quick invasion of a 11 U.S. partner or ally and attempt to impose a 12 fait accompli that would be costly and risky to 13 reverse’’. 14 (6) There is likewise broad agreement that a 15 strategy of denial is essential to deter or defeat a 16 fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China 17 against Taiwan, including as follows: 18 (A) The 2018 National Defense Strategy 19 tasked the Department of Defense with pos- 20 turing and employing forces to ‘‘delay, degrade, 21 or deny adversary aggression’’. 22 (B) Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ar- 23 gued in January 2020 that a ‘‘combat-credible, 24 forward deterrent posture is instrumental to the 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:07 Jul 12, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3934.IH H3934 khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with BILLS 11 •HR 3934 IH United States military’s ability to deter, and if 1 necessary, deny a fait accompli scenario’’. 2 (C) Deputy Secretary Hicks, Under Sec- 3 retary Kahl, Admiral Davidson, and Admiral 4 Aquilino reaffirmed the emphasis by Secretary 5 Austin on denial and testified that a strategy of 6 denial is essential for deterring Chinese aggres- 7 sion. 8 (D) The Joint Operating Concept for De- 9 terrence Operations released in December 2017 10 states that forward-deployed forces contribute 11 to ‘‘denying benefits’’ and thereby reduce ‘‘the 12 likelihood of an adversary achieving strategic or 13 tactical surprise, thus helping to prevent adver- 14 sary decision makers from concluding they 15 might achieve a military fait accompli that 16 could be extremely costly for the US to reverse 17 by force’’. 18 (E) The United States Army’s Multi-Do- 19 main Operations concept document released in 20 December 2018 states that Army forces must 21 demonstrate the capability ‘‘to immediately 22 deny a fait accompli’’ in order to deter a near- 23 peer adversary. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:07 Jul 12, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3934.IH H3934 khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with BILLS 12 •HR 3934 IH (F) The Marine Corps Force Design 2030 1 report released in March 2020 states that for- 2 ward-deployed forces possess the capability to 3 ‘‘attrite adversary forces, enable joint force ac- 4 cess requirements, complicate targeting and 5 consume adversary ISR resources, and prevent 6 fait accompli scenarios’’. 7 (G) The Tri-Service Maritime Strategy di- 8 rects the United States Navy, United States 9 Marine Corps, and United States Coast Guard 10 to ‘‘deny adversaries their objectives, defeat ad- 11 versary forces while managing escalation, and 12 set the conditions for favorable conflict termi- 13 nation’’. 14 (7) Under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 15 3301 et seq.), it is the policy of the United States 16 to consider any effort to determine the future of 17 Taiwan by other than peaceful means to be of grave 18 c [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]