II 117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION S. 434 To seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran’s nuclear program, and for other purposes. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES FEBRUARY 24, 2021 Mr. MARKEY (for himself, Ms. WARREN, Mr. SANDERS, Ms. DUCKWORTH, Mr. LEAHY, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. MURPHY, Ms. BALDWIN, Mrs. MUR- RAY, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, and Mr. MERKLEY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran’s nuclear program, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Iran Diplomacy Act 4 of 2021’’. 5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6 Congress makes the following findings: 7 (1) On July 14, 2015, the People’s Republic of 8 China, France, Germany, Russia, the United King- 9 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:58 Mar 17, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S434.IS S434 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 2 •S 434 IS dom, the United States, the European Union, and 1 Iran agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Ac- 2 tion (JCPOA). 3 (2) When all parties fully implemented the 4 JCPOA, it had increased the amount of time it 5 would take Iran to acquire enough fissile material 6 for one nuclear weapon, from approximately two to 7 three months to at least one year, if Iran made the 8 political decision to take such an action. 9 (3) The JCPOA blocked Iran’s uranium, pluto- 10 nium, and covert pathways to a nuclear weapon, in 11 the period when all sides had fully implemented their 12 commitments, in part by— 13 (A) imposing verifiable limits on Iran’s 14 uranium enrichment and plutonium production 15 capabilities; 16 (B) reducing the number of Iran’s installed 17 centrifuges by two-thirds; and 18 (C) permitting the International Atomic 19 Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor and verify 20 all stages of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle to include 21 requesting short-notice access to ‘‘verify the 22 non-diversion of declared material’’ and ‘‘ab- 23 sence of undeclared nuclear material and activi- 24 ties’’ in Iran, consistent with its provisional im- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:58 Mar 17, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S434.IS S434 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 3 •S 434 IS plementation of the Additional Protocol to its 1 IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. 2 (4) The 2018 Department of State Compliance 3 Report concluded, ‘‘Tehran’s adherence to these 4 commitments will hinder its ability to produce a nu- 5 clear weapon even after the time-bound provisions of 6 the deal expire, helping to ensure that its nuclear 7 program remains exclusively peaceful in nature’’. 8 (5) On January 29, 2019, Director of the Cen- 9 tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) Gina Haspel, testified 10 before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 11 Senate that ‘‘at the moment, technically they [Iran] 12 are in compliance,’’ with the JCPOA. 13 (6) On January 29, 2019, Director of National 14 Intelligence Dan Coats issued a worldwide threat as- 15 sessment, which observed that the United States 16 ‘‘[does] not believe that Iran is currently under- 17 taking the key activities we judge necessary to 18 produce a nuclear device’’ and ‘‘Iran’s continued im- 19 plementation of the JCPOA has extended the 20 amount of time Iran would need to produce enough 21 fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few 22 months to about one year’’. 23 (7) On May 8, 2018, President Donald J. 24 Trump announced the United States unilateral abro- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:58 Mar 17, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S434.IS S434 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 4 •S 434 IS gation of the JCPOA, and announced that the 1 United States would re-impose all of its sanctions 2 that it had lifted after Iran verifiably met its nu- 3 clear-related commitments under the agreement on 4 its implementation day of January 16, 2016. 5 (8) The United States abrogation of the 6 JCPOA is a violation of its commitments under the 7 agreement and threatened United States relations 8 with European allies, whose cooperation is necessary 9 to counter Iran’s malign influence in the Middle 10 East. 11 (9) Prior to Iran’s first breach of the JCPOA 12 on May 8, 2019, quarterly reports from the IAEA 13 Board of Governors Reports found that since ‘‘im- 14 plementation day,’’ on January 16, 2016, Iran’s nu- 15 clear program was consistent with the JCPOA’s re- 16 strictions. 17 (10) Following the removal of nearly all re- 18 maining waivers to United States nuclear-related 19 sanctions on May 2, 2019, the Government of Iran 20 committed a series of concerning, but reversible, 21 breaches of its commitments under the JCPOA, in- 22 cluding by— 23 (A) exceeding the allowable stock of low- 24 enriched uranium and heavy water; 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:58 Mar 17, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S434.IS S434 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 5 •S 434 IS (B) exceeding the allowable number of in- 1 stalled centrifuges at its Pilot Fuel Enrichment 2 Plant; 3 (C) enriching uranium at the Fordow Fuel 4 Enrichment Plant; 5 (D) exceeding the permitted Low Enriched 6 Uranium (LEU) enrichment level of 3.67 per- 7 cent of the Uranium U–235 isotope and by en- 8 riching up to 20 percent; and 9 (E) beginning production of uranium 10 metal; 11 (11) Since the full re-imposition of United 12 States nuclear-related sanctions in 2019, the Gov- 13 ernment of Iran has also engaged in a series of 14 escalatory actions outside its nuclear program that 15 have put the United States Armed Forces, dip- 16 lomats, and strategic partners at risk and have 17 heightened the threat of an armed conflict with Iran. 18 (12) Tensions with Iran reached a high-point 19 following the unauthorized United States strike 20 against Iranian General Qassem Soleimani on Janu- 21 ary 3, 2020, and an Iranian ballistic missile strike 22 on January 7, 2020, on two United States bases in 23 Iraq, which left 110 United States service members 24 with traumatic brain injuries. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:58 Mar 17, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S434.IS S434 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 6 •S 434 IS (13) On January 5, 2020, Iran announced that 1 it would no longer comply with the limits of the 2 JCPOA, while also noting that it would not take the 3 escalatory step of withdrawing from the Treaty on 4 the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at 5 Washington, London, and Moscow, July 1, 1968 6 (NPT), which commits Iran to IAEA safeguards and 7 obligates it to not obtain a nuclear weapon. 8 (14) On December 21, 2020, the foreign min- 9 isters of each of the remaining parties to the 10 JCPOA affirmed their continued ‘‘commitment to 11 preserve the agreement,’’ and called for the ‘‘full 12 and effective implementation of the JCPOA’’ by all 13 parties, heralding it as ‘‘significant achievement of 14 multilateral diplomacy that contributes to regional 15 and international security’’. 16 (15) Congressional review of the JCPOA under 17 the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 18 (Public Law 114–17; 129 Stat. 201) is already com- 19 plete, and that Act still provides a meaningful role 20 for congressional oversight of the JCPOA through 21 its reporting requirements that assess Iran’s ongoing 22 compliance with the agreement. 23 (16) During Secretary of State Antony 24 Blinken’s January 19, 2021, nomination hearing be- 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:58 Mar 17, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S434.IS S434 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 7 •S 434 IS fore the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen- 1 ate, he testified that President Joseph R. Biden’s 2 position is that ‘‘if Iran returns to compliance with 3 the JCPOA, we would do the same thing and then 4 use that as a platform, working with our allies and 5 partners to build a longer and stronger agreement to 6 also capture some of the other issues that need to 7 be dealt with regard to missiles, with regard to 8 Iran’s activities and destabilizing activities in the re- 9 gion’’. 10 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 11 It is the policy of the United States as follows: 12 (1) Full implementation of the Joint Com- 13 prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) would represent 14 a meaningful step to both preventing an Iranian nu- 15 clear weapon and a costly future armed conflict. 16 (2) The United States and Iran should prompt- 17 ly return to full compliance with all of their commit- 18 ments under the JCPOA. 19 (3) After such time that all sides return to their 20 commitments under the JCPOA, the United States 21 should lead international efforts to— 22 (A) strengthen the restrictions Iran’s on 23 ballistic missile program and counter the pro- 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:58 Mar 17, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S434.IS S434 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS 8 •S 434 IS liferation of such technology to other countries 1 and actors; 2 (B) address the sunset of select provisions 3 of the JCPOA and other elements of the agree- 4 ment that merit strengthening; and 5 (C) advance any other diplomatic measures 6 that promote United States, regional, and inter- 7 national security. 8 (4) The United States should reaffirm its com- 9 mitment to United Nations Security Resolution 10 2231 (2015). 11 (5) Through implementation of the President’s 12 January 21, 2021, National Security Memorandum 13 -1, and other steps, the United States will better fos- 14 ter an environment in which financial institutions 15 and entities can make practical use of existing ex- 16 emptions and mechanisms ‘‘allowing for the sale of 17 agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and med- 18 ical devices to Iran,’’ and help Iran battle the 19 COVID–19 pandemic. 20 Æ VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:58 Mar 17, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6301 E:\BILLS\S434.IS S434 kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS